Wage and Employment Effects of Non-Binding Minimum Wages

Common wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages – and be harmful to employment – when bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.minimum wage, bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the minimum wage to a binding level increases the bargained wage above the new minimum wage level. While the Nash solution cannot explain the existence of spillover effects, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields results that are qualitatively more in line with our experimental findings.minimum wage, bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, labor market experiments

Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages

Common wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages – and be harmful to employment – when bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Gender differences in experimental wage negotiations

We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that male players are able to obtain better bargaining outcomes than female players. Male employees get higher wages than female employees. Male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees. Moreover, we find gender differences in the first offers of the bargaining game

Ericson fluctuations in an open, deterministic quantum system: theory meets experiment

We provide numerically exact photoexcitation cross sections of rubidium Rydberg states in crossed, static electric and magnetic fields, in quantitative agreement with recent experimental results. Their spectral backbone underpins a clear transition towards the Ericson regime.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the minimum wage to a binding level increases the bargained wage above the new minimum wage level. While the Nash solution cannot explain the existence of spillover effects, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields results that are qualitatively more in line with our experimental findings

Sediment transport over static armour layers and its impact on bed stability

River morphodynamics and sediment transportRiver morphology and morphodynamic

Contribution of secondary currents to momentum fluxes in natural river flows

River hydrodynamicsBed roughness and flow resistanc