Phenomena and Objects of Research in the Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences

It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory research

Why Replication is Overrated

Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and material questions in research, and I argue that replication is not as central to psychological research as it is sometimes taken to be

Data quality, experimental artifacts, and the reactivity of the psychological subject matter

While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts. But what are experimental artifacts and what is the most productive way of dealing with them? In this paper, I approach these questions by exploring the ways in which experimenters in psychology simultaneously exploit and suppress the reactivity of their subject matter in order to produce experimental data that speak to the question or subject matter at hand. Highlighting the artificiality of experimental data, I raise (and answer) the question of what distinguishes a genuine experimental result from an experimental artifact. My analysis construes experimental results as the outcomes of inferences from the data that take material background assumptions as auxiliary premises. Artifacts occur when one or more of these background assumptions are false, such that the data do not reliably serve the purposes they were generated for. I conclude by laying out the ways in which my analysis of data quality is relevant to, and informed by, recent debates about the replicability of experimental results. © 2022, The Author(s)

What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis Of?

In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the contextsensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts. Powere

Data quality, experimental artifacts, and the reactivity of the psychological subject matter

While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts. But what are experimental artifacts and what is the most productive way of dealing with them? In this paper, I approach these questions by exploring the ways in which experimenters in psychology simultaneously exploit and suppress the reactivity of their subject matter in order to produce experimental data that speak to the question or subject matter at hand. Highlighting the artificiality of experimental data, I raise (and answer) the question of what distinguishes a genuine experimental result from an experimental artifact. My analysis construes experimental results as the outcomes of inferences from the data that take material background assumptions as auxiliary premises. Artifacts occur when one or more of these background assumptions are false, such that the data do not reliably serve the purposes they were generated for. I conclude by laying out the ways in which my analysis of data quality is relevant to, and informed by, recent debates about the replicability of experimental results

What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis of?

In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts

Progress in Psychology.

This chapter focuses on conceptual (as opposed to theoretical) developments in psychology and inquires into the criteria by which such developments constitute progress. The chapter distinguishes between the issue of (a) what are units of psychological analysis, and (b) what are objects of psychological research, positing that the units of analysis are human (and animal) individuals and that the objects of research are (cognitive, behavioral, and experiential) capacities, which are often individuated by means of folk-psychological terms. While this suggests that conceptual progress occurs when concepts provide improved descriptions of the objects in their extension, the chapter raises some doubts regarding the (seemingly intuitive) notion that are natural and/or ahistorical facts of the matter that settle what psychological concepts “really” refer to. It concludes by arguing that (1) conceptual progress occurs when concepts track their (potentially changing) objects, and (2) such efforts rely on the availability of epistemic resources, which include both propositional and non-propositional knowledge. Regarding this latter point, the chapter articulates a broad conception of progress in psychology as the accumulation of epistemic resources and argues that the history of psychology provides us with a trove of such resources