140 research outputs found
LâinterprĂ©tation ordinaire, entre simulation et mĂ©ta-reprĂ©sentation
Cet essai porte sur quelques aspects de lâopposition entre un modĂšle perceptif de la communication, selon lequel le tĂ©moignage est une source de connaissance directe du fait tĂ©moignĂ©, et un modĂšle infĂ©rentiel de la communication, selon lequel le tĂ©moignage implique de la part du rĂ©cepteur une infĂ©rence Ă partir des signes utilisĂ©s, des Ă©tats mentaux de lâĂ©metteur et du reste du contexte. Ă partir dâune rĂ©flexion sur la nature de la capacitĂ© de mĂ©ta-reprĂ©sentation, et sur sa dĂ©pendance Ă lâĂ©gard des capacitĂ©s de perception sociale et de simulation, je montre que lâattribution dâĂ©tats mentaux souvent complexes Ă lâĂ©metteur nâempĂȘche pas le fonctionnement dâun mode primitif de communication dans lequel le rĂ©cepteur hĂ©rite directement de lâinformation transmise par lâĂ©metteur. La comprĂ©hension, aussi rĂ©flexive soit-elle, reste enracinĂ©e dans la tendance naturelle Ă accepter ce que lâĂ©metteur cherche Ă nous faire savoir.In this essay, I examine some aspects of the debate between a perceptual model of communication, according to which testimony is a source of knowledge about the communicated fact, and an inferential model of communication, according to which testimony requires from the hearer an inference from the used signs, the speakerâs mental states, and other features of the context. From a reflection on the nature of the capacity for metarepresentation, and its dependence on the capacities of social perception and simulation, I show that the ascription of even complex mental states to the speaker does not preclude communication from functioning on a mode in which the hearer directly inherits the information transmitted by the speaker. Understanding is grounded on the natural tendency to accept what is intelligibly presented to us as true
The Dynamics of Deictic Thoughts
Defense of a non-psychological dynamics of demonstrative thought
Qui a peur des qualia corporels?
Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside" (seeing oneself or another in pain). I sketch another reductionist analysis which is compatible with materialism, and according to which the intentional object of bodily awareness, unlike that of external perception, constitutively depends on the subject's experience
Is Memory Purely Preservative?
Dans cet essai, je me demande si la mĂ©moire est une source de connaissance authentique, ou au contraire si elle doit ĂȘtre considĂ©rĂ©e comme une maniĂšre de maintenir en place une connaissance acquise par d'autres moyens Ă©pistĂ©miques. Je me prononce en faveur de la premiĂšre option
La signification des expressions Ă©gocentriques
Cet article porte sur la distinction, courante en psychologie cognitive, entre une reprĂ©sentation Ă©gocentrique et une reprĂ©sentation allocentrique. Mon point de dĂ©part est la signification linguistique des expressions Ă©gocentriques du type "Ă gauche", "en haut", etc., et tout particuliĂšrement leur rapport au champ perceptif. Selon une certaine conception, l'utilisation de ces expressions est fondĂ©e sur l'existence d'un espace Ă©gocentrique, c'est-Ă -dire un espace lui-mĂȘme orientĂ© sur le plan prĂ©conceptuel. Cette notion d'espace Ă©gocentrique est nĂ©anmoins problĂ©matique si elle est liĂ©e Ă une thĂ©orie absolutiste du champ perceptif, selon laquelle l'orientation d'un Ă©lĂ©ment sensible peut varier indĂ©pendamment de la structure spatiale relationnelle du champ. Je prĂ©sente un argument contre la thĂ©orie absolutiste. Si cet argument est correct, une voie importante vers une dĂ©finition de la notion d'espace Ă©gocentrique est barrĂ©e. En conclusion, je propose plus simplement de rapporter la signification des expressions Ă©gocentriques Ă celle d'expressions non directement Ă©gocentriques du type "cet objet", "cette rĂ©gion", etc
Introspection, déploiement et simulation
