Derecho de la competencia y mercados regionales y locales

Bibliografía: p. 167-168

Productivity and competitiveness: the case of football teams playing in the UEFA Champions League

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the competitive situation of the UEFA Champions League in relation to other entertainment alternatives. As tools of analysis, Malmquist indices for the football teams that have participated in the UEFA Champions League among the years 2003-2011 will be calculated. The Malmquist index measures the change in productivity whereas the efficiency ratios used for the calculation of the former were found by applying a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The relationship between productivity and competitiveness in an economic sector is as follows: an increase in productivity allows the remuneration of the factors to be increased without having to raise the price of the product offered. The UEFA Champions League may see its competitiveness threatened in relation to other entertainment alternatives, because participating teams do not show a clear increase in productivity

Team improvement in the UEFA Champions League: an application of data envelopment analysis

Football teams, when considered as economic organisations, are expected to achieve their objectives without consuming excess resources. Put another way, they must produce their products and services efficiently. In this study, we calculate efficiency on the playing field for teams in the UEFA Champions League between 2003 and 2012. We do this not only with an aim of separating the efficient and inefficient teams, but also to propose a way for inefficient teams to become more efficient. To this end, we use data envelopment analysis to calculate efficiency ratios. From those results, we calculate improvement percentages that we then use as a basis for team management recommendations. We find that no single input is to blame for inefficiency. The general recommendation for inefficient teams is to use fewer attacking plays

On the co-existence of spot and contract markets: an analysis of quality

The possible co-existence of spot and contract market that can emerge in the presence of quality issues with a number of growers and processors in each stage is something that has largely remained an open question in the literature. This paper is an attempt to fill this void. We use a straightforward two-stage Cournot oligopoly model with specific demand and cost functions. In the first stage, processors decide simultaneously whether or not to set an incentive contract. The second stage is the stage in which growers choose their levels of quantity and quality based on the industry structure developed in the first stage. With the help of numerical simulations we conducted the study of the equilibrium structures. Our results suggest that for a wide range of number of participants in both markets, participation in both markets constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the model.Marketing,

Assessment of the efficiency of spanish football teams through profiling

The aim of this paper is to assess the efficiency of Spanish football teams that participated in the Spanish First Division between 2011 and 2016. We started by specifying the production function of football teams using the production process as a basis. Considering all the moves that can be made during a match, ordering them in the logical sequence that usually links them together and considering ball possession and non-possession as different phases lead to disaggregating the match into eight subdivisions whose efficiency is calculated using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) variant known as profiling. The representative input and output variables considered in these eight subdivisions are moves made during the matches. However, the actions football teams perform, irrespective of their type, are not the result of a standardised procedure. This has two consequences on the number of moves in the field of play: firstly, a minimal variation in playing conditions (both the team's and its opponent's) can alter the number; and, secondly, it is very difficult to control and arrive at a figure possibly established in advance. Since these circumstances can be interpreted as data imprecision, one of the stochastic DEA proposals has also been used in this paper as a calculation tool to verify the robustness of the results. The results show the subdivisions in which the use of moves can be improved to increase the number of actions in the next stage. This knowledge could provide guidance for technical personnel for their training sessions

Organisational Design factors and efficiency of Spanisg First Division football teams

The activity carried out by football players during games can be considered as an example of the characteristics of a team as understood by Organizational Economics. In this study, the Spanish First Division football teams were taken as a sample to evaluate the implemented organisational design. Data Envelopment Analysis was used to calculate the efficiency and the variables representing the degree of coordination achieved in the games were determined by factor analysis. It can be concluded that there are efficient Spanish First Division football teams that have implemented organizational designs leading to good team coordination

The yield/quality trade-off and contractual choice

This paper provides an analysis of the choice of governance mechanism in agriculture using an integrated perspective based on agency theory. The main ways of organizing agriculture are compared: spot market and incentive contract. With the analytical development of both models, it is explored that the choice of the optimal mechanism depends on initial conditions such as uncertainty, the risk aversion of the agents or the number of competitors. Moreover, according to the predictions made by the economic literature on agrarian organization, the results support the coexistence of both governance alternatives.Crop Production/Industries,

Quality and governance mode choice: a transaction cost approach to the wine industry

We analyze the relationship between product quality and governance mode choice using the results of a survey of DOC Rioja wineries. Wineries that produce high-quality wines are more likely to vertically integrate than are wineries that produce low-quality wines. Consistent with Transaction Cost Economics, we find evidence that asset specificity and uncertainty are important determinants of vertical integration. Finally, the size of the winery is also an important factor that affects governance mode choice in viticulture.quality, governance mode choice, transaction cost, Industrial Organization,

Double Sided Moral Hazard and Share Contracts in agriculture

This paper develops a double-sided moral hazard model of share contract in agriculture, with imperfect quality measurement by the agent and the principal, who contribute to the final good quality in terms of production effort and marketing effort respectively. Using this model, we analyse the implications of the share contract for quantity and quality, often ignored in previous analysis. With the help of a simulation exercise, we prove that the outcome-conditioned share generally weakens the agent´s incentive to make effort in quality input. This finding could explain the contractual evidence in some differentiated markets such as the wine market, where bottle-price conditioned contracts are rarely used.share-contract, double moral-hazard, quality, Farm Management,

Technical progress and efficiency changes in football teams participating in the UEFA Champions League

This paper commits to calculate and analyze productivity levels and its components for teams that participated in the UEFA Champions League between 2003 and 2012. It will pursue three objectives: 1) evaluate resources usage, 2) analyze the productivity levels of the football teams and the sports results, and 3) see the influence of participation experience in reference to productivity and sports results. Using Malmquist Productivity Index, the results reflect a lack of consistent progression of efficiency, productivity, and technical change. This competition does not reward the efficient usage of resources and there is not a conclusive relationship between permanence in the competition and productivity. Este arti´culo pretende calcular y analizar los niveles de productividad y de sus componentes para los equipos que participaron en la Liga de Campeones de la UEFA entre 2003 y 2012. Se persiguen tres objetivos: 1) evaluar la utilizacio´n de los recursos, 2) analizar los niveles de productividad de los equipos de fu´tbol y los resultados deportivos y 3) ver si la experiencia que da la participacio´n influye en la productividad y los resultados deportivos. Usando el i´ndice de productividad de Malmquist, los resultados reflejan una ausencia de evolucio´n constante para la eficiencia, la productividad y el cambio te´cnico. Esta competicio´n no premia el uso eficiente de los recursos y no hay una relacio´n concluyente entre productividad y permanencia en la competicio´n