A new method for the determination of the locking range of oscillators

A time-domain method for the determination of the injection-locking range of oscillators is presented. The method involves three time dimensions: the first and the second are warped time scales used for the free-running frequency and the external excitation, respectively and the third is to account for slow transients to reach a steady-state regime. The locking range is determined by tuning the frequency of the external excitation until the oscillator locks. The locking condition is determined by analyzing the Jacobian matrix of the system. The method is advantageous in that the computational effort is independent of the presence of widely separated time constants in the oscillator. Numerical results for a Van Der Pol oscillator are presented

The demographics of fund turnover

This article documents various demographic factors which influence mutual fund turnover including managerial experience, location, education, and gender. On average, funds in financial centers trade more but this excess turnover declines with experience. While most extra trading is concentrated among less experienced managers in financial centers, they do not outperform inexperienced managers located in smaller towns. Furthermore, managers in financial centers increase trading after good performance. This result is particularly strong for inexperienced, more educated male fund managers investing in growth stocks and located in New York. Our results provide strong evidence that demographic factors influence fund manager trading behavior.Labor market; Mutual funds; Overconfident trading; Performance evaluation

Digital Assignments: The Importance Of Pedagogical Context

We assess students appreciation and use of various tools designed to extend effective learning beyond the classroom. For a given tool, results vary depending upon the overall pedagogical approach of the course

The Interdependence between Mutual Fund Managers and Investors in Setting Fees

In the mutual fund industry, there is a unique endogeneity between managers and investors. If a manager wants to lower fees in the hopes of attracting investors, the investors will not react unless they believe the manager will maintain low fees for a period of time. A binding contract is one way for managers to signal their commitment to low fees. However, in practice, many mutual funds waive fees with no contractual agreement that they will continue to waive fees. We show in a theoretical framework that an equilibrium with waivers can arise without contracts as long as investors' are relatively inert and discount factors are high enough for manager's to care about future fees. Investors are not fooled by waivers and are fully informed of the manager's actions and ability. If past returns have information about future returns, waivers indirectly act as a performance-based salary.

Studies of Complexes of the Transition Metals. II. Cobalt Complex with Dithioloxalate

The cobalt (II) ion and dithioloxalate ion form a complex which is stable in a water solution and highly colored. The complex was studied by means of spectrophotometric methods in the visible region. By using the method of continuous variation of Job and the method of varying mole ratio, the composition of the complex was found to be that of three moles of ligand to one mole of cobalt. The overall formation constant of the complex was determined by the method of varying mole ratio and by successive dilutions of stoichiometric proportions of ligand and metal. The ionic strength of these solutions was kept constant at 0.1, and the measurements were made at room temperature. It was assured that the cobalt (III) complex was not present in the studies by oxidizing a cobalt (II) complex and determining its spectrum. The results of this research indicate that the cobalt complex with dithioloxalate is more stable than the corresponding oxygen complex

Do Shareholders' Preferences Affect their Funds' Management? Evidence from the Cross Section of Shareholders and Funds

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies, and we find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors. We find additional evidence in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds' portfolio weights. Nous étudions comment les gestionnaires de fonds réagissent aux préférences contradictoires de leurs investisseurs. Notre étude se concentre principalement sur les conflits entre les comptes taxés et les comptes de retraite des fonds internationaux qui font l'objet de compromis différents entre les gains en dividendes et les gains de capital. En théorie, les gestionnaires peuvent résoudre ces conflits par des opérations d'arbitrage sur les dividendes, mais une base de données privée d'opérations d'arbitrage fait apparaître qu'en pratique ils ne peuvent pas. Les gestionnaires doivent alors résoudre ces conflits à travers leurs politiques d'investissement, et nous trouvons des résultats significatifs montrant que ceux dont le capital est issu majoritairement des retraites favorisent les investisseurs de fonds de pension. Nous trouvons également des différences entre les poids des portefeuilles de fonds américains et canadiens.Dividend arbitrage, tax efficiency, agency issues, mutual funds, arbitrage sur les dividendes, taxes sur les rendements, placements pour compte, fonds commun de placement

How and Why do Investors Trade Votes, and What Does it Mean?

The standard analysis of corporate governance is that shareholders vote in the ratios that firms choose, such as one-share-one-vote. But if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders vote in the ratios that they themselves choose. We document an active market for votes within the equity-loan market, where we find that the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates these vote reallocations, and we find support for this view in the cross section of votes: there is more trade for higher-spread firms and more for poor performers, especially when the vote is close. We also find that the vote reallocations correspond to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals. L'analyse classique de la gouvernance d'entreprise suppose que les actionnaires votent selon les modalités choisies par la firme, par exemple un vote par action. Mais si les coûts associés à la séparation et à l'échange des votes sont suffisamment faibles, alors les actionnaires votent selon les modalités qu'ils ont eux-mêmes choisies. Nous présentons le cas d'un marché actif de votes au sein du marché des mises de fonds sous forme d'emprunts (equity loans), où nous constatons qu'en moyenne les votes se vendent pour rien. Nous supposons que l'asymétrie d'information provoque cette réallocation des votes, et nous étayons cette hypothèse à travers l'étude transversale des votes : le nombre d'opérations est plus important pour les compagnies dont l'écart acheteur-vendeur est plus élevé ainsi que pour celles dont les résultats sont plus faibles, particulièrement lorsque le vote est clos. Cette étude montre aussi que la réallocation des votes permet de soutenir les propositions des actionnaires et de s'opposer à celles des gestionnaires.vote trading, corporate governance, equity lending, information asymmetry, transaction de votes, gouvernance d'entreprise, prêt d'actions, asymétrie d'information

Space Weathering of Olivine: Samples, Experiments and Modeling

Olivine is a major constituent of chondritic bodies and its response to space weathering processes likely dominates the optical properties of asteroid regoliths (e.g. S- and many C-type asteroids). Analyses of olivine in returned samples and laboratory experiments provide details and insights regarding the mechanisms and rates of space weathering. Analyses of olivine grains from lunar soils and asteroid Itokawa reveal that they display solar wind damaged rims that are typically not amorphized despite long surface exposure ages, which are inferred from solar flare track densities (up to 10 (sup 7 y)). The olivine damaged rim width rapidly approaches approximately 120 nm in approximately 10 (sup 6 y) and then reaches steady-state with longer exposure times. The damaged rims are nanocrystalline with high dislocation densities, but crystalline order exists up to the outermost exposed surface. Sparse nanophase Fe metal inclusions occur in the damaged rims and are believed to be produced during irradiation through preferential sputtering of oxygen from the rims. The observed space weathering effects in lunar and Itokawa olivine grains are difficult to reconcile with laboratory irradiation studies and our numerical models that indicate that olivine surfaces should readily blister and amorphize on relatively short time scales (less than 10 (sup 3 y)). These results suggest that it is not just the ion fluence alone, but other variable, the ion flux that controls the type and extent of irradiation damage that develops in olivine. This flux dependence argues for caution in extrapolating between high flux laboratory experiments and the natural case. Additional measurements, experiments, and modeling are required to resolve the discrepancies among the observations and calculations involving solar wind processing of olivine