Do Androids Dream? : Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts

This Article proposes a test to be used in answering an important question that has never received detailed jurisprudential analysis: What happens if a human artifact like a large computer system requests that it be treated as a person rather than as property? The Article argues that this entity should be granted a legal right to personhood if it has the following capacities: (1) an ability to interact with its environment and to engage in complex thought and communication; (2) a sense of being a self with a concern for achieving its plan for its life; and (3) the ability to live in a community with other persons based on, at least, mutual self-interest. In order to develop and defend this test of personhood, the Article sketches the nature and basis of the liberal theory of personhood, reviews the reasons to grant or deny autonomy to an entity that passes the test, and discusses, in terms of existing and potential technology, the categories of artifacts that might be granted the legal right of self-ownership under the test. Because of the speculative nature of the Article\u27s topic, it closes with a discussion of the treatment of intelligent artifacts in science fiction

\u3ci\u3ePalazzolo, Lucas\u3c/i\u3e, and \u3ci\u3ePenn Central\u3c/i\u3e: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing

I. Two Perspectives on Opinions: Symbolic and Managerial II. Penn Central and the Ad Hoc Balancing Approach: Pragmatic Triumph of Symbol ... A. Reasons for Approach: Complexity and Lack of Independent Definition of Property ... B. Effects of Approach: Delegation and Uncertainty III. Lucas and the Categorical Total Takings Test: Symbol in the Guise of Managerial Categories ... A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council … B. Vagueness of the Test ... 1. Recognition of Problems in Lucas … 2. Treatment of Problems in Lucas … a. Summary ... b. Preexisting Rights and Limits ... C. Narrowness of the Test .... D. Conclusion: Symbolic Nature of the Test IV. Impact of the Total Takings Test: Managerial Failure as a Result of Uncertainty and Limited Effect ... A. Cases Illustrating Treatment of Issues Raised by Test ... 1. Denominator Problems ... 2. Value of Permitted Uses ... 3. Pre-existing Rights and Limits ... a. Approaches ... b. Discussion ... B. Case Study: South Carolina ... C. Random Selection of Cases Citing Lucas V. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: The Limits of Categorical Tests and Advantages of Ad Hoc Balancing ... A. Facts and Procedural History ... B. Supreme Court Decision ... C. Impact VI. Conclusio

Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damage Awards: Morals Without Technique ?

In a series of cases decided over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has used the Due Process Clause to establish a procedural and substantive framework for awarding punitive damages. Initially, the substantive aspects of this framework were sufficiently clear and flexible that they required little change in the system and probably generated a helpful level of debate and uniformity as to some basic requirements for awards. However, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court adopted an approach characterized by a lack of clarity and consistency, an inadequate basis in theory and policy, and ad hoc decisions. The harmful results of this approach are evident in the Court\u27s recent decision, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, which requires states to instruct juries in terms of a distinction that the four dissenting judges refer to as elusive, unclear, and confusing. Even if one accepts the view that there should be, at some point, substantive due process limits on the amount of punitive damages, decisions like Williams are likely to make the process less fair and reliable. Therefore, the Court should abandon its current approach, which is both unnecessary and likely to do more harm than good, and should, instead, be more deferential to the state courts and legislatures, and be more concerned with developing a coherent framework

Sophisticated Robots : Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation

Our lives are being transformed by large, mobile, sophisticated robots with increasingly higher levels of autonomy, intelligence, and interconnectivity among themselves. For example, driverless automobiles are likely to become commercially available within a decade. Many people who suffer physical injuries from these robots will seek legal redress for their injury, and regulatory schemes are likely to impose requirements on the field to reduce the number and severity of injuries. This Article addresses the issue of whether the current liability and regulatory systems provide a fair, efficient method for balancing the concern for physical safety against the need to incentivize the innovation that is necessary to develop these robots. This Article provides context for analysis by reviewing innovation and robots\u27 increasing size, mobility, autonomy, intelligence, and interconnections in terms of safety—particularly in terms of physical interaction with humans—and by summarizing the current legal framework for addressing personal injuries in terms of doctrine, application, and underlying policies. This Article argues that the legal system\u27s method of addressing physical injury from robotic machines that interact closely with humans provides an appropriate balance of innovation and liability for personal injury. It critiques claims that the system is flawed and needs fundamental change and concludes that the legal system will continue to fairly and efficiently foster the innovation of reasonably safe sophisticated robots

\u3ci\u3ePalazzolo, Lucas\u3c/i\u3e, and \u3ci\u3ePenn Central\u3c/i\u3e: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing

I. Two Perspectives on Opinions: Symbolic and Managerial II. Penn Central and the Ad Hoc Balancing Approach: Pragmatic Triumph of Symbol ... A. Reasons for Approach: Complexity and Lack of Independent Definition of Property ... B. Effects of Approach: Delegation and Uncertainty III. Lucas and the Categorical Total Takings Test: Symbol in the Guise of Managerial Categories ... A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council … B. Vagueness of the Test ... 1. Recognition of Problems in Lucas … 2. Treatment of Problems in Lucas … a. Summary ... b. Preexisting Rights and Limits ... C. Narrowness of the Test .... D. Conclusion: Symbolic Nature of the Test IV. Impact of the Total Takings Test: Managerial Failure as a Result of Uncertainty and Limited Effect ... A. Cases Illustrating Treatment of Issues Raised by Test ... 1. Denominator Problems ... 2. Value of Permitted Uses ... 3. Pre-existing Rights and Limits ... a. Approaches ... b. Discussion ... B. Case Study: South Carolina ... C. Random Selection of Cases Citing Lucas V. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: The Limits of Categorical Tests and Advantages of Ad Hoc Balancing ... A. Facts and Procedural History ... B. Supreme Court Decision ... C. Impact VI. Conclusio

Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing

The constitutional right to compensation for a governmental taking of property is relatively easy to apply in situations involving a straightforward, physical appropriation of land for a public use like a highway. However, difficulties arise when governmental action consists only of rules that limit an owner\u27s use of land. In most situations, these limits are viewed as burdens an individual is properly subject to as a citizen and land owner. From this perspective, the exercise of the police power of the government, which has traditionally been used to prohibit public and private harms, does not usually involve a taking of property, even if the restriction involved results in a substantial loss in the economic value of the land. However, some restriction on land use are unwarranted or too extensive and, therefore, constitute a regulatory taking. Compensation is required in such cases, because the cost should be borne by the public as a whole. The problem is thus one of line-drawing: How does one distinguish mere regulation from a regulatory taking? This Article argues that no bright-line test can be devised for identifying a regulatory taking because (1) the situations involving potential regulatory takings are too diverse; and (2) there is no cultural consensus on the proper way to balance two opposing sets of values, the values furthered by the individual right to use property and the values served by governmental regulation of the property. Because it is not possible to craft a clear definite rule, a value symbolic standard may be the best that can be expected of judges. In such cases, a vague, imprecise rule which provides a structure for addressing specific circumstances in the context of a fair process will be a better way to address a problem than a clear formal substantive rule that does not respect factual distinctions that are important to differing value schemes