The Power of Empty Promises: Quasidemocratic Institutions and Activism in China

In authoritarian regimes, seemingly liberal reforms are often poorly implemented in practice. However, this study argues that even weak quasidemocratic institutions can offer important resources to political activists. Formal institutions of participation offer politically anodyne frames for activism, allowing activists to distance themselves from political taboos. Weak institutions also allow activists to engineer institutional failures that fuel legal and media-based campaigns. Evidence comes from the effects of China’s 2008 Open Government Information reform. A national field audit finds that local governments satisfy just 14% of citizen requests for basic information. Yet case studies show how Chinese activists exploited the same institution to extract concessions from government agencies and pursue policy change in disparate issue areas. These findings highlight the importance of looking beyond policy implementation to understand the effects of authoritarian institutions on political accountability

The Power of Empty Promises: Quasidemocratic Institutions and Activism in China

In authoritarian regimes, seemingly liberal reforms are often poorly implemented in practice. However, this study argues that even weak quasidemocratic institutions can offer important resources to political activists. Formal institutions of participation offer politically anodyne frames for activism, allowing activists to distance themselves from political taboos. Weak institutions also allow activists to engineer institutional failures that fuel legal and media-based campaigns. Evidence comes from the effects of China’s 2008 Open Government Information reform. A national field audit finds that local governments satisfy just 14% of citizen requests for basic information. Yet case studies show how Chinese activists exploited the same institution to extract concessions from government agencies and pursue policy change in disparate issue areas. These findings highlight the importance of looking beyond policy implementation to understand the effects of authoritarian institutions on political accountability

Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China

Why do nondemocratic regimes provide constituency service? This study develops theory based on a national field audit of China’s “Mayor’s Mailbox,” an institution that allows citizens to contact local political officials. Analyzing government responses to over 1,200 realistic appeals from putative citizens, we find that local service institutions in China are comparably responsive to similar institutions in democracies. Two key predictors of institutional quality are economic modernization and the intensity of local social conflict. We explain these findings by proposing a demand-driven theory of nondemocratic constituency service; in order to sustain the informational benefits of citizen participation, the responsiveness of service institutions must increase with citizen demand. We then offer supplementary evidence for this theory by analyzing the content of real letters from citizens to local officials in China. Keywords: authoritarian regimes; institutions; constituency service; responsiveness; Chin

Constituency Service Under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China

Why do nondemocratic regimes provide constituency service? This study develops theory based on a national field audit of China's "Mayor's Mailbox," an institution that allows citizens to contact local political officials. Analyzing government responses to over twelve hundred realistic appeals from putative citizens, we find local service institutions in China are comparably responsive to similar institutions in democracies. Two key predictors of institutional quality are economic modernization and the intensity of local social conflict. We explain these findings by proposing a demand-driven theory of nondemocratic constituency service; in order to sustain the informational benefits of citizen participation, service institutions must increase responsiveness according to citizen demand. We then offer supplementary evidence for this theory by analyzing the content of real letters from citizens to local officials in China

Does Compliance Pay? Social Standards and Firm-Level Trade

What is the relationship between trade and social institutions in the developing world? The research literature is conflicted: Importing firms may demand that trading partners observe higher labor and environmental standards, or they may penalize higher standards that raise costs. This study uses new data on retailers and manufacturers to analyze how firm-level trade responds to information about social standards. Contrary to the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, it finds that retail importers reward exporters for complying with social standards. In difference-in-differences estimates from over 2,000 manufacturing establishments in 36 countries, achieving compliance is associated with a 4% [1%, 7%] average increase in annual purchasing. The effect is driven largely by the apparel industry—a long-term target of anti-sweatshop social movements—suggesting that activist campaigns can shape patterns of global trade

Global Purchasing as Labor Regulation: The Missing Middle

Do purchasing practices support or undermine the regulation of labor standards in global supply chains? This study offers the first analysis of the full range of supply chain regulatory efforts, integrating records of factory labor audits with purchase order microdata. Studying an apparel and equipment retailer with a strong reputation for addressing labor conditions in its suppliers, we show that it persuaded factories to improve and terminated factories with poor labor compliance. However, we also find that purchase orders did not increase when labor standards improved. If anything, factories whose standards worsened tended to see their orders increase. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this “missing middle” in incentives for compliance appears unrelated to any cost advantage of noncompliant factories.Instead, lack of flexibility in supplier relationships created obstacles to reallocating orders in response to compliance findings

Leistung

Der Begriff "Leistung" ist in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft omnipräsent. Doch auf die Frage, was Leistung ist, folgt in der Regel Schweigen. Lars Distelhorst geht in seinem Essay dieser Leerstelle auf den Grund und vermag so eine tiefgehende Kritik an der "Leistungsgesellschaft" zu üben. Er zeigt: Jede Rede von Leistung mündet in einen unauflösbaren Widerspruch. Was hinter dem Leistungsbegriff liegt, ist nicht weniger als die Leere einer Gesellschaft, deren Zentrum in der Akkumulationsbewegung des Kapitals zu suchen ist, während sie die letzten Karten der Ideologie spielt

Leistung: Das Endstadium der Ideologie

Der Begriff »Leistung« ist in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft omnipräsent. Doch auf die Frage, was Leistung ist, folgt in der Regel Schweigen. Lars Distelhorst geht in seinem Essay dieser Leerstelle auf den Grund und vermag so eine tiefgehende Kritik an der »Leistungsgesellschaft« zu üben. Er zeigt: Jede Rede von Leistung mündet in einen unauflösbaren Widerspruch. Was hinter dem Leistungsbegriff liegt, ist nicht weniger als die Leere einer Gesellschaft, deren Zentrum in der Akkumulationsbewegung des Kapitals zu suchen ist, während sie die letzten Karten der Ideologie spielt.The term »performance« is omnipresent in politics, economy, and society. Yet when a definition of performance is requested, the response is usually silence. Tracking down the reason for this is the goal of this book. It stands out from the widespread criticisms of meritocracy, by proving how all the rhetoric about performance leads to an irreconcilable contradiction. Lars Distelhorst explains: What can be seen behind the concept of performance is the emptiness of a society whose center lies in the movement of capital accumulation, while she plays the last cards of ideology

Publicity-driven accountability in China

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references.What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest.by Gregory Michael Distelhorst.Ph.D

Leistung

Der Begriff "Leistung" ist in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft omnipräsent. Doch auf die Frage, was Leistung ist, folgt in der Regel Schweigen. Lars Distelhorst geht in seinem Essay dieser Leerstelle auf den Grund und vermag so eine tiefgehende Kritik an der "Leistungsgesellschaft" zu üben. Er zeigt: Jede Rede von Leistung mündet in einen unauflösbaren Widerspruch. Was hinter dem Leistungsbegriff liegt, ist nicht weniger als die Leere einer Gesellschaft, deren Zentrum in der Akkumulationsbewegung des Kapitals zu suchen ist, während sie die letzten Karten der Ideologie spielt