Derivative Exposure and the Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Risks of U.S. Banks

This paper estimates the interest rate and exchange rate risk betas of fifty-nine large U. S. commercial banks for the period of 1975-1992, as well as the bank-specific determinants of these betas. The estimation procedure uses a modified seemingly unrelated simultaneous method that recognizes cross-equation dependencies and adjusts for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Overall, the exchange rate risk betas are more significant than the interest rate risk betas. More importantly, we find a link between the scale of a bank's interest rate and currency derivative contracts and the bank's interest rate and exchange rate risks. Particularly noteworthy is the influence of currency derivatives on exchange rate betas.Off-balance sheet, Bank risk Derivatives, Interest rate risk, Exchange risk exposure JEL classification: G2, Gl, F3

Cost of Debt and Federal Home Loan Bank Funding at U.S. Bank and Thrift Holding Companies

We investigate the relationship between the cost of debt issued by bank holding companies (BHCs) and thrift holding companies (THCs) and their use of Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances. Cost of debt is used as a measure of bank riskiness for the first time in a FHLB study. A two-equation model of FHLB advances and cost of debt is estimated. Three main results are obtained. First, greater reliance on advances by BHCs and THCs is associated with lower cost of debt in the pre-crisis period, and more strongly so during the crisis, because granting of advances sends a positive signal to the market about FHLB’s support. Second, greater holding company (HC) cost of debt, as an explanatory variable, is associated with smaller advances as FHLBs restrict advances to riskier HCs. Third, we find no separate effect on the cost of debt from FHLB membership. Our results are robust to 3SLS estimation, used to address endogeneity, and to alternative model specifications. The negative association between cost of debt and advances suggests that BHCs and THCs do not use advances to make riskier loans and that FHLB policies and services have some risk-reducing effects which more than offset the effect of potential moral hazards

Large capital infusions, investor reactions, and the return and risk performance of financial institutions over the business cycle and recent finanical crisis

The authors examine investors' reactions to announcements of large seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. financial institutions (FIs) from 2000 to 2009. These offerings include market infusions as well as injections of government capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The sample period covers both business cycle expansions and contractions, and the recent financial crisis. They present evidence on the factors affecting FI decisions to issue capital, the determinants of investor reactions, and post-SEO performance of issuers as well as a sample of matching FIs. The authors find that investors reacted negatively to the news of private market SEOs by FIs, both in the immediate term (e.g., the two days surrounding the announcement) and over the subsequent year, but positively to TARP injections. Reactions differed depending on the characteristics of the FIs, stage of the business cycle, and conditions of financial crisis. Larger institutions were less likely to have raised capital through market offerings during the period prior to TARP, and firms receiving a TARP injection tended to be larger than other issuers. The authors find that while TARP may have allowed FIs to increase their lending (as a share of assets) in the year after the issuance, they took on more credit risk to do so. They find no evidence that banks' capital adequacy increased after the capital injections.Securities ; Financial services industry ; Banks and banking

Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and Bank and Thrift Holding Company Risk: Evidence From the Stock Market

Using bivariate GARCH models of stock portfolio returns and risk, we find that bank and thrift holding companies that relied the most on Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances exhibited less total risk and market risk than those that relied on them the least between 2001 and 2012. When we control for differences in holding company size, stock trading volume, residential mortgage lending, and holding company type (bank vs. thrift), the most FHLB-reliant holding companies sustain the aforesaid risk advantages except during the crisis of 2007–2009, when they exhibit greater idiosyncratic risk. The latter finding suggests that investors perceived the high reliance of the borrowing institutions on advances as a sign of distress. Portfolios that consist of only bank holding companies show qualitatively similar results

Real Estate Investment by Bank Holding Companies and Their Risk and Return: Nonparametric and GARCH Procedures

