Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions—or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure

On commutativity based edge lean search

Exploring a graph through search is one of the most basic building blocks of various applications. In a setting with a huge state space, such as in testing and verification, optimizing the search may be crucial. We consider the problem of visiting all states in a graph where edges are generated by actions and the (reachable) states are not known in advance. Some of the actions may commute, i.e., they result in the same state for every order in which they are taken (this is the case when the actions are performed independently by different processes). We show how to use commutativity to achieve full coverage of the states while traversing considerably fewer edges

Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the AI Access Foundation via the DOI in this record.A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.DFGEuropean Science FoundationNRF (Singapore)European Research CouncilHorizon 2020 European Research Infrastructure projectIsrael Science FoundationIsrael Ministry of Science and TechnologyGoogle Inter-University Center for Electronic Markets and AuctionsEuropean Social Fund (European Commission)Calabria Regio

DNA damage in mammalian cells and its relevance to lethality

From fourth symposium on microdosimetry; Pallanza, Italy (24 Sep 1973). Cell killing (loss of proliferative capacity) is a principal end point in all radiation effects contingent upon cell viability. DNA, the molecular carrier of the genetic inheritance, affects the affairs of a cell because the properties and characteristics of a cell are dictated by the DNA -- RNA -- protein axis of information storage, flow, and expression. Thus, the mutagenic and chromosome- breaking properties of radiation, the biological amplification available to a lesion in DNA, and the fact that DNA molecularly constitutes a very large radiation target, aH make DNA the principal target relative to many radiation effects. An indirect approach may be useful in studies of the sensitive targets in a mammalian cell. This stems from the fact that to kill cells with low LET radiation; sublethal damage must be accumulated and cells can repair this damage. Thus, focussing on DNA, and repair processes in DNA, while indirect, is supporied in the instance of cell killing by extensive experimental evidence. The status of damage registered directly in DNA may be assessed by examining changes in the sedimentation of DNA from irradiated cells. Along with measurements of cell survival, sedimentation data are discussed relative to their bearing on cell killing and their ability to help us understand the organization and replication of DNA in mammalian cells. (CH

False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time

False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10] for the probabilistic Banzhaf index. All these results provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley--Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic polynomial time", and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the number of false identities is fixed, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. It follows from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, which is considered highly unlikely

Neurology

Contains research objectives and reports on three research projects.Office of Naval Research (Nonr-609(39))U. S. Air Force (AF33(616)-7282)Army Chemical Corps (DA-18-108-405-Cml-942)U.S. Public Health Service (B-3055)U. S. Air Force (AF49(638)-1130)U.S. Public Health Service (B-3090

Proportional Rankings

In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that cohesive groups of voters are represented proportionally in each initial segment of the ranking. Proportional rankings are desirable in situations where initial segments of different lengths may be relevant, e.g., hiring decisions (if it is unclear how many positions are to be filled), the presentation of competing proposals on a liquid democracy platform (if it is unclear how many proposals participants are taking into consideration), or recommender systems (if a ranking has to accommodate different user types). We study the proportional representation provided by several ranking methods and prove theoretical guarantees. Furthermore, we experimentally evaluate these methods and present preliminary evidence as to which methods are most suitable for producing proportional rankings