A Stackelberg Analysis of the Potential for Cooperation in Straddling Stock Fisheries

To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement calls for the establishment of regional fisheries management organizations to manage them. This article studies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when the cooperative coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining singleton countries. Within the Stackelberg fishing game with several interested parties, the result shows that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in the steady-state fish stock, but also in the total rent of the fishery. Further, the outlook for cooperation is better within the Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition acts as a leader, than in the Cournot game. At the stable equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but also the total resource rent, participants’ rent, and non-participants’ rent are higher than those of the Cournot-Nash stable equilibrium. The new-entrant issue is a problem for the conservation of fish stock in the Stackelberg game. Self-financed transfers with commitments of the initial stable coalition will increase the level of cooperation. The theoretical findings are illustrated by a numerical example of how to reach stable full cooperation and used to indicate possible ways forward for the South China Sea fisheries.IUU fishing, non-cooperative game, regional fisheries management organization, straddling stock fisheries, stable coalition, Stackelberg game, South China Sea, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Productivity Analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Q22, Q27, R13, R58,

KINH TẾ HỌC NGHỀ KHAI THÁC VÀ NUÔI TRỒNG THỦY SẢN

The original English version of this book, Fisheries and Aquaculture Economics, can be downloaded for free from https://bookboon.com/en/fisheries-and-aquaculture-economics-ebook. A previous (2011) edition from Munin at https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/2509

The rise and decline of fishing industry support – with a translation from Norwegian of Bjørn S. Brochmann's 1981 article ‘long-term effects of government support to the fisheries’

Input and output measures, including the use of (Pigou) taxes, have been recommended to bridge the gap between average and marginal revenues in fisheries. Several countries have improved management, but few have followed the fiscal recommendations. On the contrary, subsidies that can expand capacity and effort have been and still are used. For decades, international organizations such as the WTO, FAO, and OECD have discussed subsidy issues. In the case of Norway, annual support negotiations between government and industry were institutionalised in 1964. The support increased throughout the 1970s, and at its peak in 1980 support amounted to about 40% of the gross value of all catches. Bjørn S. Brochmann was a chief economist in the Ministry of Fisheries. During a leave of absence in 1979–80 he wrote a report, and in 1981 he published a journal article discussing long-term effects of government support to fisheries. Based on the Gordon-Schaefer model, he demonstrated that revenue-augmenting and cost-reducing support could not solve the poor income problem of fisheries. Rather, subsidies will work in the opposite direction, creating even greater need for future support. His reports, conference talks, and media interviews created havoc in fishing communities and organizations. This paper places Brochmann's work in a national and international context and discusses its influence on Norwegian fisheries policy. A translated version of Brochmann's article (1981) is included in this paper, as a reference guide for subsidy-reliant countries and as a tribute to the history of the political economy of fisheries

HARVEST FUNCTIONS: THE NORWEGIAN BOTTOM TRAWL COD FISHERIES

A detailed and comprehensive set of catch and effort data for the cod fisheries of 18 Norwegian bottom trawlers have been obtained for the period 1971–85, a period with few binding quota restrictions on vessel operations. Harvest functions have been designed and estimated. The independent variables are hours of trawling per vessel day and biomass of the cod stock (3+). Daily biomass estimates have been calculated by polynomial interpolation of the annual estimates of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). By maximizing the log-likelihood function using numerical methods, parameter estimates and performance indicators of the different models were obtained. The best result was obtained for a harvest model allowing for seasonal changes and with an autocorrelated error term. For this model, the stock-output elasticity is estimated at 0.424, the effort-output elasticity at 1.232, and the technological change at about a 2% annual increase in productivity. The seasonal changes in catchability are significant, with the lowest intra-annual catchability being less than 30% of the annual maximum.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Resource rent in aquaculture

Publisher's web site for this book at https://www.fagbokforlaget.no/Contributions-in-natural-resource-economics/I9788245024715.Resource rent in aquaculture (RRA) is any payment to a farm and site owner, on land or sea, in excess of the costs needed to bring that farm into production. For analytic and policy purposes it may be useful to distinguish among different types of RRA. Three types will be discussed: rent associated with the classical economists Ricardo (1821) and Faustmann (1849), as well as oligopoly rent from access regulation (licensing) and hampered output. The latter can arise in the case of downward sloping demand for a particular type of seafood from an aquaculture country. The similarities and differences among these types of rent are discussed and the distinctions between business economics indicators and RRA are clarified. The theory is applied to the case of Atlantic salmon in Norway and white leg shrimp in Vietnam. Based on cost and revenue data for 2016 from 84 firms from the Directorate of Fisheries in Norway; and for 2014 from 318 farms and for 2016 for 120 farms from two surveys in Vietnam, both business economics and RRA indicators are calculated, after revealing the cost structure of the farms. In theory, the RRA rate may be higher or lower than the profit rate, depending on the capital structure and intensity of the firms. The analysis demonstrates very high profit and rent margins in the Norwegian salmon industry, and lower, but positive ones in Vietnam. However, the profit and rent rates are much higher in Vietnam due to the low capital intensity of the shrimp industry

Kjærlighetens følelsesregler : Parforholdets legitimitetsgrunnlag mellom fornuft og følelser

