Population mechanics: A mathematical framework to study T cell homeostasis

Unlike other cell types, T cells do not form spatially arranged tissues, but move independently throughout the body. Accordingly, the number of T cells in the organism does not depend on physical constraints imposed by the shape or size of specific organs. Instead, it is determined by competition for interleukins. From the perspective of classical population dynamics, competition for resources seems to be at odds with the observed high clone diversity, leading to the so-called diversity paradox. In this work we make use of population mechanics, a non-standard theoretical approach to T cell homeostasis that accounts for clone diversity as arising from competition for interleukins. The proposed models show that carrying capacities of T cell populations naturally emerge from the balance between interleukins production and consumption. These models also suggest remarkable functional differences in the maintenance of diversity in naïve and memory pools. In particular, the distribution of memory clones would be biased towards clones activated more recently, or responding to more aggressive pathogenic threats. In contrast, permanence of naïve T cell clones would be determined by their affinity for cognate antigens. From this viewpoint, positive and negative selection can be understood as mechanisms to maximize naïve T cell diversity

Uneven Power and the Pursuit of Peace: How Regional Power Transitions Motivate Integration. CES Working Paper, no. 150, 2007

This paper addresses two related puzzles confronting students of regional and international integration: Why do states willingly pool and delegate sovereignty within international institutions? What accounts for the timing and content of regional integration agreements? Most theories of integration suggest that states integrate in order to solve problems of incomplete information and reduce transaction costs and other barriers to economic growth. In contrast I argue that integration can serve to establish a credible commitment that rules out the risk of future conflict among states of unequal power. Specifically, I suggest that integration presents an alternative to preventive war as a means to preclude a rising revisionist power from establishing a regional hegemony. The implication is that it is not countries enjoying stable and peaceful relations that are most likely to pursue integration, but rather countries that find themselves caught in a regional security dilemma, which they hope to break out of by means of institutionalized cooperation. I evaluate this proposition against evidence from two historical cases of regional integration: the German Zollverein and the European Communities