Central Banking, Climate Change and Green Finance

Responsibility for financial and macroeconomic stability implicitly or explicitly lies with the central bank, which therefore ought to address climate-related and other environmental risks on a systemic level. Furthermore, central banks, through their regulatory oversight over money, credit, and the financial system, are in a powerful position to support the development of green finance models and enforce an adequate pricing of environmental and carbon risk by financial institutions. The central topic of this paperare the public financial governance policies through which central banks, as well as other relevant financial regulatory agencies, can address environmental risk and promote sustainable finance. The paperfirst discusses the reasons why central banks should be concerned with aligning finance with sustainable development. Second, the paperreviews the tools and instruments that can be utilized by central banks and financial regulatory agencies to address environmental risk and promote green finance and sustainable development. Third, the paperprovides a brief review of green public financial governance initiatives

HEREBY RECOAAMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING

I-wish to express deep appreciation to all of the people nho helped to make this thesis possible. Among those ueserving speciel thanks is George E. Vance, cxerk in the Ixj.inois State Archives, who gave many hours of time to assist in finding needed documents. I want to thank Rohert Pritz, K&theryn Brown, and 4-lfred Kimery for the "books loaned to assist me in my work, I wish also t

The political economy of bank regulation in developing countries: risk and reputation

Why do governments in some developing countries implement international standards, while others do not? Focusing on the politics of bank regulation, this book develops a new framework to explain regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and the periphery of the global financial system. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, it shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Regulatory interdependence is generated by relations between regulators, politicians, and banks within developing countries, and international actors including investors, peer regulators, and international financial institutions. We explain why it is that some configurations of domestic politics and forms of integration into global finance generate convergence with international standards, while other configurations lead to divergence. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory politics in the periphery, and the ways in which peripheral governments and firms manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization