64 research outputs found
Quâest-ce quâune lutte pour la reconnaissance ? RĂ©flexions sur lâantagonisme dans les thĂ©ories contemporaines de la reconnaissance
Cet article tente de rassembler quelques Ă©lĂ©ments de rĂ©ponse Ă une question Ă laquelle les thĂ©ories contemporaines de la reconnaissance nâont jamais vĂ©ritablement rĂ©pondu : quâest-ce quâune lutte pour la reconnaissance ? Nous cherchons dâabord Ă dĂ©gager les propriĂ©tĂ©s prĂȘtĂ©es Ă la lutte qui pourraient expliquer la place centrale quâelles lui confĂšrent. Nous procĂ©dons ensuite par comparaison, afin de mettre en Ă©vidence certaines caractĂ©ristiques qui la distinguent dâautres types de conflits, sur le thĂšme de lâEnnemi et de son mode de dĂ©signation. Nous considĂ©rons enfin lâaboutissement qui est attendu de la lutte. Nous dĂ©gageons ainsi trois propriĂ©tĂ©s prĂȘtĂ©es Ă la lutte pour la reconnaissance : elle porte un mouvement dâautoassertion du sujet qui suppose une rĂ©sistance ; cette rĂ©sistance est celle dâun Ennemi dotĂ© de capacitĂ©s Ă©thiques ; et cela de maniĂšre Ă ce que celui qui dĂ©clenche la lutte puisse avĂ©rer en lâarrachant son statut de changeur de monde.This paper aims at squarely addressing the question : what is a struggle for recognition ? We first identify the properties attributed to struggle that could explain its central place in current theories. We then raise the question of the enemy by comparing the struggle for recognition to other types of conflicts. We finally consider the limits of struggle, in terms of the expected outcome. It allows to identify three major features of the struggle for recognition, such as it is thought in contemporary Hegelian theories : it enables the subjectâs self-assertion, which implies a certain resistance ; the one who resists is an enemy with ethical capacities ; what is at stake in a struggle against a resisting enemy is the status of world-changer
Quâest-ce quâune lutte pour la reconnaissance ? RĂ©flexions sur lâantagonisme dans les thĂ©ories contemporaines de la reconnaissance
Cet article tente de rassembler quelques Ă©lĂ©ments de rĂ©ponse Ă une question Ă laquelle les thĂ©ories contemporaines de la reconnaissance nâont jamais vĂ©ritablement rĂ©pondu : quâest-ce quâune lutte pour la reconnaissance ? Nous cherchons dâabord Ă dĂ©gager les propriĂ©tĂ©s prĂȘtĂ©es Ă la lutte qui pourraient expliquer la place centrale quâelles lui confĂšrent. Nous procĂ©dons ensuite par comparaison, afin de mettre en Ă©vidence certaines caractĂ©ristiques qui la distinguent dâautres types de conflits, sur le thĂšme de lâEnnemi et de son mode de dĂ©signation. Nous considĂ©rons enfin lâaboutissement qui est attendu de la lutte. Nous dĂ©gageons ainsi trois propriĂ©tĂ©s prĂȘtĂ©es Ă la lutte pour la reconnaissance : elle porte un mouvement dâautoassertion du sujet qui suppose une rĂ©sistance ; cette rĂ©sistance est celle dâun Ennemi dotĂ© de capacitĂ©s Ă©thiques ; et cela de maniĂšre Ă ce que celui qui dĂ©clenche la lutte puisse avĂ©rer en lâarrachant son statut de changeur de monde.This paper aims at squarely addressing the question : what is a struggle for recognition ? We first identify the properties attributed to struggle that could explain its central place in current theories. We then raise the question of the enemy by comparing the struggle for recognition to other types of conflicts. We finally consider the limits of struggle, in terms of the expected outcome. It allows to identify three major features of the struggle for recognition, such as it is thought in contemporary Hegelian theories : it enables the subjectâs self-assertion, which implies a certain resistance ; the one who resists is an enemy with ethical capacities ; what is at stake in a struggle against a resisting enemy is the status of world-changer
The Ethics and Politics of Care in Times of Crises
