1,665 research outputs found
Mergers in Emerging Markets with Network Externalities: The Case of Telecoms
This paper develops a unifying framework to understand competition issues in networkindustries. It focuses on the telecom(munication) industry and takes two specific effectsof this industry into account. First, the telecom industry is in continuous evolution andalliances affect not only the current market power of the firms but also the evolution ofthe industry. Second, the production of services in the industry is evolving towards theprovision of integrated services in a "system" that benefits from strong "networkexternalities". The analysis suggests that the antitrust authorities should capture as wellsuch effects as the magnitude of the installed bases, the compatibility of the allianceâssystem with other systems, the switching costs for customers and application writers,and the "credibility" of the alliance to offer the service. The developed frameworkbuilds on the existing models of networks and combines the different network effects. The relevance of the framework is shown for two important merger cases (WorldCom-MCI and MSG cases), involving respectively an existing market and an emerging one. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (UnternehmenszusammenschlĂźsse in entstehenden Märkten mit Netzexternalitäten: Das Beispiel der Telekommunikationsindustrie) In diesem Beitrag wird ein einheitlicher Bezugsrahmen zur Analyse des Wettbewerbs in Netzwerkindustrien entwickelt. Er zielt auf die Analyse der Telekommunikationsindustrie ab und berĂźcksichtigt dabei spezielle Effekte dieser Industrie. Erstens ist die Telekommunikationsindustrie durch eine stetige Evolution gekennzeichnet und Allianzen zwischen den Unternehmen beeinflussen nicht nur die aktuelle Marktmacht der Unternehmen, sondern auch die Entwicklung der Industrie. Zweitens entwickelt sich die Produktion der Dienste in dieser Industrie immer stärker in Richtung auf das Angebot integrierter Dienste (Systemangebote), die Vorteile aus Netzexternalitäten nutzen. Die Analyse zeigt auch, daĂ die WettbewerbsbehĂśrden ebenfalls Merkmale wie die Anzahl der verfĂźgbaren AnschlĂźsse, die Kompatibilität des Systems der Allianz mit anderen Systemen, die Wechselkosten der Kunden sowie die GlaubwĂźrdigkeit der Dienstleistungsqualität der Allianz berĂźcksichtigen sollten. Der entwickelte Bezugsrahmen stĂźtzt sich auf die vorhandenen Netzmodelle und kombiniert die unterschiedlichen Netzeffekte und -merkmale. Die Bedeutung des Ansatzes wird am Beispiel von zwei wichtigen Fusionsfällen aufgezeigt (WorldCom-MCI und MSG), bei denen es sich jeweils um einen existierenden und einen entstehenden Markt handelt.
The treatment of distressed banks.
This article suggests some reforms of regulatory architecture for the treatment of distressed banks. Our main recommendations are: ⢠a special bankruptcy regime for banks should be implemented ; ⢠strong, truly independent supervisory agencies should be established ; ⢠the incentives of the top managers of distressed banks should not be kept unchecked ; ⢠procyclicality of solvency regulations should be dampened by the introduction of âautomatic stabilisersâ ; ⢠one should move toward centralised supervision in economic areas which are meant to be integrated.
Transferable Control
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message-contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control
Uncertainty, informational spillovers and policy reform: A gravity model approach
This is the post-print version of the final paper published in the European Journal of Political Economy. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2013 Elsevier B.V.Reforms often occur in waves, seemingly cascading from country to country. We argue that such reform waves can be driven by informational spillovers: uncertainty about the outcome of reform is reduced by learning from the experience of similar countries. We motivate this hypothesis with a simple theoretical model of informational spillovers and learning, and then test it empirically using an approach inspired by the gravity model. We find evidence of informational spillovers both with respect to both political and economic liberalization. While the previous literature has focused only on economic reform, we find that the spillovers are particularly important for political changes.Italian Ministry of Education,
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Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disad- vantages of academic and private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control- rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector's ability to direct scientists towards higher-payo¤ activities makes it more attractive for later-stage re- search.
Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investorâs earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneurâs incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a non-debt simple contract achieves efficiency â the non-contractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the non-contractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity-like claims.Moral hazard, renegotiation, convertible debt, capital structure
Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time, the private sector%u2019s ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more attractive for later-stage research.
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