The collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and international evidence

This paper evaluates the political economy and structural factors explaining the collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax (VAT), where the collection efficiency is determined by the probability of audit and by the penalty on underpaying, and implementation lags imply that the present policy maker determines the efficiency of the tax system next period. Theory suggests that the collection efficiency is affected by political economy considerations - greater polarization and political instability would reduce the efficiency of the tax collection, and collection is impacted by structural factors affecting the ease of tax evasion (such as urbanization, agriculture share, openness). We evaluate the VAT collection efficiency (VAT revenue over the aggregate consumption divided by the standard VAT rate) in a panel of 44 countries over 1970-99. A one standard deviation increase in durability of political regime, and in the ease and fluidity of political participation, increases the VAT collection efficiency by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in urbanization, trade openness and the share of agriculture, changes the VAT collection efficiency by 12.7%, 3.9% and -4.8%, respectively. Qualitatively identical results apply for the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP divided by the standard VAT

Coordinated Tax-Tariff Reforms, Informality, and Welfare Distribution

The paper studies the revenue, efficiency, and distributional implications of a simple strategy of offsetting tariff reductions with increases in destination-based consumption taxes so as to leave consumer prices unchanged. We employ a dynamic micro-founded macroeconomic model of a small open developing economy, which features an informal sector that cannot be taxed, a formal agricultural sector, and an import-substitution sector. The reform strategy increases government revenue, imports, exports, and the informal sector. In contrast to Emran and Stiglitz (2005), who ignore the dynamic effects of taxes and tariffs on factor markets, we find an efficiency gain, which is unevenly distributed. Existing generations benefit more than future generations, who (depending on pre-existing tax and tariff rates and the informal sector size) even may become worse off

Dynamic wetting and its influence on interfacial reactions during hot dip galvanising

The effect of the substrate pre-heat temperature on the dynamic wetting of galvanizing (Zn) baths on low C steel substrates was investigated. Increasing the substrate pre-heat temperature from room to bath temperature improved the wetting. As the substrate pre-heat temperature was increased from room to bath temperature the interfacial thermal resistance was decreased by two orders of magnitude (1*10-3 to 2810-5m2K/W). The reduction in interfacial thermal resistance was related to the improvement in the initial wetting between the steel substrate and the Zn bath, which lead to increased Fe-Zn alloy layer formation

Influence of substrate oxidation on dynamic wetting, interfacial resistance and surface appearance of hot dip coatings

Abstract not available

Dynamic wetting and its influence on interfacial resistance during hot dip galvanising

Abstract not available