Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy

This article considers the effect that increased shareholder activism may have on non-shareholder corporate stakeholders such as employees and consumers. One of the most outspoken proponents of increased shareholder power has argued that such increased power could have negative repercussions for other corporate stakeholders because it would force directors to focus on profits without regard to other interests. This article critically examines that argument. The article acknowledges that increased shareholder power may benefit some stakeholders more than others, and may have some negative consequences. However, this article demonstrates that shareholders not only have interests that align with other stakeholders, but also introduces empirical evidence suggesting that shareholders may use their increased power to advance the interests of other stakeholders. Thus, this article debunks the notion that increased shareholder power is necessarily problematic for non-shareholder stakeholders

The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis

The Legal Origins Theory purports to predict how countries respond to economic and social problems. Specifically, the legal origins of the United States should strongly influence the manner it approaches economic problems and its approach should be distinct from the response of civil law countries. If the theory is accurate, America\u27s legal tradition should have a profound impact on its response to the crisis. This Article seeks to test the boundaries of the theory by assessing whether it could have predicted the manner the U.S. responded to the current economic crisis. After analyzing the U.S. response to the crisis, this article reveals that such response runs fundamentally counter to its legal origins. This inconsistency suggests that political, social, and economic forces do more to explain the U.S. response to significant turmoil than its legal origins. It also suggests that the current crisis may have been so severe that it overwhelmed any explanatory or predictive value potentially derived from the legal origins theory

Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation with Board Fiduciary Duties

Corporate governance scandals inevitably raise concerns about the extent to which corporate directors failed in their responsibility to monitor the corporation and its managers, especially in terms of the latter\u27s’ misdeeds. Corporate governance reforms strive to shore up directors\u27 roles by seeking to ensure that boards have sufficient incentives to engage in effective oversight and to hold the boards more accountable. The current financial crisis has ushered in an era of significant government reform of the financial system and involvement in corporate governance matters. Such involvement has increased board of directors\u27 responsibilities but has not reconciled those responsibilities with board functions and fiduciary law, at least in Delaware. The lack of reconciliation not only represents a missed opportunity to reconsider boards\u27 proper role and function within the modern public corporation, but also may undermine the effectiveness of reforms

The Silent Resurrection of Plessy: The Supreme Court’s Acquiescence in the Resegregation of America’s Schools

This article argues that the modern Supreme Court is engaging in Plessy-like reasoning to permit segregation. The article argues that the Supreme Court relies on three rationales, all consistent with Plessy, that have resulted in the erosion of school integration: 1) segregation reflects private preferences, 2) we should defer to local governments, and 3) separate schools can result in equal quality of education for all children. The article provides an overview of the case law demonstrating this pro-Plessy bent of the Court and insists that the Court return to the reasoning of Brown to better ensure high quality education for all children