The Western-Islamic “Clash of Civilizations”: The Inadvertent Contribution of the Bush Presidency

This article argues that policies of the Bush administration since 11 September 2001, have had -- perhaps inadvertently -- the effect of generating facts on the ground that have led to the self-fulfilling realization of realities corresponding to Samuel Huntington\u27s contentious concept of the clash of civilizations in relations between the Western and Islamic “worlds”. One of the significant indicators of this phenomenon has been the counterproductive, self-defeating impact of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq on the war on terror, with all available information, even from the CIA and other U.S. governmental sources, agreeing that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq has actually become more a part of the problem than of the solution. In addition to documenting the perhaps counter-intuitive impact of President Bush\u27s policies on exacerbating the factors making for global terrorism -- and enhancing the motivation of those who are prepared to give up their lives in the execution of acts of catastrophic terrorism -- the article briefly explores policies that could turn this situation around

A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach

Excerpt As I contemplate the rise worldwide in intrastate (in contrast to interstate) conflicts (see, e.g., van Creveld, 1991 and K. Holsti, 1996), leading to Yugoslavian and Rwandan-type situations, I sense the need to do something about them. As Rousseau has said, wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). And quite frankly, there are few, if any, mechanisms worldwide relevant to staving off a future Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and the like (see Lund, 1996): witness the unfolding of the violent Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo into a possible, wider Balkan war (see, e.g., Nordland and Watson, 1998; Finn, 1999; Dinmore, 1999a, 1999b)

Virulent Ethnocentrism and Conflict Intractability: Puzzles and Challenges for 3rd Party Intervenors

This article addresses complex identity-based conflicts, such as those associated with the ending of the Cold War (e.g., Bosnia). It suggests that in many identity-based conflicts, historical memories of outrage and victimhood ( chosen traumas ) have persevered across centuries, thereby keeping the conflicting parties in history. The paper examines the role of virulent ethnocentrism in such intractable conflicts. It also examines the role of nature and nurture in embedding the universal tendency for humans to divide their species into them and us within a highly charged emotional context. The paper argues that the complexity of these conflicts has at least four dimensions which challenge the skills and good intentions of third parties: 1. Under stress parties\u27 affective level (limbic brain) tends to override their cognitive level (neocortical brain), thereby enhancing the likelihood of experiencing feeling is believing instead of seeing is believing. Parties may then not be susceptible to the efforts of third parties which often occur at the cognitive level. Such efforts do not necessarily trickle down to the affective level where chosen traumas are buried. 2. Third parties may have to first deal with an original, historical conflict (e.g., Turkey-Armenia, 1915) before they can deal with one of its more recent variations (Azerbaijan-Armenia, 1990s). 3. Analytically, third parties should employ comprehensive approaches to capturing the complexity of historically-/identity-based conflicts. Otherwise their intentions to do no harm may not only fail, but may make matters worse. 4. Effective third party intervention may then call for coordination among multitrack actors performing different roles at the same or at different points in time; in effect, the collaboration and co-evolution of approaches corresponding to otherwise competing paradigms (e.g., Political Realism, Idealism, Marxism, Non-Marxist Radical Thought [NMRT}