Strategic vertical integration without foreclosure

We determine the endogenous degree of vertical integration in a model of successive oligopoly that captures both efficiency gains and strategic effects. We show that vertical merger waves can be expected to stop by themselves before integration is complete. Consequently, vertical foreclosure plays no significant role in this paper that claims for a soft approach of vertical integration by antitrust authorities.merger waves, vertical integration, vertical foreclosure

Vertical integration, technological choice and foreclosure

This article examines why, and how, fiscal decentralization could increase the economic growth rate (the hypothesis is predatory, or "corrupt", govemments). Searching for the optimal level of decentralization, the article first investigates the effects of an horizontal partition of the political power. Two effects will compete : a positive effect due to "proximity" and a negative effect linked to "coordination failures" (for raisons of externalities, small independent régions failed to implement a sufficient level of public spending). Then, the analysis seems to provide a theory of frontiers. But the article also shows that the intervention of a super-center (even corrupted), which centralizes taxes and decentralizes spending, should realize a higher growth rate. In that way, "federalism", which rather is a vertical partition of the political power, is the optimal rule.

Strategic Delays of Delivery, Market Separation and Demand Discrimination

We show that an adequate choice of delays to deliver a durable good allows a monopolist to soften the intra-brand price competition between his two retailers on two different markets, when consumers suffer a switching cost to buy on the market where they are not located. To prevent each retailer from selling on both markets, the upstream producer increases the delay of delivery on the market where the willingness to pay is the lowest. It therefore separates the markets across time, by orientating consumers to the appropriate downstream retailer. Consumers pay their highest valuation, and a price differential higher than the switching cost persists in equilibrium. We discuss the application of our findings to the European car market.durable good, switching cost, discrimination, intrabrand competition, European car market

Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing

International audienceThe authors analyze a model of vertical differentiation in which retailers compete in product lines and may purchase a high quality good from a monopolist. The low quality good is produced by a competitive fringe. Depending on quality and cost differentials, the product lines chosen by retailers in equilibrium are either identical, completely different or partially overlapping. In the absence of upstream market power, the unique equilibrium is for retailers to offer identical product lines. They provide a detailed analysis of the link between upstream market power and product line differentiation.Cet article s'intéresse à la formation des prix et des marges en fonction des gammes de produits offertes par les distributeurs. Les auteurs considèrent un modèle de différenciation verticale avec un bien de qualité haute produit par un fournisseur en monopole et un bien de qualité basse fourni par une frange concurrentielle. Les gammes de produits offertes par les distributeurs sont endogènes. En fonction des structures de coûts et du différentiel de qualité, les gammes de produits choisies par les distributeurs peuvent être identiques, différentes ou partiellement différentes. En l'absence de pouvoir de marché en amont, les gammes offertes sont toujours identiques. Les auteurs fournissent une analyse détaillée du lien entre gammes de produits offertes et pouvoir de marché amont

Diversification and hybridization in firm knowledge bases in nanotechnologies

The paper investigates the linkages between the characteristics of technologies and the structure of a firms' knowledge base. Nanotechnologies have been defined as converging technologies that operate at the nanoscale, and which require integration to fulfill their economic promises. Based on a worldwide database of nanofirms, the paper analyses the degree of convergence and the convergence mechanisms within firms. It argues that the degree of convergence in a firm's nano-knowledge base is relatively independent from the size of the firm's nano-knowledge base. However, while firms with small nano-knowledge bases tend to exploit convergence in each of their patents/publications, firms with large nano-knowledge bases tend to separate their nano-R&D activities in the different established fields and achieve diversity through the juxtaposition of the output of these independent activities For more informations http://www.nanoeconomics.eu/

Equilibrium strategic overbuying

Abstract We consider two firms competing both to sell their output and purchase their input from an upstream firm, to which they offer non-linear contracts. Firms may engage in strategic overbuying, purchasing more of the input when the supplier is capacity constrained than when it is not in order to exclude their competitor from the final market. Warehousing is a special case in which a downstream firm purchases more input than it uses and disposes of the rest. We show that both types of overbuying happen in equilibrium. The welfare analysis leads to ambiguous conclusions

Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée

We analyze the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. Entrants depend on the vertically integrated firms on the intermediate market for the purchasing of good. While the entry threat leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that profits are lower in the punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat facilitates collusion, thus benefiting to incumbents

Strategic delays of delivery, market separation and demand discrimination

We show that an adequate choice of delays to deliver a durable good allows a monopoly to reduce competition between his two retailers on two different markets. Instead of preventing each retailer from selling on both markets, the producer separates the markets by directing the choices of consumers between the retailers. The consumer whose willingness to pay is the lowest obtains the good later than the other, and both pay their highest valuations for the good: the producer perfectly discriminates the demand. The European car market where producers try to restrict competition between retailers is an application of our findings.delivery delays, discrimination, market separation, vertical restraints, European car market