Social Protection: Why the EU Needs to Deliver

Conventional wisdom in European studies has long held that social policy is not anarea in which the European Union can make a large difference. Solidarity, it is said, can onlydevelop in societies where clear boundaries exist between individuals. Such is not the casein the EU, where a citizen’s primary allegiance is to his own country. Redistribution being azero-sum game, the majority method of decision-making is required, which may only beviable if the legitimacy of central institutions is clearly established. The legitimacy of the EUinstitutions, however, is said to be weak. In addition, a number of different traditions ofwelfare protection co-exist within the EU, as has been stressed by Gösta Esping-Andersen(1990). Citizens are strongly attached to their national brand of protection: in severalcountries, this is even regarded as a key element of national identity. The history ofEuropean integration has done little to belie these views. Social policy has experiencedrelatively modest progress, and the difficulties inherent in the adoption of European financialperspectives, undermined by the evils of juste retour have shown that redistribution andunanimity are indeed at odds. This contribution purports to examine the problem from a uniquely differentperspective. It does not start by taking an ontological view of Europe, in which the EU’sactivities are determined by reference to what Europe is. Nor does it rest on any normativeviews. Instead, it presents evidence demonstrating that European citizens are becomingincreasingly aware of their standards of living and worried about their children’s future, andthat these sentiments nurture a political protest that is a potential source of instability for theEU unless met by an adequate political response.social policy; welfare state; democracy; public opinion

Towards an audiovisual media services directive: an analysis of the Commission's proposal. Egmont European Affairs Publication, 2006

The current “Television without frontiers” (TVWF) Directive constitutes the basic regulation of the European Community’s broadcasting policy. Adopted in 1989, the Directive provides for the free movement of television broadcasting services in the Union as it requires Member States to guarantee the freedom of reception and transmission on their territory of television programmes which originate from other Member States. Consequently, the Directive harmonized certain national programming and advertising rules. With the aim of protecting the European TV market, it also introduced broadcasting quota for European and independent works. In the light of the rapid developments in the television sector, a revision of the Directive took place in 1997. Since 2002, the Commission is engaged in a new revision process in order to modernise the rules on televised services. It has also examined the possibility to extend the scope of these rules to cover all services which have an audiovisual content, including new media services delivered by Internet, email, mobile communication, etc. On 13 December 2005, the Commission eventually adopted the legislative proposal for the revision of the Directive. The aim of this paper is to analyse the Commission’s strategy in reviewing the regulatory framework. First, we will shortly discuss and evaluate the underlying principles of the present Directive. We will subsequently take a look at the elements which require a revision of the Directive. Third, we will examine the Commission’s proposal and we will conclude with some critical comments

The Making of a Transnational Constitution: An Institutionalist Perspective on the European Convention

No matter how one evaluates the product of its work, the Convention on the Future ofEurope has marked a turning point in the history of European integration. This article is divided into three parts. The first presents the different actors who participated in the Convention and the cleavages that existed within the assembly. The secondpart addresses the impact of these cleavages and the logics that shaped the final compromise.In the third part, we will attempt to analyze the respective importance of these variousdecision-making modes and the variables that determined their relative influence. Goingbeyond the classical opposition between deliberation and negotiation often used to describethe work of the Convention, we will argue that the choices made on the composition andfunctioning of the Convention had a strong influence on its work, and therefore, on thesubstance of the draft constitution.Constitution for Europe; European Convention

