618 research outputs found
Key exchange with the help of a public ledger
Blockchains and other public ledger structures promise a new way to create
globally consistent event logs and other records. We make use of this
consistency property to detect and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks in a key
exchange such as Diffie-Hellman or ECDH. Essentially, the MitM attack creates
an inconsistency in the world views of the two honest parties, and they can
detect it with the help of the ledger. Thus, there is no need for prior
knowledge or trusted third parties apart from the distributed ledger. To
prevent impersonation attacks, we require user interaction. It appears that, in
some applications, the required user interaction is reduced in comparison to
other user-assisted key-exchange protocols
On the Design of Cryptographic Primitives
The main objective of this work is twofold. On the one hand, it gives a brief
overview of the area of two-party cryptographic protocols. On the other hand,
it proposes new schemes and guidelines for improving the practice of robust
protocol design. In order to achieve such a double goal, a tour through the
descriptions of the two main cryptographic primitives is carried out. Within
this survey, some of the most representative algorithms based on the Theory of
Finite Fields are provided and new general schemes and specific algorithms
based on Graph Theory are proposed
Analysis of common attacks in LDPCC-based public-key cryptosystems
We analyze the security and reliability of a recently proposed class of
public-key cryptosystems against attacks by unauthorized parties who have
acquired partial knowledge of one or more of the private key components and/or
of the plaintext. Phase diagrams are presented, showing critical partial
knowledge levels required for unauthorized decryptionComment: 14 pages, 6 figure
A New View on Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions for NP Problems
We study the result by Bogdanov and Trevisan (FOCS, 2003), who show that
under reasonable assumptions, there is no non-adaptive worst-case to
average-case reduction that bases the average-case hardness of an NP-problem on
the worst-case complexity of an NP-complete problem. We replace the hiding and
the heavy samples protocol in [BT03] by employing the histogram verification
protocol of Haitner, Mahmoody and Xiao (CCC, 2010), which proves to be very
useful in this context. Once the histogram is verified, our hiding protocol is
directly public-coin, whereas the intuition behind the original protocol
inherently relies on private coins
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows two principals communicating over a public network, and each holding public /private keys, to agree on a shared secret value. In this paper we study the natural extension of this cryptographic problem to a group of principals. We begin from existing formal security models and refine them to incorporate major missing details (e.g., strong-corruption and concurrent sessions). Within this model we define the execution of a protocol for authenticated dynamic group Diffie-Hellman and show that it is provably secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our security result holds in the standard model and thus provides better security guarantees than previously published results in the random oracle model
Horizon formation and far-from-equilibrium isotropization in supersymmetric Yang-Mills plasma
Using gauge/gravity duality, we study the creation and evolution of
anisotropic, homogeneous strongly coupled supersymmetric
Yang-Mills plasma. In the dual gravitational description, this corresponds to
horizon formation in a geometry driven to be anisotropic by a time-dependent
change in boundary conditions.Comment: 4 pages, typos corrected, published versio
Chosen-ciphertext security from subset sum
We construct a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme whose
security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of the Subset Sum problem. Our scheme achieves the standard notion of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) and can be used to encrypt messages of arbitrary polynomial length, improving upon a previous construction by Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev (TCC 2010) which achieved only the weaker notion of semantic security (IND-CPA) and whose concrete security decreases with the length of the message being encrypted. At the core of our construction is a trapdoor technique which originates in the work of Micciancio and Peikert (Eurocrypt 2012
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