What Is Time?

In this paper, I answer the question of what time is. First, however, I consider why one might ask this question and what exactly it is asking. The latter consideration reveals that in order to answer the question, one must first engage in a more basic investigation of what a thing, anything at all, is. Such radical investigation requires a special methodology. After briefly characterizing this methodology, I show how it can be employed to answer the titular question. This answer is significant not merely because it illuminates something of perennial interest, but because it is essential to a comprehensive and fully satisfactory metaphysics of time and, hence, to a view of the full structure in reality

Knowing Things in Themselves

A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological framework in which it takes place. Doing so is instrumental to illuminating acquaintance, the state that enables the direct engagement of a mind and some other thing. The author discusses this state and shows how it has the epistemic heft, with a Brentanian account of judgment, to provide the foundations of one’s knowledge of the world. A naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge is open to a compelling objection; the author presents this objection with the means of undermining it. In conclusion, the author recurs to the opening theme of the primacy of ontology and suggests that familiar misgivings about knowing things in themselves are all based on questionable—and ultimately untenable—ontological presuppositions

Structure, Intentionality and the Given

The given is the state of a mind in its primary engagement with the world. A satisfactory epistemology—one, it turns out, that is foundationalist and includes a naïve realist view of perception—requires a certain account of the given. Moreover, knowledge based on the given requires both a particular view of the world itself and a heterodox account of judgment. These admittedly controversial claims are supported by basic ontological considerations. I begin, then, with two contradictory views of the world per se and the structure one experiences. I draw out the consequences of these two views for what intentionality is. The two views yield incompatible accounts of the given. The definitive spontaneity of the one account, and passivity of the other, can be understood in terms of the structure (or lack thereof) in the given. In defense of the claim that a structured given is not an apt epistemic basis, I examine an attempt to found an epistemology on such an account in light of the so-called myth of the given. I maintain that the given, if it is to provide some justification for taking the world to be a particular way, must be unstructured. To support this, I first discuss a significant problem with traditional foundationalism. I then argue that a satisfactory (foundationalist) epistemology requires the rejection of the orthodox propositional view of judgment in favor of a non-propositional, reistic view

A Quandary of Wokeness

Being woke, that is, being aware of the appalling injustices borne by many in American society because of certain identities or features and wanting to act to redress these injustices, seems to put one in a quandary: either one can accept a role in the struggle against injustice that seems obviously inefficacious or, if one insists on doing more, one must, it seems, engage in epistemic imperialism, thereby wronging some of those one is endeavoring to help

Decaying correlations for the supercritical contact process conditioned on survival

Analysis and Stochastic

Detection of a slow-flow component in contrast-enhanced ultrasound of the synovia for the differential diagnosis of arthritis

Contrast Enhanced Ultrasound (CEUS) is a sensitive imaging technique to assess tissue vascularity, that can be useful in the quantification of different perfusion patterns. This can particularly important in the early detection and differentiation of different types of arthritis. A Gamma-variate can accurately quantify synovial perfusion and it is flexible enough to describe many heterogeneous patterns. However, in some cases the heterogeneity of the kinetics can be such that even the Gamma model does not properly describe the curve, especially in presence of recirculation or of an additional slowflow component. In this work we apply to CEUS data both the Gamma-variate and the single compartment recirculation model (SCR) which takes explicitly into account an additional component of slow flow. The models are solved within a Bayesian framework. We also employed the perfusion estimates obtained with SCR to train a support vector machine classifier to distinguish different types of arthritis. When dividing the patients into two groups (rheumatoid arthritis and polyarticular RA-like psoriatic arthritis vs. other arthritis types), the slow component amplitude was significantly different across groups: mean values of a1 and its variability were statistically higher in RA and RA-like patients (131% increase in mean, p = 0.035 and 73% increase in standard deviation, p = 0.049 respectively). The SVM classifier achieved a balanced accuracy of 89%, with a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 78%. © 2017 SPIE