Open-Source web-based geographical information system for health exposure assessment

This paper presents the design and development of an open source web-based Geographical Information System allowing users to visualise, customise and interact with spatial data within their web browser. The developed application shows that by using solely Open Source software it was possible to develop a customisable web based GIS application that provides functions necessary to convey health and environmental data to experts and non-experts alike without the requirement of proprietary software

Contracting for innovation : vertical disintegration and interfirm collaboration

Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory expects. Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that, when parties in a supply chain have to make transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism will drive them away from contracts and toward vertical integration. Despite the conventional theory, however, contemporary practice is moving in the other direction. Instead of vertical integration, we observe vertical disintegration in a significant number of industries, as producers recognize that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the success of their products. In doing this, the parties are developing forms of contracting beyond the reach of contract theory models. In this Article, we connect the emerging contract practice to theory, learning from what has happened in the real world to frame a theoretical explanation of this cross-organizational innovation and to reconceptualize the boundaries of the firm accordingly. We argue that the vertical disintegration of the supply chain in many industries is mediated neither by fully specified technical interfaces that allow suppliers to produce a modular piece of the ultimate product, nor by entirely implicit relational contracts supported only by norms of reciprocity and the expectation of future dealings. Rather, we suggest that the change in the boundary of the firm has given rise to a new form of contracting between firms -- what we call "contracting for innovation." This pattern braids explicit and implicit contracting to support iterative collaborative innovation by raising switching costs. These costs, represented by the parties' parallel transaction-specific investments in knowledge about their collaborators' capacities, deter opportunism under circumstances where explicit contracting, renegotiation, and the anticipation of future dealings cannot

On the move:Exploring the impact of residential mobility on cannabis use

AbstractA large literature exists suggesting that residential mobility leads to increased participation in risky health behaviours such as cannabis use amongst youth. However, much of this work fails to account for the impact that underlying differences between mobile and non-mobile youth have on this relationship. In this study we utilise multilevel models with longitudinal data to simultaneously estimate between-child and within-child effects in the relationship between residential mobility and cannabis use, allowing us to determine the extent to which cannabis use in adolescence is driven by residential mobility and unobserved confounding. Data come from a UK cohort, The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children. Consistent with previous research we find a positive association between cumulative residential mobility and cannabis use when using multilevel extensions of conventional logistic regression models (log odds: 0.94, standard error: 0.42), indicating that children who move houses are more likely to use cannabis than those who remain residentially stable. However, decomposing this relationship into within- and between-child components reveals that the conventional model is underspecified and misleading; we find that differences in cannabis use between mobile and non-mobile children are due to underlying differences between these groups (between-child log odds: 3.56, standard error: 1.22), not by a change in status of residential mobility (within-child log odds: 1.33, standard error: 1.02). Our findings suggest that residential mobility in the teenage years does not place children at an increased risk of cannabis use throughout these years

Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms

In developing a contractual response to changes in the economic environment, parties choose the method by which their innovation will be adapted to the particulars of their context. These choices are driven centrally by the thickness of the relevant market – the number of actors who see themselves as facing similar circumstances – and the uncertainty related to that market. In turn, the parties\u27 choice of method will shape how generalist courts can best support the parties\u27 innovation and the novel regimes they envision. In this Article, we argue that contractual innovation does not come to courts incrementally, but instead reaches courts later in the innovation\u27s evolution and more fully developed than the standard picture contemplates. Highly stylized, the trajectory of innovation in contract we find is this: Private actors respond to exogenous shocks in their economic environments by changing existing structures or procedures to make them efficient under the new circumstances. The innovating parties stabilize their newly emergent practices through a variety of regimes – both bilateral and multilateral – with the goal of establishing the context through which the innovation is implemented. It is only at this point, and when a dispute is presented to them, that courts step in. If contract innovation does indeed reach generalist courts through the mediating institution of these contextualizing regimes, then our argument follows directly: Because a central goal of contract adjudication is to enforce the agreement in the context the parties intended, the courts\u27 willingness to defer to the context provided by the parties will put the law more directly in the service of innovation

Braiding: the Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine

This Article studies the relationship between formal and informal con tract enforcement The theoretical literature treats the two strategies as separate phenomena. By contrast, a rich experimental literature considers whether the introduction of formal contracting and state enforcement "crowds out" the operation of informal contracting. Both literatures focus too narrowly on how formal contracts create incentives for parties to perform substantive actions, while assuming that informal enforcement depends on preexisting levels of trust. As a result, current scholarship misses the relationship between formal and informal contract mechanisms that characterizes contemporary contracting in practice. Parties respond to ?sing uncertainty by writing contracts that intertwine formal and informal mechanisms?what we call "braiding"?in a way that allows each to assess the disposition and capacity of the other to respond cooperatively and effectively to unforeseen circumstances. These parties agree on formal contracts for exchanging information about the progress and prospects of their joint activities, and it is this information sharing regime that "braids" the formal and informal elements of the contract and endogenizes trust. We argue that the low-powered enforcement associated with the formal governance structure in these braided contracts complements rather than crowds out the informal mechanisms that rely on increasing levels of trust. We examine the braiding phenomenon in a variety of contexts characterized by increasing uncertainty. In each instance, courts appear to have harnessed the braiding phenomenon by using low-powered sanctions to protect formal contractual "preliminaries." This technique allows potential collaborators to explore and develop their relations, but it does not impose mutually enforceable obligations to pursue a particular project. Despite the wisdom of temperate enforcement of braided contracts, however, courts that emphasize the contemporary duty to negotiate in good faith are often tempted to expand the legal sanction. We conclude by explaining how courts can best support the braiding strategies that are critical to the success of an integrated regime of formal and informal contracting