This essay is based on The Global Ethics of Care round-table discussion which was organized by the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade in June 2021. The idea for organizing a discussion on this topic emerged as all societies were, and still are, facing a myriad of pressing moral and political issues that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 triggered or, perhaps more precisely, intensified in a dramatic and abrupt way. If it had not been obvious before, indeed, the (ongoing) COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the fact that human beings are needy and vulnerable creatures who depend on one another for physical and emotional care; speaking quite generally, moreover, it deepened various pre-existing inequalities both within and between sovereign states. What are the implications of recognizing human neediness, vulnerability, dependence and interdependence for the ways in which individuals act, the manner in which many societies are currently organized as well as existing domestic and international political practice? What do the values of freedom, equality and care require in times of crises on both the individual and the collective level? Can the ethics of care revitalize our moral commitment to equal human worth as well as to a decent life for all? In this essay, we explore and attempt to provide answers to these and other pertinent questions from the standpoint of the ethics and politics of care
Anderson's ethical vulnerability: animating feminist responses to sexual violence
Pamela Sue Anderson argues for an ethical vulnerability which âactivates an openness to becoming changedâ that âcan make possible a relational accountability to one another on ethical mattersâ. In this essay I pursue Andersonâs solicitation that there is a positive politics to be developed from acknowledging and affirming vulnerability. I propose that this politics is one which has a specific relevance for animating the terms of feminist responses to sexual violence, something which has proved difficult for feminist theorists and activists alike. I will demonstrate the contribution of Andersonâs work to such questions by examining the way in which âethical vulnerabilityâ as a framework can illuminate the intersectional feminist character of Tarana Burkeâs grassroots Me Too movement when compared with the mainstream, viral version of the movement. I conclude by arguing that Andersonâs âethical vulnerabilityâ contains ontological insights which can allay both activist and academic concerns regarding how to respond to sexual violence
Le Noir et le Cyborg. Remarques sur le dispositif racial
Il ne suffit pas de rĂ©pĂ©ter que la notion de race ne renvoie Ă aucune rĂ©alitĂ© biologique pour justifier le fait de placer la notion hors champ d'investigation. Cet article propose de rĂ©flĂ©chir sur les apories de l'interdit qui frappe le nom «race» . Il mobilise notamment la notion de dispositif, au sens de Foucault. Il propose un Ă©clairage sur les binĂŽmes hiĂ©rarchiques, et les Ă©quivalences qui structurent la question de la «race». Il appelle les sciences sociales Ă enquĂȘter sur la maniĂšre dont perdure, dans le dispositif racial, la mĂ©taphysique de la substance, et la maniĂšre dont elles y participent Ă la fois en produisant un certain savoir, et en s'abstenant d'en produire d'autres.Ferrarese Estelle. Le Noir et le Cyborg. Remarques sur le dispositif racial. In: Raison prĂ©sente, n°174, 2e trimestre 2010. Racisme, race et sciences sociales. pp. 67-76
Se soucier des autres dans un monde faux
En dĂ©pit de sa cĂ©lĂšbre assertion selon laquelle « il nây a pas de vie juste dans un monde faux », Adorno semble admettre que si personne dans notre monde administrĂ© ne mĂšne une existence moralement acceptable, il y a des gestes â fugaces et minuscules face Ă la totalitĂ© sociale â justes au sens dâajustĂ©s, Ă©liminant la souffrance, visant Ă mettre fin Ă lâintolĂ©rable, rĂ©sultant dâune confrontation avec et dâune acceptation de la polymorphie dâautrui, dâune levĂ©e des yeux vers celle-ci. Il menti..
« âGabba-Gabba we accept you, one of us.â Vulnerability and Power in the Relationship of Recognition »
International audienceCurrent Hegelian theories of recognition assume a concept of the subject as always being available for harming. This emphasis placed on vulnerability, whose validity is not being called into question as such here, leave a certain number of elements on the nature of the harm threatening the person expecting recognition unclarified, especially the fact that it cannot be perpetrated without the victim being aware. At the same time, it fails to address the nature of the relationship of recognition, omitting from consideration the exercise of power and the mechanisms inherent to this relationship. These omissions, as I show, cause a particular dimension of recognition-driven struggles to be neglected, a dimension which I will refer to as the politics of exit
- âŠ