The Costs of Disposal and Recycling. An Application to Italian Municipal Solid Waste Services

The paper investigates the costs of waste disposal and recycling services by using a well-behaved Composite cost function model. Our estimates on a unique sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities highlight that the refuse collection technology exhibits constant returns to scale as well as scope economies between disposal and recycling. As far as the size of the municipality increases, scope economies rise up to 14%, but they are accompanied with overall diseconomies of scale. Our findings suggest that, on the one hand, joint management of disposal and recycling should be encouraged, and, on the other hand, that strategies aimed at increasing the share of waste sent for recycling would not imply a considerable increase in total costs.Solid waste, recycling, cost functions

The Costs of Disposal and Recycling. An Application to Italian Municipal Solid Waste Services

The paper investigates the costs of waste disposal and recycling services by using a well-behaved Composite cost function model. Our estimates on a unique sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities highlight that the refuse collection technology exhibits constant returns to scale as well as scope economies between disposal and recycling. As far as the size of the municipality increases, scope economies rise up to 14%, but they are accompanied with overall diseconomies of scale. Our findings suggest that, on the one hand, joint management of disposal and recycling should be encouraged, and, on the other hand, that strategies aimed at increasing the share of waste sent for recycling would not imply a considerable increase in total costs.solid waste, recycling, cost functions

The determinants of board compensation in SOEs. An application to Italian local public utilities

This paper investigates the determinants of board compensation for a sample of Italian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). To that purpose, we use a newly collected panel data of 106 local public utilities observed form 1994 through 2004, which includes detailed information on the boards of directors. During this period, the deregulation process inspired institutional interventions that forced utilities, traditionally owned by local municipalities, to change their juridical form and ownership structure, thereby facilitating the entrance of private investors. The corporate governance literature shows that such changes may exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders, top executives and the board. However, board compensation could reduce the agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders. This paper addresses this issue by investigating the impact that board composition, firm characteristics and performance have on board compensation. We find that the average board pay is negatively related to board size and positively related to firm dimension. The public or private nature of the major shareholder does not influence board compensation but the juridical form does. Finally, while the proportion of politically connected directors is found to negatively influence the level of per capita compensation, the impact of firm performance is uncertain.board compensation, board composition, politicians, local public utilities

The determinants of board compensation in SOEs: An application to Italian public utilities

This paper investigates the determinants of board compensation for a sample of Italian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). To that purpose, we use a newly collected panel data of 106 local public utilities observed for the years 1994-2004, which includes detailed information on the boards of directors. During this period, the deregulation process inspired institutional interventions that forced utilities, traditionally owned by local municipalities, to change their juridical form and ownership structure, thereby facilitating the entrance of private investors. The corporate governance literature shows that such changes may exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders, top executives and the board. However, board compensation could reduce the agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders. This paper addresses this issue by investigating the impact that board composition, firm characteristics and performance have on board compensation. We find that the average board pay is negatively related to board size and positively related to firm dimension. The public or private nature of the major shareholder does not influence board compensation but the juridical form does. Finally, while the proportion of politically connected directors is found to negatively influence the level of per capita compensation, the impact of firm performance is uncertain.board compensation, board composition, politicians, local public utilities

The determinants of board compensation in SOEs: an application to Italian local public utilities

This article investigates the determinants of board compensation for a sample of Italian state owned enterprises (SOEs). To that purpose, we use newly collected panel data of 106 local public utilities observed from 1994 through 2004, which includes detailed information on the boards of directors. During this period, the deregulation process inspired institutional interventions that forced utilities, traditionally owned by local municipalities, to change their juridical form and ownership structure, thereby facilitating the entrance of private investors. The corporate governance literature shows that such changes may exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders, top executives and the board. However, board compensation could reduce the agency costs by aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders. This article addresses this issue by investigating the impact that board composition,firm characteristics and performance have on board compensation. Wefind that the average board pay is positively related to firm dimension and negatively related to board size. The public or private nature of the major shareholder does not influence board compensation but the juridical form does. Finally, while the proportion of politically connected directors is found to negatively influence the level of per capita compensation, the impact offirm performance is uncertain.Publicad

Crystalline and liquid Si3 N4 characterization by first-principles molecular dynamics simulations

Silicon nitride (Si3 N4 ) has a wide range of engineering applications where its mechanical and electronic properties can be effectively exploited. In particular, in the microelectronics field, the amorphous silicon nitride films are widely used as charge storage layer in metal-alumina-nitrideoxide nonvolatile memory devices. Atomic structure of amorphous silicon nitride is characterized by an high concentration of traps that control the electric behavior of the final device by the trappingde-trapping mechanism of the electrical charge occurring in its traps. In order to have a deep understanding of the material properties and, in particular, the nature of the electrical active traps a detailed numerical characterization of the crystalline and liquid phases is mandatory. For these reasons first-principles molecular dynamics simulations are extensively employed to simulate the crystalline Si3 N4 in its crystalline and liquid phases. Good agreement with experimental results is obtained in terms of density and formation entalpy. Detailed characterization of c-Si3 N4 electronic properties is performed in terms of band structure and band gap. Then constant temperature and constant volume first-principles molecular dynamics is used to disorder a stoichiometric sample of Si3 N4 . Extensive molecular dynamics simulations are performed to obtain a reliable liquid sample whose atomic structure does not depend on the starting atomic configuration. Detailed characterization of the atomic structure is achieved in terms of radial distribution functions and total structure factor