A pH Dependant Switch in DHP Oxidation Mechanism

Dehaloperoxidase (DHP) is a multifunctional enzyme found in Amphitrite ornata, a sediment-dwelling marine worm. This enzyme possess the structure of a traditional hemoglobin enzyme and serves as the primary oxygen carrier in A. ornata; however, it also possesses peroxidase and peroxygenase capabilities. These secondary oxidative functions provide a remarkable ability for A. ornata to resist the effects of toxic metabolites secreted by other organisms that cohabit its benthic ecosystem. This study will analyze the novel catalytic switching between peroxygenase and peroxidase oxidation mechanisms employed by DHP in response to pH changes

On the Economics and Biology of Trust

In recent years, many social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in economic and social transactions. Despite its proposed importance, the measurement and the definition of trust seem to be not fully settled, and the identification of the exact role of trust in economic interactions has proven to be elusive. It is still not clear whether trust is just an epiphenomenon of good institutions or whether it plays an independent causal role capable of shaping important aggregate economic outcomes. In this paper, I rely on a behavioral definition of trust that enables us to relate it to economic primitives such as preferences and beliefs. I review strong biological and behavioral evidence indicating that trusting is not just a special case of risk-taking, but based on important forms of social preferences such as betrayal aversion. Behaviorally defined trust also opens the door for understanding national and ethnic trust differences in terms of differences in preferences and beliefs, and it suggests ways to examine and interpret a causal role of trust.trust, preferences, beliefs, biological basis

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Psychological Foundations, Incentives

The Persistence of "Bad" Precedents and the Need for Communication: A Coordination Experiment

Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how such coordination failure can be mitigated and whether subjects are aware of it. In an initial phase, groups were able to establish a precedent in a repeated weakest-link game, and in a second phase two groups with dierent precedents are merged into a larger group. As expected, this leads to coordination failures. Unlike most of the previous literature, subjects could endogenously choose to communicate in the merged group for a small fee. The results suggest that communication can mitigate the coordination failure in the merged group and, in most cases, leads to efficient coordination. However, subjects in particular from groups with an efficient precedent in the initial phase are inattentive to the potential coordination failure and choose not to communicate. This can have profound consequences since groups who fail to implement communication are unable to achieve efficient coordination in the second phase. The results may be useful for the understanding of how groups learn to solve coordination problems from past coordination success or failure.coordination, precedent, costly communication, cheap talk

On the Economics and Biology of Trust

In recent years, many social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in economic and social transactions. Despite its proposed importance, the measurement and the definition of trust seem to be not fully settled, and the identification of the exact role of trust in economic interactions has proven to be elusive. It is still not clear whether trust is just an epiphenomenon of good institutions or whether it plays an independent causal role capable of shaping important aggregate economic outcomes. In this paper, I rely on a behavioral definition of trust that enables us to relate it to economic primitives such as preferences and beliefs. I review strong biological and behavioral evidence indicating that trusting is not just a special case of risk-taking, but based on important forms of social preferences such as betrayal aversion. Behaviorally defined trust also opens the door for understanding national and ethnic trust differences in terms of differences in preferences and beliefs, and it suggests ways to examine and interpret a causal role of trust.trust, preferences, beliefs, biological basis

The economics of impatience

In experiments, animals often prefer smaller, immediate rewards over larger rewards that are deferred — thus failing to maximize their total gain. Many people exhibit similar behaviour.economics, impatience

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research

On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences

Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour— unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self- interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters—in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.Detrimental effects, sanctions, human altruism