Navigating the minefield of the ESA review. ECMI Commentary No. 49 / 27 February 2018

In its review of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the European Commission is proposing a radical expansion of the competences of the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), but without changing the final decision-making structure of the ESAs. Such a change of scale, creating important new powers for ESMA in capital markets’ supervisory functions for the EU-27, was not expected by most market participants. With the biggest financial centre soon leaving the EU, the review introduces some provisions on future cooperation with third countries but outside any strategic thinking about the competitiveness and attractiveness of the post-Brexit Capital Markets Union (CMU)

A Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover Regulation. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2012

Takeovers are one-off events, altering control and strategy within an organisation. But the chances of becoming the target of a bid, even where remote, daily influence corporate decision-making. Takeover rules are therefore central to company law and the balance of power among managers, shareholders and stakeholders alike. This study analyses the corporate governance drivers underpinning takeover bid regulations and assesses the implementation of the EU Directive on takeover bids and compares it with the legal framework of nine other major jurisdictions, including the US. It finds that similar rules have different effects depending on company-level and country-level characteristics and considers the use of modular legislation and optional provisions to cater for them

The Forum of European Securities Commissions (Fesco): an Answer to the Needs of a European Single Market for Financial Services

This article describes the role of Fesco. It allows regulators to express their viewpoints to European authorities, and to establish standards. Fesco has concentrated its actions on four issues : financial operations, market organisation, financial intermediaries, and market integrity. JEL Classifications : G18Demarigny Fabrice. The Forum of European Securities Commissions (Fesco): an Answer to the Needs of a European Single Market for Financial Services . In: Revue d'économie financière (English ed.), n°60, 2000. Security and financial regulation. pp. 125-133

Le Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) : une première réponse aux besoins de régulation du marché unique des services financiers

Fesco (Forum of european securities commissions) : a preliminary answer to regulatory needs in the european markets of financial services This article describes the role of Fesco. It allows regulators to express their viewpoints to european authorities, and to establish standards. Fesco has concentrated its actions on four issues : financial operations, market organisation, financial intermediaries, and market integrity. Classification JEL : G18Fabrice Demarigny (Secrétaire général de Fesco) décrit le fonctionnement et le rôle de Fesco. Fesco est une structure institutionnelle originale qui regroupe les régulateurs européens et travaille en étroite concertation avec les autorités européennes. Les hauts responsables de la Commission européenne participent aux réunions de Fesco. De manière réciproque, Fesco participe aux réunions du Financial Services Policy group (ESPPG) et à celles du groupe de haut niveau des régulateurs de marché. Fabrice Demarigny montre que Fesco a pour rôle d’exprimer le point de vue des régulateurs auprès des autorités européennes et d’établir des standards qui permettent de préciser les directives. Fesco est intervenu plus particulièrement dans quatre domaines en matière de régulation des marchés en Europe : les opérations financières réalisées par les sociétés cotées, l’organisation des marchés et des systèmes de transactions alternatifs, les intermédiaires financiers et les questions d’intégrité du marché. Classification JEL : G18Demarigny Fabrice. Le Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) : une première réponse aux besoins de régulation du marché unique des services financiers. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°60, 2000. Sécurité et régulation financières. pp. 125-134

Holland Hospital Home Health Telemonitor Initiatives

Electronic telemonitoring systems have been used in homecare settings to allow close nursing supervision of patient data and rapid response to changes in patient status while allowing patients to maintain control of their care. The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationship between insurance status and hospital readmission rates for participants within a telehealth initiative research study. Dorthea Orem’s Self-Care Theory suggests self-reliance and responsibility for personal care improves illness prevention and health outcomes. Using Orem’s theory as a guideline, ninety-five participants were included in this retrospective chart review. Participants were selected through a convenience sample from a community hospital home health agency in the Midwest over a three-month period. Of the 95 patients, 21.1% (n=20) were monitored using telehealth. Data were analyzed using SPSS version 23. The top three admitting diagnoses for readmitted telehealth patients included: cardiac (73.7%, n=14), pulmonary (42.1%, n= 8), and renal (26.3%, n=5). There was not a significant relationship between insurance status and telehealth monitoring (χ2 = 2.144a, p= 0.709). Some limitations to this study include a small sample size, inclusion of patients readmitted more than once throughout the three-month study period, a lack of accurate census of total telehealth patients, and single site data collection. This research implicates the need for further research in the effectiveness of telehealth and the prevention of hospital readmission. Using telehealth routinely in the home care setting may allow for increased patient autonomy, safety, and overall promotion of health

Les investisseurs institutionnels : des actionnaires neutres ?

Demarigny Fabrice. Les investisseurs institutionnels : des actionnaires neutres ?. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°31, 1994. Corporate governance : Le gouvernement d’entreprise. pp. 109-118

Translation (French to English) - Independent Administrative Authorities in France and the Case of the French Council for Competition

In G. Majone (ed), Regulating Europe, Routledge: Oxford, 157-179. ISBN: 978041514296