Mobility and reliefs for traveling expenses to work

This paper proposes the question whether or not traveling expenses to work should be deductible from the income tax base. In order to answer this question, a simple model of (im-) perfect household and worker mobility is employed. The focus of the analysis is on the efficient use of land and the efficient allocation of people and labor in a multi-region framework. The paper shows that deductibility is inefficient only if households are perfectly mobile and if households cannot choose their place of work. If the region of work is not exogenously fixed, traveling expenses to work should be deductible at more than one hundred percent, even if households choose simultaneously the place of work and the region of residence, and even if tax rates are not standardized within the federation. --income taxation,reliefs,household mobility,labor mobility,raveling expenses to work,optimum taxation

Unemployment, commuting, and search intensity

Employing a standard matching unemployment model extended by within-labor-market-regions commuting, this paper analyzes the tradeoff between commuting costs and unemployment. Depending on whether commuters are able to bargain for fringe benefits, search may or may not be biased towards distant workplaces and less productive centers. As a consequence, unemployment benefits should be tied to search in high productivity regions. Using German county data, the paper tests some positive predictions that emerge from of the model. In particular, it confirms that increasing labor market tightness reduces the willingness to out-commute. --unemployment,matching,commuting,search,labor market policy

Tax Deductibility of Commuting Expenses and Residential Land Use with more than one Center

This paper analyzes the treatment of commuting expenses by the income tax code from a normative and a positive point of view within a continuous space framework with endogenous residence choices and perfect labor mobility. As commuting expenses should never be deductible from the income tax base in a first-best world, deductibility might well be the outcome of a second-best-optimum-tax approach provided that not all factors of production were mobile. Non-deductibility might be justified by a lack of instruments to internalize environmental and congestion externalities or by perfect mobility of all production factors. However, the existence of deductions in many coun-tries can be easily explained within a public choice framework by redistribution from non-commuters to commuters.Income tax, relief, residential land use, labor mobility, commuting expenses, optimum taxation

Voting for mobile citizens

This paper analyzes inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using the citizen-candidate model. It focuses on conflicting interests among regions and among citizens of varying mobility. If discrimination with respect to place of residence and degree of mobility is possible, diversity of interests is high. Under the plurality rule and with sincere voting, the largest socioeconomic group of citizens supplies the winning candidate and discriminates against all other groups. However, if discrimination with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained, mobile citizens may gain power and interregional redistribution is reduced.Voting, mobility, inter- and intraregional redistribution, discrimination

Multinational Capital Structure and Tax Competition

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational's affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. If the formula is predominately based on capital shares and if there is a positive debt externality there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment.Multinational enterprises, financial policy, profit shifting, corporate taxation, tax competition.

A note on reliefs for traveling expenses to work

Assuming that higher traveling expenses reduce traveling time, this paper considers reliefs for traveling expenses to work when a distorting wage tax is levied. While the decision on traveling expenses would not be distorted if traveling costs were completely deductible, taxation would still not be neutral with respect to the leisure-consumption choice. Moreover, the paper shows that second-best optimum taxation requires less than complete deductibility of traveling expenses to work. --income taxation,reliefs,traveling expenses to work,optimum taxation

Heterogeneous Skills and Homogeneous Land: Segmentation and Agglomeration

This paper analyzes the impact of skill heterogeneity on regional patterns of production and housing in the presence of pecuniary externalities within a general-equilibrium framework assuming monopolistic competition at intermediate good markets. It shows that the interplay of heterogeneous skills and relatively homogeneous land demand triggers skill segmentation and agglomeration. The core region, being more attractive to high skilled workers, has a disproportionately large share of production at all levels of the supply chain. The paper studies the effects on segmentation and agglomeration of interregional trade in intermediate goods, attachment to home, the presence of immobile unskilled workers, various conditions at local land markets, and federal taxation.Skill heterogeneity, land use, segmentation, agglomeration.

Multinational Capital Structure and Tax Competition

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational’s affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction’s tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. If the debt externality is not negative, there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment.multinational enterprises, financial policy, profit shifting, corporate taxation, tax competition

Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It shows that equalization of standardized tax revenue improves the spatial allocation of capital provided that agglomeration externalities are sufficiently strong.Agglomeration, tax competition, fiscal equalization

Health Values, Preference Inconsistency, and Insurance Demand

Several empirical studies provide evidence that their actual health state affects people’s attitudes towards health and medical care in hypothetical health states. In the tradition of behavioural economics this paper considers the actual health state as a point of reference and builds a model for studying the implications of this phenomenon on health insurance and on demand for medical care. It considers the insurance demand of different types of agents: naive individuals, individuals who are able to commit to medical care demand and sophisticated individuals. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether inconsistency of preferences reinforces or tones down moral hazard problems.health insurance, medical care, health state, behavioural economics, prospect theory, time inconsistency