We investigate the association between real estate investment by US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and their return, risk and risk-adjusted returns. Three portfolios are formed of BHCs according to whether they do or do not invest in real estate, strictness of the regulation on real estate investment and the ratio of real estate investment to assets. Wilcoxon tests of differences in portfolio returns, risk, risk-adjusted returns and value at risk between each pair of portfolios are conducted to determine how engagement in real estate, stricter regulation and increased real estate investment affect BHC performance. These effects are also investigated within a GARCH framework. Wilcoxon tests indicate that real estate investment or operating under lenient rules lower return and risk-adjusted returns and raise risk. Within GARCH, increases in real estate investment are associated with lower returns and greater systematic risk for BHCs with higher real estate shares in assets. These results indicate that benefits from real estate investment by banks are outweighed by greater variability of real estate prices and BHCs’ lack of expertise in the field. BHCs in the sample invested no more than 4.54% of their assets in real estate, leaving open the possibility that a higher threshold exists, beyond which performance improvements would be manifested

Moment Risk Premia and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

The aim of this paper is to assess the existence and the sign of moment risk premia. To this end, we use methodologies ranging from swap contracts to portfolio sorting techniques in order to obtain robust estimates. We provide empirical evidence for the European stock market for the 2008-2015 time period. Evidence is found of a negative volatility risk premium and a positive skewness risk premium, which are robust to the different techniques and cannot be explained by common risk-factors such as market excess return, size, book-to-market and momentum. Kurtosis risk is not priced in our dataset. Furthermore, we find evidence of a positive risk premium in relation to the firm’s size

Towards a skewness index for the Italian stock market

The present paper is a first attempt of computing a skewness index for the Italian stock market. We compare and contrast different measures of asymmetry of the distribution: an index computed with the CBOE SKEW index formula and two other asymmetry indexes, the SIX indexes, as proposed in Faff and Liu (2014). We analyze the properties of the skewness indexes, by investigating their relationship with model-free implied volatility and the returns on the underlying stock index. Moreover, we assess the profitability of skewness trades and disentangle the contribution of the left and the right part of the risk neutral distribution to the profitability of the latter strategies. The data set consists of FTSE MIB index options data and covers the years 2011-2014, allowing us to address the behavior of skewness measures both in bullish and bearish market periods. We find that the Italian SKEW index presents many advantages with respect to other asymmetry measures: it has a significant contemporaneous relation with both returns, model-free implied volatility and has explanatory power on returns, after controlling for volatility. We find a negative relation between volatility changes and changes in the Italian SKEW index: an increase in model-free implied volatility is associated with a decrease in the Italian SKEW index. Moreover, the SKEW index acts as a measure of market greed, since returns react more negatively to a decrease in the SKEW index (increase in risk neutral skewness) than they react positively to an increase of the latter (decrease in risk neutral skewness). The results of the paper point to the existence of a skewness risk premium in the Italian market. This emerges both from the fact that implied skewness is more negative than physical one in the sample period and from the profitability of skewness trading strategies. In addition, the higher performance of the portfolio composed by only put options indicates that the mispricing of options is mainly focused on the left part of the distribution

The properties of a skewness index and its relation with volatility and returns

The objective of this study is threefold. First, we investigate the properties of a skewness index in order to determine whether it captures fear (fear of losing money), or greed in the market (fear of losing opportunities). Second, we uncover the combined relationship among skewness, volatility and returns. Third, we provide further evidence and possible explanations for the relationship between skewness and future returns, which is highly debated in the literature. The stock market investigated is the Italian one, for which a skewness index is not traded yet. The methodology proposed for the construction of the Italian skewness index can be adopted for other European and non-European countries characterized by a limited number of option prices traded. Several results are obtained. First, we find that in the Italian market the skewness index acts as measures of market greed, as opposed to market fear. Second, for almost 70% of the daily observations, the implied volatility and the skewness index move together but in opposite directions. Increases (decreases) in volatility and decreases (increases) in the skewness index are associated with negative (positive) returns. Last, we find strong evidence that positive returns are reflected both in a decrease in the implied volatility index and in an increase in the skewness index the following day. Implications for investors and policy makers are drawn