Nested identification of subjective probabilities

The theory of games against nature relies on complete preferences among all conceivable acts, i.e. among all potential assignments of consequeces to states of nature (case 1). Yet most decision problems call for choosing an element from a limited set of acts. And in games of strategy, the set of strategies available to a player is givent and not amenable to artificial extensions. In “Assessing Strategic Risk”,(ECON DP 2005-20) R.J. Aumann and J.H. Drèze extend the basic result of decision theory (maximisation of subjectvely expected utility) to situations where preferences are defined only for a given set of acts, and for lotteries among these and sure consequences (case 2). In this paper, we provide a similar extension for two other situations : those where only the set of optimal elements from a given set of acts is known (case 3); and those where only a single optimal act is known (case 4). To these four cases correspond four nested sets of admissible subjective probabilities over the states or the opponent’s strategies, namely a singleton in case 1 and increasing sets in cases 2-4. The results for case 3 and 4 also define the extent to which subjective probabilities must be specified in order to solve a given decision problem or play a given name.

Commodity Taxation and Social Welfare: The Generalised Ramsey Rule

Commodity taxes have three distinct roles: (1) revenue collection, (2) interpersonal redistribution, and (3) resource allocation. The paper presents an integrated treatment of these three concerns in a second-best general equilibrium framework, which leads to the "generalised Ramsey rule for optimum taxation. We show how many standard results on optimum taxation and tax reform have straightforward counterpart in this general framework. Using this framework, we also try to clarify the notion of "deadweight loss", as well as the relation between alternative distributional assumptions and the structure of optimum taxes.

Future of Mid-Day Meals

Spurred by a recent Supreme Court order, many Indian states have introduced cooked mid-day meals in primary schools. This article reports the findings of a recent survey which suggests that this initiative could have a major impact on child nutrition, school attendance and social equity. However, quality issues need urgent attention if mid-day meal programmes are to realise their full potential. Universal and nutritious mid-day meals would be a significant step towards the realisation of the right to food.School Meals, Educational Attainment, Health, India

Do consumers really know if the price is right ? Direct measures of references price are their implications for retailing

Reference price research suggest that consumers memorize and recall price information when selecting brands for frequently purchased products. In this study, we show that previous price-knowledge surveys provided imperfect estimates of reference price. Further, we propose to use a combination of price recall, price recognition, and deal recognition to measure representations to memorize prices. In addition we identify consumer and product characteristics that explain the variations in price knowledge.price knowledge; reference price; retailing

Assessing Strategic Risk

In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary’s choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic fondation for it.

When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value - what rational players may expect - and optimal strategies - how they should play to achieve that expectation. Seventy-seven years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic questions of value and optimal strategies are concerned. Equilibrium theories do not tell players how to play and what to expect; even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it is not at all clear that the players “should” play this equilibrium, nor that they should expect its payoff. Here, we return to square one : abandon all ideas of equilibrium and simply ask, how should rational players play, and what should they expect. We provide answers to both questions, for all n-persons games in strategic form.

When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value–what rational players may expect–and optimal strategies–how they should play to achieve that expectation. Seventyseven years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic questions of value and optimal strategies are concerned. Equilibrium theories do not tell players how to play and what to expect; even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it it is not at all clear that the players “should” play this equilibrium, nor that they should expect its payoff. Here, we return to square one: abandon all ideas of equilibrium and simply ask, how should rational players play, and what should they expect. We provide answers to both questions, for all n-person games in strategic form.

Consumers' immediate memory for prices

In this article, the authors examine the cognitive mechanics involved in keeping prices in short-terme memory for subsequent recall. Consumers code and store prices verbally, visually, and in terms of their magnitude. The encoding used influences immediate recall performance. The memorability of prices depends on their verbal length, usualness and overall magnitude. They find that the performance of consumers recall prices better than what previous digit span studies with simple numbers have suggested.consumer behavior; numerical cognition; price memory

Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria

The label “Keynes-Negishi equiibria” is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks - as posited in Negishi’s 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics. Such equilibria are defined in a general equilibrium model, and shown to exist. Methodological implications are briefly discussed in a concluding section.Equilibrium, imperfect competition, perceived demands, kinky demand, princing rules, union wage model, union objectives, cash-in-advance