Policy Externalism

I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, I investigate some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies

Technology Transfer: A View from the Trenches

Dr. Drucker, who has lab-wide responsibility for technology transfer at Argonne National Laboratory, argues that transferring rights in discoveries made through tax supported research to private entities can contribute to public welfare in many ways

Block Sensitivity of Minterm-Transitive Functions

Boolean functions with symmetry properties are interesting from a complexity theory perspective; extensive research has shown that these functions, if nonconstant, must have high `complexity' according to various measures. In recent work of this type, Sun gave bounds on the block sensitivity of nonconstant Boolean functions invariant under a transitive permutation group. Sun showed that all such functions satisfy bs(f) = Omega(N^{1/3}), and that there exists such a function for which bs(f) = O(N^{3/7}ln N). His example function belongs to a subclass of transitively invariant functions called the minterm-transitive functions (defined in earlier work by Chakraborty). We extend these results in two ways. First, we show that nonconstant minterm-transitive functions satisfy bs(f) = Omega(N^{3/7}). Thus Sun's example function has nearly minimal block sensitivity for this subclass. Second, we give an improved example: a minterm-transitive function for which bs(f) = O(N^{3/7}ln^{1/7}N).Comment: 10 page

The Zoning in and the Zoning out of the Elderly: Emerging Community and Communication Patterns

Increasingly, senior only residences are zoning seniors out of mainstream residential areas and into segregated living and mature communities. Senior gated communities are variations on a theme of gated communities in which lifestyle is packaged and sold. Active adult retirement communities exclude the young and offer active lifestyle living, with diverse levels of senior living choices. Such an approach contrasts with policies designed to encourage aging in place. It is also distinct from Golden Age Zoning districts designed to allow affordable housing for senior citizens in a public/private partnership. Some towns have zoned public parks to establish areas for children distinct from the elderly. Simultaneously, more and more older adults are embracing the modern media environment. According to the Pew Research Center, baby boomers and seniors are the fastest growing group of social networking website users to connect with family, friends from the past, and seeking information and support with medical issues. This paper explores the person/place relationship and issues associated with design for the social needs of an aging in a media filled world

When propriety is improper

We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case