PERFECT RECALL AND PRUNING IN GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 1

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72986/1/j.1467-8640.1996.tb00256.x.pd

Quantum Matching Pennies Game

A quantum version of the Matching Pennies (MP) game is proposed that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm) setting. We construct the quantum game without using the state vectors, while considering only the quantum mechanical joint probabilities relevant to the EPR-Bohm setting. We embed the classical game within the quantum game such that the classical MP game results when the quantum mechanical joint probabilities become factorizable. We report new Nash equilibria in the quantum MP game that emerge when the quantum mechanical joint probabilities maximally violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt form of Bell's inequality.Comment: Revised in light of referees' comments, submitted to Journal of the Physical Society of Japan, 14 pages, 1 figur

An integrative framework of preemption strategies

Pre-print; author's draftThis paper performs a review of the various pre-emption strategies prescribed in the economics literature. These are cost superiority, consumers' switching cost, channel exclusivity, environmental barriers of entry and credible commitment to react aggressively. Through our analysis, we develop an integrative framework of the pre-emption strategies that will result in long-term payoffs to the firm. The framework proposes that there are two key dimensions—strategic advantage and strategic focus—and identify five generic types of pre-emption strategies for market incumbents. These are the switching cost, blockade, credible commitment, tie-up, and cost leadership strategies. The pre-emption strategies and the framework presented can assist managerial decision-making for the successful pre-emption of potential competition to complement their existing efforts

COVID-19 with stigma: Theory and evidence from mobility data

This study conducts both theoretical and empirical analyses of how the non-legally-binding policies originating from COVID-19 affect people's going-out behavior. The theoretical analysis assumes that under a declared state of emergency, the individual going out suffers psychological costs arising from both the risk of infection and the stigma of going out. Our hypothesis is derived that under a declared state of emergency, going out entails a strong psychological cost, and people refrain from going out. Then, this study estimates the model using regional mobility data and emergency declarations data to analyze self-restraint behavior under a non-legally binding emergency declaration. The results show that, compared with the pre-declaration of the state of emergency, going-out behavior under and after lifting of the state of emergency was suppressed even when the going-out behavior did not result in penalties, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis

Analyzing three-player quantum games in an EPR type setup

We use the formalism of Clifford Geometric Algebra (GA) to develop an analysis of quantum versions of three-player non-cooperative games. The quantum games we explore are played in an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type setting. In this setting, the players' strategy sets remain identical to the ones in the mixed-strategy version of the classical game that is obtained as a proper subset of the corresponding quantum game. Using GA we investigate the outcome of a realization of the game by players sharing GHZ state, W state, and a mixture of GHZ and W states. As a specific example, we study the game of three-player Prisoners' Dilemma.Comment: 21 pages, 3 figure

On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

We consider a principal-agent setting in which a manager’s compensation depends on a noisy performance signal, and the manager is granted the right to choose an (accounting) method to determine the value of the performance signal. We study the effect of the degree of such reporting discretion, measured by the number of acceptable methods, on the optimal contract, the expected cost of compensation, and the manager’s expected utility. We find that a minimal degree of discretion may be necessary for successful contracting. We also find that while an increase in reporting discretion never harms the manager, the effect on the expected cost of compensation is more subtle. We identify three main effects of increased reporting discretion and characterize the conditions under which the aggregate of these three effects will lead to a higher or lower cost of compensation. Finally, we find that when reporting discretion induces costly effort on the part of the manager, the optimal degree of discretion can be higher than when it is costless