Master's thesis in Sociology and social work (ME522)Parforhold, kjærlighet og skilsmisser, er utgangspunktet for denne oppgaven som stiller spørsmålet om hvordan kjærlighet forstås, og hvilke følelsesregler som gjelder for det moderne parforholdet. Samlivsbrudd er en del av norsk kultur, og noe mange opplever. Samlivsbrudd er også noe som kan vise oppfatninger om hva som tar slutt når kjærligheten tar slutt, og på den måten fortelle noe om hva kjærligheten bør inneholde. Kjærlighet beskrives som en følelse, og ulike teoretiske perspektiver på følelseserfaringer, er utgangspunkt for denne studien. Dette handler om hvordan følelser kan forstås både som en individuell erfaring, og noe som formes av kultur. Begge disse forståelsene får konsekvenser for hvordan følelsen kan studeres, og handler om en fenomenologisk og en hermeneutisk «inngang» tilfølelser. Analysen tar også utgangspunkt i de teoretiske perspektivene i «The Transformation of Intimacy» (Anthony Giddens,1992), og «Why Love Hurts» og «The End Of Love» (Eva Illouz, 2012 og 2019) som er sentrale sosiologiske studier om parforhold i moderne samfunn, men som gir nokså ulike forklaringer og tolkninger av dette

Middlemen: good for resources and fishermen?

Submitted manuscript version. Published version available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X19000196. This paper studies the role of middlemen in open-access fisheries and how the organization of the supply chains affects resource exploitation and the level and distribution of economic rent. Imperfect competition among middlemen can help ensure that fish stocks are not depleted, which is typically the case in open-access fisheries with competitive markets. Middlemen with market power can also induce higher economic rent for the supply chain in total, but these rents mainly benefit the middlemen. The supply chains of inshore anchovy and offshore skipjack tuna fisheries in Vietnam are used as empirical examples. The analysis shows that in the anchovy supply chain, the middlemen have insignificant market power and the stock is being overexploited. In the skipjack tuna supply chain, the middlemen have oligopsony power and the stock is higher than the level that produces maximum sustainable yield

Effects of Temperature and Angular Velocity on Eccentric Force of an Intrinsic Thumb Muscle

Temperature and velocity have significant effects on muscle contractile properties. For example, it is well known that changing angular velocity and altering muscle temperature can change the force-producing capacity of muscle. It is typically understood that with increasing shortening velocity and cooler temperature force decreases. However, the influence of temperature and angular velocity on force during lengthening contractions is less understood.  The purpose of this study was to determine whether temperature and/or velocity has an effect on the eccentric to isometric force ratio of the adductor pollicis muscle in young males. Ten young (~25y) male subjects performed lengthening (0-40°) electrically-evoked contractions of the left adductor pollicis muscles at ~50% of maximum voluntary force at angular velocities ranging from 0-320°/s. This procedure was performed initially at room temperature (21˚C), and then repeated two more times after a 20min bath, first in a cold (15°C) water and then in a warm (43°C) water bath in order to change the muscle temperature. The eccentric to isometric ratio was significantly greater in the cold compared to the normal condition (P<0.05), but was not different from normal for the warm condition (P>0.05). The eccentric to isometric ratio was significantly greater at 80, 160 and 320°/s (P<0.05) than at 20°/s, but was not different at velocities slower than 80°/s (P>0.05).  Instantaneous stiffness was measured 1 s after attaining maximum stretch. There was a significant (~38%) increase in active stiffness in the cold muscle compared to normal. No significant difference (~15%) in stiffness was observed for the warm compared with the normal condition, and no significant difference (~20%) was found between warm and cold muscles. The findings suggest that there is an increased force per cross-bridge as temperature approaches normal physiological temperature, but decreases when temperature deviates from normal

Økosystemforvaltning - Hvorfor økonomisk analyse er viktig

Journal home page at https://www.samfunnsokonomene.no/magasin/.I et økosystem vil noen arter være byttedyr, andre predatorer og mange begge deler, skiftende gjennom sitt livsløp. Så også i de marine økosystem der norske fiskere årlig fisker mellom 2 og 3 millioner tonn, noe som gjør at Norge er blant de 10 største fiskerinasjoner i verden. De fleste fiskebestander av stor kommersiell verdi har en utbredelse som innebærer at årlige totalkvoter fastsettes og fordeles i samråd med relevante parter i Nord-øst Atlanteren. For disse fiskebestandene er det utarbeidet høstingsregler basert på den enkelte fiskebestands biologiske produktivitet. Det tas med andre ord ikke eksplisitt hensyn til hverken kostnader eller priser for fangsten. Det tas heller ikke hensyn til de kostnader en stor predatorbestand kan ha ved at den desimerer en byttedyrbestand og gjennom dette reduserer fangstpotensialet som byttedyret kan ha for fiskerne. Et viktig samfunnsøkonomisk spørsmål er: kan den samlede netto fangstverdien fra, eksempelvis, de norske fiskeriene økes dersom en tar hensyn til inntekter og kostnader, og særlig predatorkostnader ved utarbeidelse og bruk av høstingsregler? Dette diskuteres, uten at målet er å gi et endelig svar. Til det trengs det vesentlig mer arbeid. Formålet med denne artikkelen er å introdusere leseren til bioøkonomisk flerbestands-analyse og modellering, som er viktig for god forvaltning av våre marine økosystem. Jeg skal gjøre dette ved diskusjon av nyere og eldre litteratur, og med eksempler relatert hovedsakelig til Nord-øst Atlanteren. De viktigste resultatene av bioøkonomisk analyse av enkeltbestander er at det optimale nivået av fiskeinnsats (beskatningsgrad) er mindre enn det som ville vært ved fritt fiske, og at det optimale bestandsnivået er høyere enn ved fritt fiske. Disse generelle resultatene for enbestands-modeller er gyldige enten optimum er avledet ved å maksimere årlig økonomisk overskudd, grunnrente, eller nåverdien av grunnrente for mange år. I en rovdyr-bytte-modell kan imidlertid resultatet bli at det er økonomisk gunstig å overbeskatte rovdyret for å utnytte byttedyret bedre