The power of suggestion: post-hypnotically induced changes in the temporal binding of intentional action outcomes

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception

The sense of agency as tracking control

Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent.We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone

How Can People Commit Atrocities When They Follow Orders?

The human capacity to obey orders, even leading to atrocities, no longer requires proving. As Howard Zinn famously pointed out, “historically, the most terrible things—war, genocide, and slavery—have resulted not from disobedience, but from obedience” (Zinn, 1997). However, the question of “how” people can commit atrocities when they follow orders remains open. Milgram’s studies famously revealed a strong compliance with the orders of the experimenter but such studies only revealed the situational and social factors supporting obedience. They did not enable us to understand how so many people accepted to administer painful and potentially deadly shocks to another person. In the present article, I will contrast qualitative interviews conducted with former perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda and experimental research in neuroscience to attempt to provide a partial answer to this critical question. I will argue that transcending the boundaries of different scientific disciplines is key to a better understanding of how obedience alters prosociality. I will also defend the provocative idea that researchers should take the opportunity to leave their laboratories to study the issue of obedience

How using brain-machine interfaces influences the human sense of agency.

Brain-machine interfaces (BMI) allows individuals to control an external device by controlling their own brain activity, without requiring bodily or muscle movements. Performing voluntary movements is associated with the experience of agency ("sense of agency") over those movements and their outcomes. When people voluntarily control a BMI, they should likewise experience a sense of agency. However, using a BMI to act presents several differences compared to normal movements. In particular, BMIs lack sensorimotor feedback, afford lower controllability and are associated with increased cognitive fatigue. Here, we explored how these different factors influence the sense of agency across two studies in which participants learned to control a robotic hand through motor imagery decoded online through electroencephalography. We observed that the lack of sensorimotor information when using a BMI did not appear to influence the sense of agency. We further observed that experiencing lower control over the BMI reduced the sense of agency. Finally, we observed that the better participants controlled the BMI, the greater was the appropriation of the robotic hand, as measured by body-ownership and agency scores. Results are discussed based on existing theories on the sense of agency in light of the importance of BMI technology for patients using prosthetic limbs

The effect of military training on the sense of agency and outcome processing

Working in military structures implies a reduction in individual autonomy, in which agents must comply with hierarchical orders. Here, the authors show that working within such a structure is associated with a reduced sense of agency and outcome processing for junior cadets, but this relationship is absent in trained officers

graphical representation of the four conditions.

<p>graphical representation of the four conditions.</p

Electrophysiological results.

<p>On POz and Oz, the light blue displays the visual N1 associated with a homologous robot movement, while the dark blue displays the visual N1 associated with a non-homologous robot movement. On Fz, FCz and Cz, the full green line displays brain potentials associated with the robot homologous—tone congruent condition (RH–TC), the dotted green line displays brain potentials associated with the robot homologous—tone incongruent condition (RH-TI), the full red line displays brain potentials associated with the robot non-homologous—tone congruent condition (RnH-TC), and the dotted red line displays brain potentials associated with the robot non-homologous—tone incongruent condition (RnH-TI). (A) Topographical representation associated with homologous robot movement. (B) Topographical representation associated with non-homologous robot movement. (C) Topographical representation associated with RH-TC. (D) Topographical representation associated with RH-TI. (E) Topographical representation associated with RnH-TC. (F) Topographical representation associated with RnH-TI.</p

Schematic representation of the association phases and test phases.

<p>Schematic representation of the association phases and test phases.</p

Behavioural Results.

<p>(A) Interval judgment estimation in the two experimental conditions in which the robot movement was homologous with the participant’s movement. (B) Interval judgment estimation in the two experimental conditions in which the robot movement was non-homologous with the participant’s movement. ** indicates a significant difference (two-tailed p < .01). Error bars refer to standard errors. All the tests were two-tailed.</p

Components of the Placebo-suggestion.

<p>(A) Context-placebos (laboratory, equipment, running software and experimenter). (B) Timeline of the different parts of Experiment 1.</p