A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates

We model the term structure of interest rates as resulting from the interaction between investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities and risk-averse arbitrageurs. Because arbitrageurs are risk averse, shocks to clienteles’ demand for bonds affect the term structure— and constitute an additional determinant of bond prices to current and expected future short rates. At the same time, because arbitrageurs render the term structure arbitrage-free, demand effects satisfy no-arbitrage restrictions and can be quite different from the underlying shocks. We show that the preferred-habitat view of the term structure generates a rich set of implications for bond risk premia, the effects of demand shocks and of shocks to short-rate expectations, the economic role of carry trades, and the transmission of monetary policy

A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

Treasury Market, Liquidity, Search

Equilibrium interest rate and liquidity premium with transaction costs.

In this paper we study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices. We assume an overlapping generations economy with two riskless assets. The first asset is liquid while the second asset carries proportional transaction costs. We show that agents buy the liquid asset for short-term investment and the illiquid asset for long-term investment. When transaction costs increase, the price of the liquid asset increases. The price of the illiquid asset decreases if the asset is in small supply, but may increase if the supply is large. These results have implications for the effects of transaction taxes and commission deregulation.

Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions.

We propose a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion bias; that is, they fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive. We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social influence, whereby one’s influence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the social network that determines communication. Persuasion bias also implies the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions; that is, individuals’ opinions over a multidimensional set of issues converge to a single “left-right” spectrum. We explore the implications of our model in several natural settings, including political science and marketing, and we obtain a number of novel empirical implications.

A Model of Persuasion - With Implications for Financial Markets

We propose a model of the phenomenon of persuasion. We argue that individual beliefs evolve in a way that overweights the opinions and information of individuals whom they "listen to" relative to other individuals. Such agents can be understood to be acting as though they believe they listen to a representative sample of the individuals with valuable information, even though they may not. We analyze dynamics and convergence of beliefs, characterizing when agents' beliefs converge over time to the same beliefs, and when they instead diverge. Convergent beliefs can be characterized as the weighted average of agents' initial beliefs, and these weights can be interpreted as a measure of ``influence.'' We then explore implications in an asset trading setting. Here we demonstrate that agents profit from being influential as well as being accurate. When agents' choice of whom to listen to is endogenous, we show that an individual's influence can be persistent, even though the individual may be inaccurate.

The dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage

We develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets traded in segmented markets, and in doing so provide liquidity to investors. A collateral constraint limits their positions as a function of capital. We show that the dynamics of arbitrage activity are self-correcting: following a shock that depletes arbitrage capital, profitability increases, and this allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more and recover faster for more volatile trades, although arbitrageurs cut their positions in these trades the least. When arbitrage capital is more mobile across markets, liquidity in each market generally becomes less volatile, but the reverse may hold for aggregate liquidity because of mobility-induced contagion

The analytics of the Greek crisis: celebratory centenary issue

We provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis of 2010. We first benchmark the crisis against all episodes of sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts in emerging and advanced economies since 1980. The decline in Greece’s output, especially investment, is deeper and more persistent than in almost any crisis on record over that period. We then propose a stylized macro-finance model to understand what happened. We find that a severe macroeconomic adjustment was inevitable given the size of the fiscal imbalance; yet a sizable share of the crisis was also the consequence of the sudden stop that started in late 2009. Our model suggests that the size of the initial macro/financial imbalances can account for much of the depth of the crisis. When we simulate an emerging market sudden stop with initial debt levels (government, private, and external) of an advanced economy, we obtain a Greek crisis. Finally, in recent years, the lack of recovery appears driven by elevated levels of non-performing loans and strong price rigidities in product markets

The Greek crisis: an autopsy

The Greek crisis is one of the worst in history, even in the context of recorded ‘trifecta’ crises – the combination of a sudden stop with output collapse, a sovereign debt crisis, and a lending boom/bust. This column quantifies the role of each of these factors to better understand the crisis and formulate appropriate policy responses. While fiscal consolidation was important in driving the drop in output, it accounted for only for half of that drop. Much of the remainder can be explained by the higher funding costs of the government and private sectors due to the sudden stop