Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare eect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary eect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the rms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent effciency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large effciency gains are realized, an ineffcient public rm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare

Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of raising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership not only on the objective function of the firms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes.

On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firm's objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.Mixed oligopoly; Nash equilibria; Endogenous Timing; Distortionary taxes

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of public funds

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm complete in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector : a possible cost inefficiency and an allocative inefficiency due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenezing the determiantion of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred.mixed oligopoly, privatization, endogenous timing, distortionary taxes

Vascular injury during laparoscopic cholecystectomy: An often-overlooked complication

: Laparoscopic cholecystectomy is one of the most frequently performed procedures in gastrointestinal surgery worldwide. Bleeding complications due to vascular injuries represent an important cause of morbidity and mortality, especially when facing major bleeding during laparoscopy, where bleeding control can be technically challenging in inexperienced hands. Interestingly, the reported incidence rate of conversion to open surgery due to vascular lesions is approximately 0%-1.9%, with a mortality rate of approximately 0.02%. The primary aim of this article was to perform an up-to-date overview regarding the incidence and surgical management of vascular injuries during laparoscopic cholecystectomy according to the available scientific evidence

Deciduoid mesothelioma of the thorax: A comprehensive review of the scientific literature.

AbstractObjectiveDeciduoid mesothelioma is a rare variant of malignant epithelioid mesothelioma. It often involves the peritoneum, but also thoracic cases have been reported. The aim of the present review is to describe the demographic, clinical, radiological, and pathological features of such a rare variant of thoracic mesothelioma, and the state of the art regarding the therapeutic approaches currently available.Data sourceEnglish‐language articles published from 1985 to June 2016, and related to thoracic deciduoid mesothelioma cases were retrieved using the Pubmed database.Study selectionThe search terms were "mesothelioma," "thoracic mesothelioma," "epithelial mesothelioma," "pleural mesothelioma," and "deciduoid mesothelioma."ResultsForty‐four cases included in 16 articles, published in the period under investigation, were analyzed in detail.ConclusionsThe mean age of the patients was 63 years, and the male to female ratio 1.7:1. Approximately 58% had exposure to asbestos, and 73% had a smoking history; familiarity was rarely reported. The most common anatomical site of origin was the right pleura, and the most frequent clinical manifestations were chest pain, dyspnea, cough, and weight loss. Thoracic X‐ray and computed tomography were the imaging techniques most employed for diagnosis and surgical planning. The pathological diagnosis was obtained by examination of surgical or biopsy specimens in most cases. The best treatment strategy of deciduoid mesothelioma is a matter of debate; nevertheless a multidisciplinary approach is currently the best option for the choice of the adequate therapeutic scheme

Acute Esophageal Necrosis as a Rare Complication of Metabolic Acidosis in a Diabetic Patient: A Case Report

Objective: Challenging differential diagnosisBackground: Acute esophageal necrosis, or Gurvits syndrome, is a rare clinical process often secondary to a systemic low -flow state. It can be caused by several medical conditions, and it is thought to arise from a combination of impaired mucosal barrier and chemical and ischemic insults to the esophagus. Acute esophageal necrosis usually presents with severe complications due to delayed diagnosis and only rarely has surgical indications. We present a case of Gurvits syndrome, presumably triggered by metabolic acidosis in a diabetic patient.Case Report: A 61-year-old man with history of hypertension and type 2 diabetes mellitus treated with metformin, canagliflozin, glimepiride, and pioglitazone came to our attention with persistent vomiting, odynophagia, chest pain after each meal, and progressive weight loss. Arterial blood analysis showed mild metabolic acidosis, while the first esophagogastroduodenoscopy performed revealed a circumferential black appearance of the esophageal mucosa, as in concentric necrosis of the distal esophagus with possible fungal superinfection. Brushing cytology confirmed the infection by Candida spp. and the patient was treated with intravenous fluconazole. The second esophagogastroduodenoscopy, performed after 2 weeks, showed almost complete healing of the esophageal mucosa; in this case, biopsy confirmed mucosal ischemia and necrosis, without showing deep impairment of the mucosa by fungal agents.Conclusions: Due to its high lethality, often caused by the underlying medical diseases, acute esophageal disease should be considered in the differential diagnosis of digestive symptoms, even without upper gastrointestinal bleeding. Prompt diagnosis and treatment of contextual collateral conditions can help clinicians to avoid the worst out-comes of the disease. Among the causative factors of metabolic acidosis leading to esophageal necrosis we recognized metformin and dapagliflozin