Hyperthymic affective temperament and hypertension are independent determinants of serum brain-derived neurotrophic factor level

BACKGROUND: Brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) has neuroprotective, proangiogenic and myogenic effects and, therefore, possibly acts as a psychosomatic mediator. Here, we measured serum BDNF (seBDNF) level in hypertensive patients (HT) and healthy controls (CONT) and its relation to affective temperaments, depression and anxiety scales, and arterial stiffness parameters. METHODS: In this cross-sectional study, affective temperaments, anxiety, and depression were studied with questionnaires (TEMPS-A, HAM-A, and BDI, respectively). SeBDNF level and routine laboratory parameters were measured as well. Arterial stiffness was evaluated with a tonometric method. RESULTS: Allover, 151 HT, and 32 CONT subjects were involved in the study. SeBDNF level was significantly higher in HT compared to CONT (24880 +/- 8279 vs 21202.6 +/- 6045.5 pg/mL, p < 0.05). In the final model of regression analysis, hyperthymic temperament score (Beta = 405.8, p = 0.004) and the presence of hypertension (Beta = 6121.2, p = 0.001) were independent determinants of seBDNF. In interaction analysis, it was found that in HT, a unit increase in hyperthymic score was associated with a 533.3 (95 %CI 241.3-825.3) pg/mL higher seBDNF. This interaction was missing in CONT. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest a complex psychosomatic involvement of BDNF in the pathophysiology of hypertension, where hyperthymic affective temperament may have a protective role. BDNF is not likely to have an effect on large arteries

Philosophy of law in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies

The fate of Marxism in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies as the former’s extension owing to post-WWII occupation was from the beginning sealed by Bolshevism, that is, the politico-ideological domination and use of the scholarly domain as well, made to self-close in a merely justificatory role. There may have been attempts at opening, even if only conceivable within—i.e. preserving at the same time—this framework function. In the present conspectus, the limiting positions are occupied by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, completed by after-1968 Czechoslovakia, as well as Yugoslavia and pre-1968 Czechoslovakia, representing the substitute-to-religion dogmatic side, exclusively politically motivated in the former and subordinated to a humanising tendency in the latter case, on the one hand, and Poland, dedicated to a purely analytical approach, in which Marxism has simply no relevance, on the other. Hungary, treated in an earlier paper by the author, was in-between, taking Marxism seriously but mostly as a methodology, and thereby able to foster live debates. All that notwithstanding, there has been quite a few progressive moves also in Romania and Bulgaria in this specific academic field. Turning topoi of the discussions were, chronologically but recurrent transubstantiatedly, the exclusivity of Vyshinsky’s socialist normativism, the consequences ensuing from the law’s superstructural nature, the discontinuity vs. continuity of law in historical development, and, in the background, the dilemma of the ontological/epistemological understanding of Marxism, the latter standing for a rigid Leninist reducibility of law to its material substratum as the product of sheer reflection, and the former enabling to develop the law’s relative autonomy as in Lukács’ posthumous ontology. On the final analysis, all these forced paths made a whole region’s efforts to be belated as compared to international developments, the fact notwithstanding those outstanding achievements were born especially on the fields of legal ontology and sociology, as well as the legal methodology and particularly that of the comparison of laws