Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange

Under what conditions do social preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: Each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the players’ preferences for the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto efficient. The results have implications for interpreting the rotten kid theorem, gift exchange in the laboratory, and gift exchange in the field

Neural signatures of strategic types in a two-person bargaining game

The management and manipulation of our own social image in the minds of others requires difficult and poorly understood computations. One computation useful in social image management is strategic deception: our ability and willingness to manipulate other people's beliefs about ourselves for gain. We used an interpersonal bargaining game to probe the capacity of players to manage their partner's beliefs about them. This probe parsed the group of subjects into three behavioral types according to their revealed level of strategic deception; these types were also distinguished by neural data measured during the game. The most deceptive subjects emitted behavioral signals that mimicked a more benign behavioral type, and their brains showed differential activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left Brodmann area 10 at the time of this deception. In addition, strategic types showed a significant correlation between activation in the right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups. The neurobehavioral types identified by the game raise the possibility of identifying quantitative biomarkers for the capacity to manipulate and maintain a social image in another person's mind

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees

Graft remodeling during growth following anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction in skeletally immature sheep

INTRODUCTION: Ruptures of the anterior cruciate ligament are being diagnosed with increasing frequency in skeletally immature individuals. It was our aim to investigate the graft remodelling process following an autologous, transphyseal reconstruction of the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) in skeletally immature sheep. We hypothesized that the ligamentisation process in immature sheep is quicker and more complete when compared to adult sheep. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Skeletally immature sheep with an age of 4 months underwent a fully transphyseal ACL reconstruction using an autologous tendon. The animals were subsequently sacrificed at 3, 6, 12 and 24 weeks following surgery. Each group was characterised histomorphometrically, by immunostaining (VEGF, SMA), by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) and biomechanically (UFS Roboter). RESULTS: The histomorphometric analysis and presence of VEGF and SMA positive cells demonstrated a rapid return to a ligament like structure. The biomechanical analysis revealed an anteroposterior translation that was still increased even 6 months following surgery. CONCLUSION: As in adult sheep models, the remodeling of a soft tissue graft used for ACL reconstruction results in a biomechanically inferior substitute. However, the immature tissue seems to remodel faster and more complete when compared to adults

Evolutionary Roots of Property Rights; The Natural and Cultural Nature of Human Cooperation

Debates about the role of natural and cultural selection in the development of prosocial, antisocial and socially neutral mechanisms and behavior raise questions that touch property rights, cooperation, and conflict. For example, some researchers suggest that cooperation and prosociality evolved by natural selection (Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, De Waal 2013, 2014), while others claim that natural selection is insufficient for the evolution of cooperation, which required in addition cultural selection (Sterelny 2013, Bowles and Gintis 2003, Seabright 2013, Norenzayan 2013). Some scholars focus on the complexity and hierarchical nature of the evolution of cooperation as involving different tools associated with lower and the higher levels of competition (Nowak 2006, Okasha 2006); others suggest that humans genetically inherited heuristics that favor prosocial behavior such as generosity, forgiveness or altruistic punishment (Ridley 1996, Bowles and Gintis 2004, Rolls 2005). We argue these mechanisms are not genetically inherited; rather, they are features inherited through cultural selection. To support this view we invoke inclusive fitness theory, which states that individuals tend to maximize their inclusive fitness, rather than maximizing group fitness. We further reject the older notion of natural group selection - as well as more recent versions (West, Mouden, Gardner 2011) – which hold that natural selection favors cooperators within a group (Wynne-Edwards 1962). For Wynne-Edwards, group selection leads to group adaptations; the survival of individuals therefore depends on the survival of the group and a sharing of resources. Individuals who do not cooperate, who are selfish, face extinction due to rapid and over-exploitation of resources

Secretion dynamics of soyasaponins in soybean roots and effects to modify the bacterial composition

Soyasaponins are triterpenoid saponins widely found in legume plants. These compounds have drawn considerable attention because they have various activities beneficial for human health, and their biosynthesis has been actively studied. In our previous study, we found that legume plants including soybean secrete soyasaponins from the roots in hydroponic culture throughout the growth period, but the physiological roles of soyasaponins in the rhizosphere and their fate in soil after exudation have remained unknown. This study demonstrates that soyasaponins are secreted from the roots of field-grown soybean, and soyasaponin Bb is the major soyasaponin detected in the rhizosphere. In vitro analysis of the distribution coefficient suggested that soyasaponin Bb can diffuse over longer distances in the soil in comparison with daidzein, which is a typical isoflavone secreted from soybean roots. The degradation rate of soyasaponin Bb in soil was slightly faster than that of daidzein, whereas no soyasaponin Bb degradation was observed in autoclaved soil, suggesting that microbes utilize soyasaponins in the rhizosphere. Bacterial community composition was clearly influenced by soyasaponin Bb, and potential plant growth-promoting rhizobacteria such as Novosphingobium were significantly enriched in both soyasaponin Bb-treated soil and the soybean rhizosphere. These results strongly suggest that soyasaponin Bb plays an important role in the enrichment of certain microbes in the soybean rhizosphere

Secure certification of mixed quantum states with application to two-party randomness generation

We investigate sampling procedures that certify that an arbitrary quantum state on $n$ subsystems is close to an ideal mixed state $\varphi^{\otimes n}$ for a given reference state $\varphi$, up to errors on a few positions. This task makes no sense classically: it would correspond to certifying that a given bitstring was generated according to some desired probability distribution. However, in the quantum case, this is possible if one has access to a prover who can supply a purification of the mixed state. In this work, we introduce the concept of mixed-state certification, and we show that a natural sampling protocol offers secure certification in the presence of a possibly dishonest prover: if the verifier accepts then he can be almost certain that the state in question has been correctly prepared, up to a small number of errors. We then apply this result to two-party quantum coin-tossing. Given that strong coin tossing is impossible, it is natural to ask "how close can we get". This question has been well studied and is nowadays well understood from the perspective of the bias of individual coin tosses. We approach and answer this question from a different---and somewhat orthogonal---perspective, where we do not look at individual coin tosses but at the global entropy instead. We show how two distrusting parties can produce a common high-entropy source, where the entropy is an arbitrarily small fraction below the maximum (except with negligible probability)