Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach

Characterization and regulation of the expression of scyllatoxin (Leiurotoxin I) receptors in the human neuroblastoma cell line NB-OK 1

Abstract125I-[Tyr2]scyllatoxin allowed to label a single class of high-affinity receptors in membranes from the human neuroblastoma cell line NB-OK 1. The Kd of these receptors was 60 pM for scyllatoxin (Leiurotoxin I) and 20 pM for apamin and the Bmax was low (3.8 fmol/mg membrane protein). K+ increased toxin binding at low concentrations but exerted opposite effects at high concentrations. Ca2+, guanidinium and Na+ exerted only inhibitory effects on binding. Scyllatoxin binding sites were overexpressed 2.5-fold after a 24-h cell pretreatment with 2 mM butyrate. This effect was suppressed by cycloheximide

Les projets de procédure d'injonction structurelle en France face au droit de l'Union européenne

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Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform? Research Papers in Law, 5/2008

From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases

Les projets de procédure d'injonction structurelle en France face au droit de l'Union européenne

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Michelin II: A per se rule against rebates by dominant companies?

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La cour de justice des communautés européennes

Notes recueillies par Denis Chaïbi et corrigées par Monsieur Denis WaelbroeckCours donné en 2e licence et épreuve unique en Droit Européen ;2e licence en Droit International ;3e licence en Droit (cours à option)info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Coty, clarifying competition law in the wake of pierre fabre

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Une nouvelle approche à l'égard des abus de monopolisation? Quelques commentaires à propos du document de travail de la Commission européenne relatif à l'application de l'article 82 aux abus de monopolisation

In the context of the modernisation of the EC competition rules, the Commission published in December 2005 a « Discussion Paper » on the application of Article 82 EC to exclusionary abuses, calling for comments. This article considers the merits of the Discussion Paper and the scope for improvement. The principle emphasised in the Discussion Paper that an economic effects based approach should be taken to Article 82 EC is welcomed both for its realism and its greater coherency in relation to the approach taken under Article 81 EC and the merger regulation. The explicit recognition that competition law is there to protect consumers and not competitors and the adoption of an 'as effective competitor' test are also positive developments. Nonetheless, often in practice the Discussion Paper fails to translate this desire to reform into appropriate legal tests, often creating unjustified presumptions of dominance and abuse. In this regard, the possibility of presuming dominance on the basis of market shares alone, completely ignoring the dynamic nature of competition, appears particularly problematic. In the case of abuses, the Discussion Paper all too often creates presumptions based on irrelevant factors or conditions that are far too easily fulfilled (for example, the presumption of abuse in case of individualised quantitative rebates, even when these relate to an insignificant proportion of client requirements). Moreover, the defences are too rigid and narrowly defined, preventing economic efficiencies and commercial realities from being sufficiently taken into account. The wholesale transposal of the Article 81(3) EC test to Article 82 EC is particularly regrettable, given that the conditions of indispensibility and absence of elimination of competition appear not to fit in with an analysis of dominant companies' behaviour. Although no rule is perfect, it must not be forgotten that false positives are just as damaging to competition as false negatives. Failure to take this into account will have the paradoxical effect that competition policy in Europe will chill competition rather than fostering it. Nonetheless, any shortcomings of the Discussion Paper do not detract from its merits. It can only be hoped that later drafts of the Discussion Paper and/or future guidelines build on this already solid base in the spirit of the reform :a fairer, more realistic and economic based approach to Article 82 EC.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

When the judge prosecutes, power prevails over law

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