"The Policy Revelance of the EU State Aid Rules"

This paper argues that Commission State aid policy is characterised by a formalism which may be underlining its policy relevance. The definition of a State aid, to the extent that one exists, renders seemingly innocuous policy statements unlawful whilst failing to catch measures that are purposely designed to distort competition. The issuing of numerous aid guidelines acts as a straightjacket on aid instruments across a range of policy areas. These often constrain minute policy details, but none set limits on the overall level of spend. Last, the benefits in terms of transparency which could flow from the existence of these aid guidelines has not been exploited -- the vast majority of Commission decisions are positive and concern aid schemes which it has 'de facto' approved to the extent that they conform with a published framework

The impact of European Cohesion Policy in different contexts

The impact of European Cohesion Policy in different contexts. Regional Studies. Cohesion Policy, an important pillar of the European Union, has always been closely scrutinized and subject to debate because of the size of the budget and supranational role of the European Commission. Recent research has acknowledged that the impact of Cohesion Policy is far from uniform; academic interest has shifted away from attempts to assess its â\u80\u98total impactâ\u80\u99 towards an emphasis on the â\u80\u98conditioning factorsâ\u80\u99 that explain where, when and how policy is effective. This provides insights that can contribute to policy design. The five papers in this thematic issue contribute to this research agenda by showing in what contexts and under what conditions Cohesion Policy can be more effective

From Negative to Positive Integration. European State Aid Control through Soft and Hard Law

European state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of negative integration. It constrains the potential for Member States to distort competition by reducing their ability to subsidize industry. In addition, this paper argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member States' preferences have enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of “good” state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid which it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created positive integration “from above” and increasingly influences the objectives of national state aid policies