2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties

The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear constraints, admits a rational solution and such a solution can be found in polynomial time using only an LP solver. If in addition, the game is succinct, i.e., the coefficients in its convex program are ``small'', then its solution can be found in strongly polynomial time. We also give a non-succinct linear game whose solution can be found in strongly polynomial time

Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley-Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms

Can we Rationally Learn to Coordinate?

In this paper we examine the issue whether individual rationality considerations are sufficient to guarantee that individuals will learn to coordinate. This question is central in any discussion of whether social phenomena (read: conventions) can be explained in terms of a purely individualistic approach. We argue that the positive answers to this general question that have been obtained in some recent work require assumptions which incorporate some convention. This conclusion may be seen as supporting the viewpoint of institutional individualism in contrast to psychological individualism

Reconstructing a Simple Polytope from its Graph

Blind and Mani (1987) proved that the entire combinatorial structure (the vertex-facet incidences) of a simple convex polytope is determined by its abstract graph. Their proof is not constructive. Kalai (1988) found a short, elegant, and algorithmic proof of that result. However, his algorithm has always exponential running time. We show that the problem to reconstruct the vertex-facet incidences of a simple polytope P from its graph can be formulated as a combinatorial optimization problem that is strongly dual to the problem of finding an abstract objective function on P (i.e., a shelling order of the facets of the dual polytope of P). Thereby, we derive polynomial certificates for both the vertex-facet incidences as well as for the abstract objective functions in terms of the graph of P. The paper is a variation on joint work with Michael Joswig and Friederike Koerner (2001).Comment: 14 page

Learn your opponent's strategy (in polynomial time)!

Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world. This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context, learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two-agent model, in which agents are represented by finite automata, and one of the agents plays a fixed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time. We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time

Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.Comment: 20 pages, 3 figures. This third version improves the overll presentation; Optimization and Control (math.OC), Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT), Probability (math.PR

Majority Dynamics and Aggregation of Information in Social Networks

Consider n individuals who, by popular vote, choose among q >= 2 alternatives, one of which is "better" than the others. Assume that each individual votes independently at random, and that the probability of voting for the better alternative is larger than the probability of voting for any other. It follows from the law of large numbers that a plurality vote among the n individuals would result in the correct outcome, with probability approaching one exponentially quickly as n tends to infinity. Our interest in this paper is in a variant of the process above where, after forming their initial opinions, the voters update their decisions based on some interaction with their neighbors in a social network. Our main example is "majority dynamics", in which each voter adopts the most popular opinion among its friends. The interaction repeats for some number of rounds and is then followed by a population-wide plurality vote. The question we tackle is that of "efficient aggregation of information": in which cases is the better alternative chosen with probability approaching one as n tends to infinity? Conversely, for which sequences of growing graphs does aggregation fail, so that the wrong alternative gets chosen with probability bounded away from zero? We construct a family of examples in which interaction prevents efficient aggregation of information, and give a condition on the social network which ensures that aggregation occurs. For the case of majority dynamics we also investigate the question of unanimity in the limit. In particular, if the voters' social network is an expander graph, we show that if the initial population is sufficiently biased towards a particular alternative then that alternative will eventually become the unanimous preference of the entire population.Comment: 22 page

Polytopality and Cartesian products of graphs

We study the question of polytopality of graphs: when is a given graph the graph of a polytope? We first review the known necessary conditions for a graph to be polytopal, and we provide several families of graphs which satisfy all these conditions, but which nonetheless are not graphs of polytopes. Our main contribution concerns the polytopality of Cartesian products of non-polytopal graphs. On the one hand, we show that products of simple polytopes are the only simple polytopes whose graph is a product. On the other hand, we provide a general method to construct (non-simple) polytopal products whose factors are not polytopal.Comment: 21 pages, 10 figure