A IMPOSSIBILIDADE DE SE MORRER NO (A)MAR: ECOS DE UM MAR MORTO

      A partir da obra Mar morto, de Jorge Amado, buscaremos o enfoque de dois elementos recorrentes: amor e morte. Elementos estes tão presentes na vida de Guma, dos marítimos, do cais. Seguiremos a análise guiados pelo estudo da narrativa presente em Agamben, Morin e Blanchot, buscando tecer contextos entre eles, o amor, a morte e a Literatura, conduzidos como o leme nas mãos experientes de Guma à procura dos mistérios do mar e de Iemanjá. Iremos, com ele, em busca do desconhecido narrativo. &nbsp

Delusional beliefs and reason giving

Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states

Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions

Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity

In this paper I argue that there are gestalt principles underlying intersubjective interactions and that this means that intersubjective ‘units’, can be recognised as unified gestalt wholes. The nub of the claim is that interactions within a ‘plural subject’ can be perceived by others outside this plural subject. Framed from the first-person perspective: I am able to recognise intersubjective interactions between multiple others who are not me. I argue that the terminology of gestalt structures is helpful in framing and understanding the non-reducible make-up of these relational units. I consequently defend the legitimacy of the claim that we can attend to more than one other person at once, holding multiple others as a single focus of attention insofar as we can attend to multiple others as a gestalt whole. I argue that it is therefore legitimate to talk about attending to, perceiving and addressing multiple others at the same time, in the second-person plural. I argue that this can be identified in the phenomenology of such interactions and in an analysis of the core underlying structures of these interactions

Self-conciousness and experience

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