Collateral, credit history, and the financial decelerator

The author develops a simple model in which financial imperfections can serve to stabilize aggregate fluctuations and not merely aggravate them as in much of the previous literature; the author terms this a financial decelerator. In the model agents borrow to purchase housing and secure their loans with this long-lived asset. There are two financial imperfections in this model. First, agents are unable to commit to repay their loans — that is, they can strategically default. This limits the amount that lenders are willing to offer. In addition, however, lenders are also imperfectly informed as to a borrower’s propensity to default; that is, there is adverse selection. The latter imperfection implies that default may actually occur in equilibrium, unlike in much of the previous literature. For relatively high house prices the commitment problem ensures that the equilibrium is typically characterized by a standard financial accelerator; that is, the borrowing constraints which prevent default become tighter as falling prices reduce the wealth with which agents can collateralize future loans, thereby exacerbating aggregate fluctuations. However, Elul shows that when prices are very low, agents will default, which serves as a stabilizing force; he terms this a financial decelerator. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 05-14Credit ; Default (Finance)

What have we learned about mortgage default?

By the end of 2009, one out of every 11 mortgages was seriously delinquent or in foreclosure. Economists have devoted considerable energy over the past several years to understanding the underlying causes of this increase in defaults. One goal is to provide a guide to dealing with the existing problems. In addition, a better understanding may help avoid future problems. In “What Have We Learned About Mortgage Default?” Ronel Elul reviews recent research that has shed light on two areas: the extent to which securitization is responsible for the increase in default rates; and the relative contributions of negative equity, compared with “liquidity shocks,” in explaining mortgage default.Mortgage loans ; Default (Finance)

Securitization and mortgage default

The academic literature, the popular press, and policymakers have all debated securitization's contribution to the poor performance of mortgages originated in the run-up to the recent crisis. Theoretical arguments have been advanced on both sides, but the lack of suitable data has made it difficult to assess them empirically. The author examines this issue by using a loan-level data set from LPS Analytics, covering approximately two-thirds of the mortgages originated in 2005 and 2006, and including both securitized and nonsecuritized loans. ; The author finds evidence that privately securitized loans do indeed perform worse than observably similar, nonsecuritized loans. Moreover, this effect is strongest in prime mortgage markets, which have not been studied in the previous literature. For example, a typical prime loan becomes delinquent at a 20 percent higher rate if it is privately securitized, ceteris paribus. This is consistent with the existence of adverse selection; that is, that lenders used information not available to investors to securitize loans that were riskier than they otherwise appeared. By contrast, for subprime mortgages, the impact of private securitization is concentrated in low or no-documentation loans; this latter result is consistent with previous work such as Keys et al. (2009).Mortgage-backed securities ; Default (Finance)

Liquidity crises

Financial markets have experienced several episodes of “liquidity crises” over the past 20 years. One prominent example is the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998. The recent market disruption brought about by the downturn in subprime mortgages also shares many features with liquidity crises. What is liquidity? Why does it sometimes seem that the market’s supply of it is insufficient? Can anything be done about it? In “Liquidity Crises,” Ronel Elul outlines some theories of market liquidity provision, how it breaks down in times of crisis, and some possible government responses.Liquidity (Economics)

The economics of asset securitization

Ronel Elul explains why asset-backed securities exist and discusses some reasons for their common structure. Elul notes that despite well-developed theories on the what and why of securitization, more research is needed. In particular, additional research could uncover the effect that government regulation and bankruptcy law have on securitization.Asset-backed financing

Regulating short-sales

Short-selling, the practice of selling a security the seller does not own, is done in an attempt to profit from an expected decline in the price of the security. During the recent financial turmoil, many press accounts blamed short-selling for declines in stock prices and even for the collapse of some firms. In "Regulating Short-Sales," Ronel Elul discusses the issue of short-selling. He notes that research has shown that short-selling plays a valuable role in setting accurate prices for securities but that it can also be used to facilitate market manipulation. This latter consideration may provide justification for restricting short-sales under certain circumstances.

Bankruptcy: Is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?

In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a specified period of time has elapsed. The authors model this provision and determine conditions under which it is optimal. ; They develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to finance a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. They show that forgetting a default makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment for failure. However, following a default it is generally good to forget, because pooling riskier agents with safer ones makes exerting high effort to preserve their reputation more attractive. ; The authors' key result is that if agents are sufficiently patient, and low effort is not too inefficient, then the optimal law would prescribe some amount of forgetting --- that is, it would not permit lenders to fully utilize past information. The authors also show that such a law must be enforced by the government - no lender would willingly agree to forget. Finally, they also use their model to examine the policy debate that arose during the adoption of these rules. ; Also issued as: Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 07-05

Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must we Also Forget?

In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a specified period of time has elapsed. We model this provision and determine conditions under which it is optimal. We develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to finance a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that forgetting a default makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment for failure. However, following a default it is generally good to forget, because by improving an entrepreneur’s reputation, forgetting increases the incentive to exert effort to preserve this reputation. Our key result is that if agents are sufficiently patient, and low effort is not too inefficient, then the optimal law would prescribe some amount of forgetting — that is, it would not permit lenders to fully utilize past information. We also argue that forgetting must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government — no lender would willingly agree to ignore information available to him.Bankruptcy, Information, Incentives, Fresh Start

Bankruptcy: is it enough to forgive or must we also forget?

In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers' past defaults. The authors study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. They analyze its effects on borrowers' incentives and access to credit, and identify conditions under which it is optimal. The authors argue that “forgetting” must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government. Their model's predictions are consistent with the cross-country relationship between credit bureau regulations and the provision of credit, as well as the evidence on the impact of these regulations on borrowers' and lenders' behavior.Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy exemptions, credit history, and the mortgage market.

We develop and test a model of mortgage underwriting, with particular reference to the role of credit bureau scores. In our model scores are used in a standardized fashion, which reflects the prevalence of automated underwriting in industry practice. We show that our model has implications for the debate on the effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on secured lending. Recent literature (Berkowitz and Hynes (1999), Lin and White (2001)) has developed conflicting theories—and found conflicting results—seeking to explain how exemptions affect the mortgage market. ; By contrast, our model implies that when lenders use credit scores in a standardized manner, exemptions should be irrelevant to the mortgage underwriting decision. Merging data from a major credit bureau with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset, we confirm this prediction of our model. We also show that while ignoring borrower credit quality may make exemptions appear to be significant, once one controls for credit scores then exemptions have no effect on the likelihood that a mortgage application is approved. We confirm this empirically and argue that this may help explain some of the results of the previous literature.Bankruptcy ; Credit scoring systems ; Mortgage loans