Change and Continuity in European Governance

Since the mid 1990s, European governance has evolved substantially, particularly in thedirection of fewer constraints: flexibility, coordination, peer monitoring, and soft law havebecome fashionable themes. The literature on new modes of governance (or NMGs) hasflourished alongside these transformations. But is the existence of new instruments ofgovernance necessarily synonymous with an innovative way of doing things? Is it really thecase that NMGs now play a central role in EU policy-making? Are we witnessing theemergence of an entirely new system of governance at the European level? In order toaddress these questions, this paper begins by briefly making the point that the concept ofgovernance is better suited to describing the way public policy is conducted in the EuropeanUnion, than that of government. It then moves to a discussion of the main trends that areidentified as NMGs in order to assess to what extent they can properly be described asnew. This is followed by an overview of more traditional forms of EU action, which showsthat old governance has far from disappeared.The European system of governance is thus a good example of change in continuity: oldand new are not mutually exclusive and this hybrid situation may in part be due to the greatcontiguity that exists between new modes of governance and their forerunners. New modesof governance are best analysed as an accentuation of the original features of the system,rather than as outright innovations. Both were largely conceived to respond to the sameneed, to provide a framework for interstate cooperation without leading to an unwanteddegree of centralisation. This is not without analogy with the metaphor of the marble cake,used over a century ago by Morton Grodzins to describe the coexistence of several varietiesof federalism in American government. Pure innovations are rare in the world of governance.directives; European law; governance; legitimacy; multilevel governance; open coordination; policy coordination; soft law

The nuclear safety framework in the European Union after Fukushima. Egmont Paper No. 73, December 2014

Summary. On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design, insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examination of nuclear reactor security in Europe. It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe. Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether. This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided. The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland. Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress tests’. Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles, and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has established a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines. In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States. Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The intervention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Community method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar mechanism that deserves more attention

Fédéralisme, asymétrie et interdépendance : aux origines de l’action internationale des composantes de l’État fédéral

This article deals with a problem relatively neglected by studies devoted to the foreign relations of federated states, namely the reasons that impel the member Itates of some federations to develop foreign affairs policy independently of each other. Several types of factors are taken into consideration. It appears that the growing interdependence of industrialized countries leads to both an increase and a diversification of international contacts between public authorities, thus undermining he traditional monopoly held by external affairs departments. This phenomenon, however, does not arise to the same degree in all federations, suggesting that internal factors may equally play a major role. The composite character and above all the asymmetry of some federations have, clearly enough, centrifugal effects. But the influence of institutional variables must not be neglected: the combination of a particularly pronounced asymmetry together with weaknesses n the representation accorded at the national level to different regions making up the federation probably explain the activism shown by Belgium's linguistic communities and some Canadian provinces

The reform of the EU courts (IV). The Need for a Better Focus on the European Court of Justice’s Core Mission. Egmont Paper 96, September 2017

In recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has sometimes been accused of judicial activism, especially in Great Britain. This accusation is far from new. In 1993, Margaret Thatcher declared to the House of Lords that ‘some things at the Court are very much to our distaste’.1 Before that, Michel Debré had even evoked the Court’s ‘pathological megalomania’.2 From a technical point of view, Rasmussen published a seminal comment in the 1980s,3 and many others followed. There is now a huge volume of literature on the subject

Social protection

Conventional wisdom in European studies has long held that social policy is not an area in which the European Union can make a large difference. Solidarity, it is said, can only develop in societies where clear boundaries exist between individuals. Such is not the case in the EU, where a citizen’s primary allegiance is to his own country. Redistribution being a zero-sum game, the majority method of decision-making is required, which may only be viable if the legitimacy of central institutions is clearly established. The legitimacy of the EU institutions, however, is said to be weak. In addition, a number of different traditions of welfare protection co-exist within the EU, as has been stressed by Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990). Citizens are strongly attached to their national brand of protection: in several countries, this is even regarded as a key element of national identity. The history of European integration has done little to belie these views. Social policy has experienced relatively modest progress, and the difficulties inherent in the adoption of European financial perspectives, undermined by the evils of “juste retour” have shown that redistribution and unanimity are indeed at odds (...)

The Unmaking of a Constitution: Lessons from the European Referenda

The reference to a so-called “European Constitution” rendered recourse to referenda practically inevitable. Because it suggests a radical departure from the past, the term would inevitably affect how the constitutional treaty would be ratified. In a number of countries, the modifications of European treaties must in any case be submitted to a popular vote. In France, the idea of a referendum advanced by a number of personalities such as the president of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, received the approval of leaders of all political groups consulted by the President of the Republic. Jacques Chirac underscored that it was “logical” to consult the people on the future of European institutions. In a period in which distrust in the political class is considerable, opposition to popular consultation risked accusations of elitist arrogance, which no political leader could get away with easily (...)