Second-order effects or ideational rifts? Explaining outcomes of European elections in an era of populist politics

This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of populist and anti-European Union (EU) politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives. It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations. Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents. Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often associated with EP elections

Still second-order? European elections in the era of populism, extremism, and euroskepticism

The continued relevance of the second-order elections (SOE) theory is one of the most widely debated issues in the study of European Parliament (EP) elections. While the theory has been criticized from many angles, the recent success of populist, extremist, and Eurosceptic parties raises additional questions about the applicability of a model that depicts EP elections as a lowstakes affair revolving around national issues. This article tests the SOE model with party-level data from all 175 EP elections held between 1979 and 2019. While turnout in EP elections remains well below participation rates in national elections, the 2019 EP elections were marked by a significant reduction in the average turnout gap. Across all election years, party size is the most potent predictor of electoral gains and losses in EP elections. Incumbency is associated with electoral losses in most EP election years. These effects are moderated by the electoral cycle and the electoral system in some but not all years. The expectation that the SOE model performs worse in countries with fragmented party systems was not confirmed. All in all, the SOE model continues to wield significant explanatory power in both the West and the East

Internet voting in Estonia 2005–2019: Evidence from eleven elections

Internet voting is a highly contested topic in electoral studies. This article examines Internet voting in Estonia over 15 years and 11 nation-wide elections. It focuses on the following questions: How is Internet voting organized and used in Estonia? How have the Estonian Internet voting system and its usage evolved over time? What are the preconditions and consequences of large-scale deployment of Internet voting? The results suggest that the rapid uptake and burgeoning usage rates reflect the system's embeddedness in a highly developed digital state and society. Through continuous technological and legal innovation and development, Estonia has built an advanced Internet voting system that complies with normative standards for democratic elections and is widely trusted and used by the voters. Internet voting has not boosted turnout in a setting where voting was already easily accessible. Neither has it created digital divides: Internet voting in Estonia has diffused to the extent that socio-demographic characteristics no longer predict usage. This, combined with massive uptake, reduces incentives for political parties to politicize the novel voting mode

Kuidas tagada esmaste doonorite kujunemine korduvateks: küsitlusuuring Põhja-Eesti Regionaalhaigla verekeskust külastanud doonorite hulgas

Taust ja eesmärgid. Vajalike verevarude tagamiseks on ülimalt oluline esmaste doonorite värbamine ning doonorite motiveerimine edasisteks korduvateks vereloovutusteks. Korduvdoonorite veri on võrreldes esmaste doonorite omaga mitmeid kordi ohutum, kuna regulaarsed doonorid on oma tervisest teadlikumad ning nende riskikäitumine on väiksem. Vere loovutamine Eestis on tasustamata ja vabatahtlik tegevus ning seega on doonorite vajaduste mõistmine ning nendelt vere loovutamise kohta saadud tagasiside äärmiselt olulised. Esmane vere loovutamise kogemus peab jätma inimesele hea enesetunde ning soovi uuesti verd loovutama tulla. Küsitlusuuringu eesmärgid olid 1) selgitada välja, miks paljud esmased doonorid ei naase järgnevatele vereloovutustele; 2) töötada välja strateegiad, mis aitaksid motiveerida esmaseid doonoreid tulema korduvalt verd loovutama. Metoodika. Uuring korraldati PERHi verekeskuse doonorite seas. Septembris 2012 saadeti küsimustik posti teel doonoritele, kellel oli 2010. aastal üks õnnestunud vereloovutus ning kes polnud naasnud järgnevale vereloovutusele 2012. aastaks. Koos korduspostitusega oli vastamise aktiivsus 30,1%. Uurimuses kasutati nii kvantitatiivset (küsimustiku valikvastused ja hinnangute andmine skaalal) kui ka kvalitatiivset (küsimustiku vabad vastused) käsitlust, küsimustik koosnes 31 küsimusest. Tulemused ja järeldused. Uuring näitas, et enam kui pooled esmased doonorid olid noored (18–29aastased) ja olid oma esimese vereloovutuse teinud verekeskuse väljasõidul. Vene keelt kõnelenud doonorid olid vähemuses: ainult 8% kõigist 2010. aasta esmastest doonoritest eelistas suhelda vene keeles. Doonorid olid rahul verekeskuse tööga (töötajate suhtumine ja protseduurid). 74%-l vastanutest ei esinenud negatiivseid füüsilisi kõrvalmõjusid. Doonorid, kellel oli meeldiv vereloovutuse kogemus ja hea üldine enesetunne pärast protseduuri, olid meelsamini valmis uuesti verd loovutama. Seega on verekeskusel vaja säilitada/täiustada teenuseid, et doonorite hoidmine oleks edukas ja jätkusuutlik. Küsitlusest selgus ka, et enamus (73,3%) doonoritest ei ole veel oma doonorikarjääri otsustanud lõpetada. Esmased doonorid soovisid saada kutset vereloovutusele, kontakti võtmiseks eelistati e-kirja ja SMSi. Kindlustamaks, et kõik esmased doonorid saaksid kutse, tehti Eesti vereteenistuse infosüsteemi (EVI) arendus, nii et süsteem saadab nüüd kõigile esmastele doonoritele kutse, arvestades viimase annetuse aega.Eesti Arst 2015; 94(3):132–13

