Tax Evasion and Dynamic Inefficiency

I show within a two-period overlapping generations model with income tax evasion that when the penalty rate set by the government is su¢ ciently small, it is theoretically possible for the capital stock to exceed the golden-rule level on the balanced-growth path. However, such a dynamic inefficiency cannot be guaranteed when the probability of evasion detection is nil.

A Stochastic Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Implications for Australia

In this paper we develop a stochastic endogenous growth model augmented with income tax evasion. Our model avoids some existing discrepancies between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions of traditional tax evasion models. Further, we show that: i) productive government expenditures play an important role in affecting economy's tax evasion rate; ii) the average marginal income tax rate in Australia come close to the optimal; and iii) the phenomenon of tax evasion is not an excuse for a productive government to advocate an excessive income taxation.Tax evasion; Economic growth; Public services

CAN WE TAX THE DESIRE FOR TAX EVASION?

A static income tax evasion model ?? la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible with the Yitzhaki's (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities.Tax Evasion, Optimal Taxation, Economic Growth

The Impact of Bequest Motives on Retirement Behavior in Japan: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

In this paper, we conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of bequest motives on the work and retirement behavior of households in Japan using micro data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University. Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical model and show that respondents with an altruistic or strategic/exchange bequest motive work more at the intensive margin than those without any bequest motive but that respondents with a strategic or exchange bequest motive work less at the extensive margin (i.e., retire earlier) than those without any bequest motive. Our findings for the strategic or exchange motive suggest that respondents with such a motive tend to work harder than others before they retire so that they can earn more, leave a larger bequest to their children, and elicit more care from them but that they tend to retire earlier than others so that they can start receiving care for themselves and their spouses from their children sooner. A policy implication of our findings is that the exchange of bequests for the care of parents by children may be very sensitive to the inheritance tax framework

Does Property Ownership by Women Reduce Domestic Violence? A Case of Latin America

It is widely believed that empowering women via various material means increases women’s outside options and, thereby, makes them less vulnerable to intimate partner violence. However, the effect of such empowerment on domestic violence could be subtle particularly in countries with pre-existing high tolerance to violence, weak law enforcement and male institutional domination. Using cross-sectional household-level survey data for Latin American countries, we test the effect of property ownership by women on domestic violence. The results show that a woman’s sole property ownership is not associated with less domestic violence against her; sometimes the correlation is even positive. However, married women who co-own the property are less likely to face domestic abuse by husbands

Parental Transfers and Fertility: Does the Recipient's Gender Matter?

This paper examines the role of parental transfers on family size. We introduce a simple theoretical model of fertility decision where preferences towards children may differ between female and male spouses. Parental transfers increase both the household income and the bargaining power of the recipient spouse. Therefore, transfers from wife’s and husband’s parents may have dissimilar effects on the number of children. We empirically test and confirm this hypothesis using a unique household-level data for Japan. In particular, received transfers from the wife’s parents reduce the demand for children. In contrast, both received and expected transfers from the husband’s parents increase the demand for children. These results hold important policy implications

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of why individuals provide are and attention to their elderly parents using a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous saving and a “contest success function” and test this model using micro data from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. To summarize our main findings, we find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the selfish bequest motive or the exchange motive (much stronger than in the United States), but we find that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms

Survival misperception, time inconsistency, and implications for life-cycle saving and welfare

Some empirical studies firmly reveal that people tend to form overly pessimistic survival expectations for relatively less distant ages and overly optimistic survival expectations for relatively more distant ages. We incorporate this observation into a life-cycle continuous time overlapping-generations model of consumption/saving with a general form for a subjective survival function. Resulting time-inconsistent optimal control problem has been analytically solved. At the micro level, time inconsistency leads to higher consumption at young and old ages, but this alone fails to improve lifetime well-being since micro-level decisions made with a lack of information about true mortality are suboptimal. In general equilibrium, however, such time inconsistent behavior with survival misperception is conducive to aggregate capital accumulation and greater equilibrium bequest income. The latter effects can produce substantial welfare gains. We also note that empirically observed old age optimistic bias is an important phenomenon, as it helps to avoid unrealistic very old-age debt accumulation within a life-cycle model. In addition, if for a given level of optimistic bias we increase early-life pessimism, this would result in slower capital accumulation, lower bequest income, and thus be detrimental to welfare. Since recent literature reports that young-age survival pessimism has grown over time, it raises some concerns