The Case for an Autonomy-Centred View of Physician-Assisted Death

Most people who defend physician-assisted death (PAD) endorse the Joint View, which holds that two conditions—autonomy and welfare—must be satisfied for PAD to be justified. In this paper, we defend an Autonomy Only view. We argue that the welfare condition is either otiose on the most plausible account of the autonomy condition, or else is implausibly restrictive, particularly once we account for the broad range of reasons patients cite for desiring PAD, such as “tired of life” cases. Moreover, many of the common objections to an Autonomy Only view fail once we understand the extent of the autonomy condition’s requirements—in particular, the importance of one’s values for autonomous choices. If our view is correct, then the scope of permissible PAD is broader than is currently accepted in both the philosophical literature and the law, and therefore poses an important challenge to this widely accepted view on justified PAD

Reversible detection of proteases and their inhibitors by a pulsed chronopotentiometric polyion-sensitive electrode

Polymer membrane electrodes operated by pulsed chronopotentiometry have recently been introduced to replace traditional ion-selective electrodes for a number of applications. While ion-selective electrodes for the polycation protamine have been reported, for instance, a pulsed chronopotentiometric readout mode (called here pulstrode) provides improved stability and reproducibility while exhibiting sufficient selectivity for the direct detection of protamine in undiluted whole blood samples. Here, such protamine-sensitive pulstrodes are applied for the real-time detection of the activity of the protease trypsin and its soybean inhibitor. This is possible because small fragments produced by the trypsin digestion are not detectable by the protamine-sensing membrane. The real-time response to the proteolytic reaction is shown to exhibit good reproducibility and reversibility, and the initial reaction rate is dependent on the concentration of the protease and its inhibitor

Nanoscale Potentiometry

Potentiometric sensors share unique characteristics that set them apart from other electrochemical sensors. Potentiometric nanoelectrodes have been reported and successfully used for many decades, and we review these developments. Current research chiefly focuses on nanoscale films at the outer or the inner side of the membrane, with outer layers for increasing biocompatibility, expanding the sensor response, or improving the limit of detection (LOD). Inner layers are mainly used for stabilizing the response and eliminating inner aqueous contacts or undesired nanoscale layers of water. We also discuss the ultimate detectability of ions with such sensors and the power of coupling the ultra-low LODs of ion-selective electrodes with nanoparticle labels to give attractive bioassays that can compete with state-of-the-art electrochemical detection

Asymmetries and Ill-Being

Despite the significant attention that has been given to developing and defending theories of intrinsic prudential value, or what makes us well off, far less attention has been given to explaining what makes us intrinsically badly off. In Chapter 1, I argue that theories of prudential badness, or ill-being, do not trivially follow from theories of well-being, yet an account of ill-being is necessary for a complete theory of prudential value. In the remaining chapters, I investigate how well the major theories of well-being extend to ill-being. Considering ill-being also makes possible asymmetries between the good and the bad. I show that there are many such asymmetries, involving both structure, such as when a condition of welfare does not apply to illfare, and value, such as when the disvalue of a bad outweighs the value of its counterpart good. Chapter 2 concerns pain as the counterpart to pleasure. I argue that, in equal intensities, pain is a greater bad than pleasure is a good. Chapter 3 is on ‘adjusted subjective theories’, which adjust the value of pleasure or happiness based on other factors. I show how one theory—L.W. Sumner’s theory of welfare as authentic happiness—fails as an account of ill-being. In Chapter 4, I argue that the most common account of ill-being for the desire theory, that frustrated desires contribute disvalue, should be replaced by an aversion account, according to which there is a negative counterpart to desires. In Chapter 5, I consider two objective goods, autonomy and knowledge. I argue that autonomy has no negative counterpart, while knowledge has many counterparts, only some of which are intrinsically bad. In Chapter 6, I argue that, insofar as achievement is a plausible objective prudential good, there is a state of anti-achievement that is intrinsically bad. Finally, in Chapter 7 I show how the hybrid theory of well-being produces an implausible account of ill-being.Ph.D