Peer Effects, Financial Aid, and Selection of Students into Colleges and Universities: An Empirical Analysis

The goal of this paper is to develop predictions regarding market consequences of peer effects in higher education and to offer empirical evidence about the extent to which those predictions are borne out in the data. We develop a model in which colleges seek to maximize the quality of the educational experience provided to their students. From this model we deduce predictions about the hierarchy of schools that emerges in equilibrium, the allocation of students by income and ability among schools, and about the pricing policies that schools adopt. In the empirical analysis, we use both university-level data provided primarily by Petersons and student-level data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study obtained from the NCES. The findings of this paper suggest that there is a hierarchy of school qualities which is characterized by substantial stratification by income and ability. The evidence on pricing by ability is supportive of positive peer effects in educational achievement from high ability at the college level. However, the evidence on pricing also suggests that more highly ranked schools exercise some degree of market power. This is reflected in the substantial variation of price with income coupled with discounts to more able students that are modest at best.

School Finance Reform: Assessing General Equilibrium Effects

In 1994 the state of Michigan implemented one of the most comprehensive school finance reforms undertaken to date in any of the states. Understanding the effects of the reform is thus of value in informing other potential reform initiatives. In addition, the reform and associated changes in the economic environment provide an opportunity to assess whether a simple general equilibrium model can be of value in framing the study of such reform initiatives. In this paper, we present and use such a model to derive predictions about the effects of the reform on housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions. Broadly, our analysis implies that the effects of the reform and changes in the economic environment are likely to have been reflected primarily in housing prices and only modestly on neighborhood demographics. We find that evidence for the Detroit metropolitan area from the decade encompassing the reform is largely consistent with the predictions of the model.

The Practice and Proscription of Affirmative Action in Higher Education:An Equilibrium Analysis

The paper examines the practice of affirmative action and consequences of its proscription on the admission and tuition policies of institutions of higher education in a general equilibrium. Colleges are differentiated ex ante by endowments and compete for students that differ by race, household income, and academic qualification. Colleges maximize a quality index that is increasing in mean academic score of students, educational resources per student, an income-diversity measure, and a racial-diversity measure. The pool of potential nonwhite students has distribution of income and academic score with lower means than that of whites. In benchmark equilibrium, colleges may condition admission and tuition on race. In a computational model calibrated using estimates from related research, equilibrium has colleges offer tuition discounts and admission preference to nonwhites to promote racial diversity. Equilibrium entails a quality hierarchy of colleges, so the model predicts practices and characteristics of colleges along the hierarchy. Proscription of affirmative action requires that admission and tuition policies are race blind. Colleges then use the informational content about race in income and academic score in reformulating their optimal policies. Admission and tuition policies are substantially modified in equilibrium of the computational model, and both races are significantly affected. Representation of nonwhites falls significantly in all colleges. The drop is particularly pronounced in the top third of the quality hierarchy of colleges.

On the political economy of tax límits

We study the political economy of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restriction on housing markets, community composition, and types of taxes and expenditures undertaken by local governments. We characterize equilibrium when voters choose values of multiple policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, finding that tax limitations have very substantial effects on housing prices and the composition of communities. Political support for tax limits comes from suburban voters and from a subset of central-city voters. Support for tax limits come even from residents of communities that are not constrained by the limits

Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming

Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most-able students, and flat-rate vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that would inject private-school competition and increase technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to effect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding conditions like tuition constraints such as vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This can be accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. To explain this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Members of the economy vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good, and they vote on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision of the good, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of excludability and non-congestion are investigated. Comparative statics and computational analysis demonstrate properties of equilibrium.

Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational Benefits

School districts in the U.S. typically have multiple schools, centralized finance, and student assignment determined by neighborhood of residence. In many states, centralization is extending beyond the district level as states assume an increasing role in the finance of education. At the same time, movement toward increased public school choice, particularly in large urban districts, is growing rapidly. Models that focus on community-level differences in tax and expenditure policy as the driving force in determination of residential choice, school peer groups, and political outcomes are inadequate for analysis of multi-school districts and, hence, for understanding changing education policies. This paper develops a model of neighborhood formation and tax-expenditure policies in neighborhood school systems with centralized finance. Stratification across neighborhoods and their schools is likely to arise in equilibrium. Consequences of intra-district choice with and without frictions are characterized, including effects on the allocation of students across schools, tax and expenditure levels, student achievement, and household welfare.

Admitting Students to Selective Education Programs: Merit, Profiling, and Affirmative Action

For decades, colleges and universities have struggled to increase participation of minority anddisadvantaged students. Urban school districts confront a parallel challenge; minority and disadvantaged students are underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. In their referral and admission policies to such selective programs, school districts may potentially set different admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may potentially take account of differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop an econometric model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and profiling. Implementing the model for an urban district, we find profiling by race and income, and affirmative action for low-income students. Counterfactual analysis reveals that these policies achieve more than 80% of African American enrollment that could be attained by race-based affirmative action