Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure

Recently in Australia, common-law judges began to modify the way expert evidence is prepared and presented. Judges from a range of civil jurisdictions have conscientiously sought to reduce expert partisanship and the extent of expert disagreement in an attempt to enhance procedural efficiency and improve access to justice. One of these reforms, concurrent evidence, enables expert witnesses to participate in a joint session with considerable testimonial latitude. This represents a shift away from an adversarial approach and a conscientious attempt to foster scientific values and norms. Here, Edmond describes how changes to Australian civil procedure, motivated by judicial concerns about the prevalence of partisanship among expert witnesses, may have been enfeebled because they were based upon enduring scientific conventions such as the ethos of science

Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure

Recently in Australia, common-law judges began to modify the way expert evidence is prepared and presented. Judges from a range of civil jurisdictions have conscientiously sought to reduce expert partisanship and the extent of expert disagreement in an attempt to enhance procedural efficiency and improve access to justice. One of these reforms, concurrent evidence, enables expert witnesses to participate in a joint session with considerable testimonial latitude. This represents a shift away from an adversarial approach and a conscientious attempt to foster scientific values and norms. Here, Edmond describes how changes to Australian civil procedure, motivated by judicial concerns about the prevalence of partisanship among expert witnesses, may have been enfeebled because they were based upon enduring scientific conventions such as the ethos of science

Implications of the Uropygial Gland and Skin in the Excretion of Insecticides from Birds

Dieldrin-14c was administered to chickens, ducks, and cormorants to determine: (1) the accumulation and excretion of dieldrin, (2) the importance of the uropygial gland as an organ of excretion of the insecticide. Analysis of all samples was by liquid scintillation counting (14c-analysis). Samples of whole body, uropygial glands, and feathers were taken for analysis. In addition, eggs from chickens, feces from ducks and cormorants, and ectoparasites from cormorants were analyzed. Modes of excretion included eggs, feces, uropygial glands, and skin. Chickens, ducks, and cormorants with uropygial glands averaged 3.2, 6.3, and 1.8 times more radioactivity per gram, respectively on their feathers than those whose uropygial gland had been surgically removed. Use of the uropygial gland as an organ of excretion of the insecticide was indicated. Radioactivity on the feathers of birds without uropygial glands indicated that the insecticide might have been secreted through lipoid bodies in the skin of the birds. That ingested pesticides are transferred to ectoparasites was shown when radioactivity was found on ectoparasites from cormorants. These pesticides may have an effect on ectoparasite numbers

Conjectures and exhumations: Citations of history, philosophy and sociology of science in US federal courts

This article examines the circumstances in which a version of Sir Karl Popper\u27s philosophy of science became US law. Among historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, as well as legal commentators, the US Supreme Court\u27s Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, .Inc. (1993) decision has received considerable attention. The case is significant because America\u27s most senior court produced a definition of science (for legal purposes). This definition was authorized by the symbolic exhumation, celebration and appropriation of key elements of the philosophy of science developed decades earlier by Popper. Significantly, it was not just Popper\u27s philosophy that was exhumed and resurrected but also his standing and the social authority of philosopy more generally. This article explores how the US Supreme Court invoked a mediated and essentialized representation of Popper\u27s philosophy of science - in a context where the quality of expert evidence seems to have been conceived as a pressing socio-legal problem - to support the inauguration of a more onerous response to admissibility decision making in federal courts. In undertaking this task we also reflect on the use of the writings of other philosophers, historians and sociologists of science which have appeared somewhat erratically in recent judgments. These later references have been conspicuously less influential than the Supreme Court\u27s attempt to grapple with the nature of science in Daubert. In order to substantiate our claims we provide an analysis of references to the history, philosophy and sociology of science which have appeared in US federal court decisions. Our sample was gathered using the relatively straightforward methodology of searching the WESTLAW database for references to well-known authors from the history, philosophy and sociology of science. The search covered the period from the 1940\u27s up to the time of writing. Our analysis is not quantitative (there were only a small number of relevant citations), but rather, qualitative. The significance and meaning of citations will be assessed against the backdrop of the wider socio-legal debates and judicial uses of Daubert

Slow dynamics in cylindrically confined colloidal suspensions

We study bidisperse colloidal suspensions confined within glass microcapillary tubes to model the glass transition in confined cylindrical geometries. We use high speed three-dimensional confocal microscopy to observe particle motions for a wide range of volume fractions and tube radii. Holding volume fraction constant, we find that particles move slower in thinner tubes. The tube walls induce a gradient in particle mobility: particles move substantially slower near the walls. This suggests that the confinement-induced glassiness may be due to an interfacial effect.Comment: Submitted to AIP conference proceedings for "Slow Dynamics in Complex Systems" (Sendai, Japan, Dec. 2012

Latent science: a history of challenges to fingerprint evidence in Australia

Through a review of reported challenges this article explains how latent fingerprint evidence was routinely admitted and relied upon as proof of identity in criminal proceedings before its value and limitations were studied or understood. That it was admitted and used in ways that were disengaged from scientific research reveals a great deal about our adversarial system — of pleas, rules of admissibility, trial safeguards, standards of proof, and heavy reliance on the technical competence of lawyers and judges. This article draws on contemporary scientific research to explain how more than a century of routine legal reliance, along with quite a few admissibility challenges, produced few meaningful responses and no apparent endogenous understanding of the limitations of latent fingerprint comparison. Trial personnel and trial safeguards did not lead to the identification, recognition and communication of methodological problems, uncertainties or the frequency of error. Latent fingerprint evidence continues to be presented in ways that are not informed by scientific research, are inconsistent with mainstream scientific advice, exaggerate the value of opinions, and unecessarily threaten both the rectitude and fairness of criminal proceedings

Fingerprint evidence in New Zealand’s courts: The oversight of overstatement

This article documents the persistent misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the most ubiquitous forensic science of the past century. That is, the treatment of latent fingerprint evidence as categorical identification of a specific person. Following a review of the manner in which latent fingerprint evidence was presented in trials and appeals, starting at the beginning of the 20th century and continuing until the present, it introduces scientific research and advice. This juxtaposition allows us to observe how New Zealand’s legal institutions have not required fingerprint examiners to temper their claims in response to mainstream scientific research and advice (emerging largely out of the United States and the United Kingdom). In conclusion, drawing upon scientific recommendations, the article explains what is required to make the claims of latent fingerprint examiners scientifically grounded such that their probative opinions can be evaluated in ways that facilitate the goals of rectitude and fairness