A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d\u27Etat

This Article considers the response of the Organization for African Unity (the OAU, founded in 1963) and its successor, the African Union (the AU, which began operating in 2003) to coups d\u27etat, since 1997. The Article addresses these organizations\u27 policies concerning unconstitutional changes of government, as well as the application of these policies. In considering these issues, the Article examines the response of the AU to the coups in Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), and Niger (2010). In each case, the AU was unwilling to recognize the government that came to power through coup, even when the regime had popular and political support within the state. The Article concludes by arguing that the AU should pursue a more nuanced policy in this area

The crisis of international criminal law in Africa: A regional regime in response?

This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law

The African Union, Boko Haram and Women in Crisis

The paper considers whether the African Union’s (AU) powers would allow for intervention in protection of the rights of women during armed conflict. In considering that question, this paper evaluates the AU’s legal and policy framework for the protection of women in armed conflict, and discusses the AU’s response to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. It argues that the AU is constrained in its response by conflicting provisions of treaties, traditional international law principles in particular non-intervention in sovereign states, practical and political concerns, and gendered perspectives. The paper concludes that as a result the AU left the protection of women to a territorial state which, for a period of time, lacked the will and the ability to protect women in crisis but rejected external assistance. The paper concludes that protecting women’s rights in conflict zones will require the AU to prioritise human security in every African Union peace and security mandate, for only through action can the AU demonstrate that it attaches value to women’s rights in conflict zones

Even Generals Need Friends

Signals from domestic and international actors have been shown to influence the likelihood of coups. Coups remain difficult to predict and consequently leave policy makers in a reactive stance, but little systematic work assesses how these reactions influence long-term outcomes. We examine how reactions from domestic and international actors influence the duration of coup-born regimes, arguing that negative reactions will shorten leadership duration. We further probe these relationships by considering how signaling consistency, Cold War dynamics, and precoup relationships condition the influence of reactions on leadership duration. Tests use events data to capture domestic and international reactions and newly coded information on leadership to capture leader duration. Results indicate that international responses have a profound influence on leadership tenure, especially those from strong actors. We find tentative support that state reactions have the strongest effect during the Cold War, while international organizations matter the most afterward