Selon une thĂ©orie cognitiviste de lâauto-attribution, je peux parvenir Ă la connaissance directe, non-infĂ©rentielle de mes propres croyances. Cette thĂ©orie a Ă©tĂ© traditionnellement associĂ©e Ă la notion dâintrospection conçue comme source de connaissance interne. On sait (au moins depuis Wittgenstein) que le recours Ă cette notion compromet lâapplication Ă soi-mĂȘme dâun concept unifiĂ© de croyance, valable Ă©galement pour autrui. Dans cet essai, jâexplore une autre mĂ©thode dâauto-attribution, Ă©galement envisagĂ©e par Wittgenstein (et plus tard par Gareth Evans), que jâappelle « mĂ©thode de dĂ©ploiement ». Selon cette mĂ©thode, je parviens Ă la connaissance de mes croyances en portant mon attention, non pas Ă lâintĂ©rieur de moi-mĂȘme, mais directement sur le monde extĂ©rieur tel que je lâai trouvĂ©. Certains arguments wittgensteiniens suggĂšrent que la mĂ©thode de dĂ©ploiement conduit inexorablement au solipsisme. Je mâoppose Ă ces arguments, en mâinspirant de travaux rĂ©cents sur la thĂ©orie de la simulation mentale. Je parviens Ă deux conclusions gĂ©nĂ©rales. PremiĂšrement, la mĂ©thode de dĂ©ploiement nâest pas rĂ©servĂ©e Ă lâauto-attribution ; elle fonde Ă©galement lâattribution de croyances Ă autrui. En second lieu, on peut faire ressortir la spĂ©cificitĂ© de lâattribution Ă©gologique par le « matĂ©riau ontologique » auquel cette mĂ©thode sâapplique. Par exemple, je suis fondĂ© Ă croire que je crois quâil pleut parce que câest le fait quâil pleut, et non une simple possibilitĂ©, qui se prĂ©sente Ă moi lorsque je me tourne vers le monde. La mĂ©thode de dĂ©ploiement peut Ă©chapper au solipsisme si on lâassocie Ă une distinction ontologique naĂŻve entre des faits et de simples possibilitĂ©s.On a cognitivist account of self-ascription, I can have direct, non-inferential knowledge about my own beliefs. This account makes traditionally appeal to the notion of introspection, conceived as an internal source of knowledge. At least since Wittgenstein, many philosophers have justly worried that such a notion makes it impossible to make sense of the ascription of a unified notion of belief, which can be shared with others. In this essay, I explore another method of self-ascription, which was also envisaged by Wittgenstein (and later by Gareth Evans), which I call âthe method of deploymentâ. This method is such that I can gain knowledge about my own beliefs by attending not inwards but outwards, on the external world as I found it. Wittgenstein feared that the method of deployment would inevitably lead to solipsism. With reference to recent work in the theory of mental simulation, I try to show that Wittgensteinâs fear is ungrounded. I draw two general conclusions. First, the method of deployment does not concern self-ascription only ; it can also ground the ascription of beliefs to others. Second, what is special about self-ascription is the âontological substrateâ on which it is based. For instance, I am warranted in believing that I believe that it is raining because I am presented with the fact that it is raining, in contrast to a mere possibility. The method of deployment does not lead to solipsism if it is based on a naĂŻve ontological distinction between facts and mere possibilities
Situated Representations and Ad Hoc Concepts
Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and (at one time) John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental representations are âsituated' in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I explore some aspects of Recanati's own account. I focus on situated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and ad hoc or temporary concepts
From linguistic contextualism to situated cognition: the case of ad hoc concepts
Our utterances are typically if not always ââsituated,'' in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally represented. In this paper, I try to make precise the notion of representation at stake here. In one sense of ârepresentation', something is represented if it is inferentially relevant. In another, less demanding sense, something is represented if it is relevant to the construction of a contextsensitive, ad hoc concept. Ad hoc concepts act as ââproxies'' for cognitively more demanding representations. They ââimitate'' the latter's epistemic and pragmatic roles while being inferentially less sophisticated. Thus, there are two senses in which a thought can be said to be situated: (1) its truth-value is relative to a non-represented contextual parameter, (2) its truth-value is not itself relative, but it involves a context-sensitive, ad hoc concept
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