Theory and Test on the Corporate Governance of Financial Cooperative Systems: Merger vs. Networks

This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of financial cooperatives (FC). The first part presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost economics (TCE) that seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. The second part is an empirical study that compares X-efficiency between members of the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM) and the United States Credit Union system (USCU), the first organized as a tight network of institutions and the second composed largely by independent institutions with few ties. The fundamental proposition is that networks, are a superior form of governance mechanism (over markets and mergers) for relatively wide and relevant ranges of contractual hazard and size of the institutions. Further, that networks provide substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms, discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences by agents, both occurring in large FC. The theory allows us to generate a set of testable hypothesis of which we highlight three: i) For small FC, differences in efficiency will be relatively small, if any. ii) Large institutions should display systematically lower efficiency than similar sized FC members of strategic networks. iii) Networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators. Throughout, empirical results are consistent with our central theoretical proposition.Transaction cost economics, financial cooperatives, credit unions, networks, corporate governance, technical efficiency, X-efficiency

Music, Padlocks and the Commons

Depuis l’avènement des formats de compression numérique et des services d’échange point à point (Peer-to-Peer) comme Napster, l’industrie du disque est en émoi. Plus fondamentalement, il y a lieu de se questionner sur ce qui apparaît comme une crise d’efficacité du droit d’auteur. Si les copistes semblent avoir pris de court de puissants intérêts, les contre-mesures ne sauraient tarder à venir. L’apparition de protections techniques ­ Trusted Systems ­ présage une ère de contrôle total par les titulaires de droits. L’«hyper efficacité» bouleversera le rapport à l’œuvre, entraînant du même souffle un déséquilibre dans les dimensions privée et publique du droit d’auteur.Since the advent of the digital compression formats and Peer-to-Peer transaction services like Napster, the recording industry is in a state of disarray. Fundamentally, there is reason to reflect on what appears to be a copyright efficacy crisis. While the copyists seemed to have gained an upper hand against some powerful interests, countermeasures are in the wake. The foreseeable implementation of secured formats, so-called Trusted Systems, portends an era of total control by the titleholders. ‘Super efficacy’ will radically change in relation to the work, compromising the balance struck between the private and public dimensions of copyright law

The Growing Imbalance: Recent Trends in U.S. Postsecondary Education Finance

Compares trends at public, private, and research institutions in enrollment, revenues, and spending as well as their effect on bottom lines; analyzes widening disparities; and considers implications for improving the affordability of higher education

Efficiency and Expense Preference in Philippines' Cooperative Rural Banks

This paper attempted to test whether efficient cooperative rural banks (CRBs) have a better control of their agency costs. We used two different concepts of efficiency, namely, cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency, and found somewhat different results from both approaches. Using Stochastic Frontier Approach and Distribution Free Approach, we tested two different propositions. The first proposition is that an adequate corporate governance scheme should improve efficiency of CRBs. We failed to find very conclusive evidence that corporate governance theories apply to the Philippines’ CRBs. However, the results confirmed both managers’ compensation theory and large stakeholders theory. The second proposition is that agency costs should reduce efficiency of CRBs, and we found a much clearer relationship on that issue. As expected, most efficient CRBs are characterized by a better control of agency costs. These results are in accordance with previous studies on shirking behavior among mutual financial intermediaries. We also found that rural CRBs are most profit-efficient, despite their somewhat regular cost-efficiency, a manifestation that they are able to charge higher fees for the quality of services they offer. Large CRBs are not able to pass their higher costs to customers through higher fees. We found that small CRBs might have a better interest rate policy, that is, they offer lower rates on both loans and deposits.Agency costs, Corporate Governance, Stochastic Cost Function, X-Efficiency

Les isoloirs

Choco n’est pas un type standard. Voilà ce que répète le patron de La Caboose depuis deux ans. Pour commencer, Choco est immense. Plus de deux mètres. Cent vingt kilos de muscles. Ensuite, Choco est le seul homme noir du bar. Ni crips, ni blood, ni motard, ni mafieux, seulement noir. Aux curieux, Choco raconte qu’il n’a pas besoin d’affiliations pour faire sa place, qu’il travaille en solo, en artiste. « C’est que j’en suis un, moi, un artiste. » À ce propos, personne ne le contredit. Personne n’oserait

La terre de personne : [le Madrid]

Jérémie et Liliane n’ont pas terminé leurs grilled cheese, et leurs Tetra Pak de jus de pomme sont vides. Charles a déjà réglé l’addition. Devant la porte du restaurant, un homme tend un sac de voyage à une femme. Ils se regardent sans parler. Un petit garçon est plaqué contre la femme, la tête pressée contre sa hanche, le pouce dans la bouche. Charles consulte sa montre. Son ex-femme devait arriver il y a trente minutes. Il s’en veut d’avoir rangé les cahiers à colorier au fond des sacs. Les enfants fixent un des téléviseurs de la salle à manger. Leurs traits sont tirés. Chez lui, ils dorment mal, trop de bruit, trop peu d’espace. Charles aurait mieux fait de passer son tour cette fin de semaine. La grippe qu’il garde à distance depuis vendredi est en train d’éclore. Scusez… J’prendrais un p’tit refill de café. En ce milieu de dimanche après-midi, la salle à manger du Madrid ressemble à une zone de transit. La plupart des tables sont occupées par des pères divorcés et leurs enfants. Même s’il figure parmi les nouveaux venus, Charles reconnaît quelques visages