Between Security and Mobility: Negotiating a Hardening Border Regime in the Russian-Estonian Borderland

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies on 27th Feb 2015, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1015408Since the end of the Cold War order post-Soviet borders have been characterised by geopolitical tensions and divergent imaginations of desirable political and spatial orders. Drawing upon ethnographic research in two border towns at the Russian-Estonian border, the article makes a case for a grounded examination of these border dynamics that takes into account how borders as sites of ‘mobility and enclosure’ are negotiated in everyday life and shaped by the differentiated incorporations of statecraft into people’s lives. Depending on their historical memories, people interpret the border either as a barrier to previously free movement or as a security device and engage in correspondingly different relations to the state – privileging local concerns for mobility or adopting the state’s concerns over security and sovereignty. Analysing these border negotiations and the relations between citizens and the state, articulated in people’s expectations and claims, can provide us with a better understanding of how people participate in the making of borders and contribute to the stability and malleability of political orders

Enlargement of the European Union and the problem of popular consent

The erosion of popular support that has accompanied the expansion of European-level governance has given rise to interesting debates about the origins of public support for the European Union (EU). The utilitarian explanation that focuses on rational cost-benefit calculations competes with a cultural approach that ties evaluations of the EU to dominant societal values and individual socialization experiences. A third approach regards domestic political dynamics as an important determinant of public support for the EU. Empirical tests of these explanations have been limited almost exclusively to current EU member states, while the growing differentiation of popular attitudes in the Central and Eastern European candidate countries has received much less attention. This dissertation brings the Western European literature to bear on the EU's Eastern enlargement, seeking to explain extensive variations in the level of popular support for the EU both within and across post-communist societies. Hypotheses derived from the utilitarian, cultural and domestic politics explanations are tested with individual- and national-level data from a variety of candidate countries and, for purposes of comparison, three non-applicant Eastern European states. The results lend some support to all three explanations, suggesting that support for the EU is influenced by micro-level expectations of gain, changes in macro-economic conditions, the prevalence of democratic norms, and trust in domestic political incumbents. The dissertation also examines the implications of growing popular euroskepticism for the integration process, situating the discussion of popular attitudes in post-communist societies in the broader discourse on European-level democracy and legitimacy. The dissertation reviews the controversy over which standards of legitimacy are suitable in a non-state polity such as the EU, and presents an overview of the various institutional channels through which European electorates can influence European governance. In sum, the dissertation adds an interesting bottom-up dimension to the predominantly elite-centered study of the Eastern enlargement and contributes to the construction of general theories about the logic of public support for regional integration and international governance

Estonia: Empowering the Executive

Estonia successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 in spring 2020. The government reacted relatively rapidly to the crisis outbreak, declaring an emergency situation on March 12 and introducing measures such as closing schools, banning public gatherings, and restricting movement across borders. Saaremaa, the largest island and the epicenter of the virus, was isolated. A 2 billion-euro aid program was launched, including labor market support, sickness benefits, and tax incentives. Adjustment to the emergency situation was alleviated by Estonia’s advanced digital society. Levels of public compliance with the restrictions were, in general, high. While the government’s handling of the crisis is considered successful overall, the emergency situation facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of the executive. In a situation where normal parliamentary and societal debate were hampered, the government pushed through legislative proposals concerning migration, environment, and social affairs that extended beyond the immediate needs of the pandemic and that undermined democratic values.https://www.etis.ee/Portal/Publications/Display/7201fece-5957-4073-8e11-b96556396b9