A Jumbo Financial Instrument for EU External Action? Bertelsmann Stiftung Commentary 19 February 2019

By proposing to integrate 11 existing financial instruments into a unified Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the European Commission hopes to both simplify its spending on external action under the EU’s general budget for 2021-2027 and make it more effective. Can the NDICI – by overcoming unnecessary budgetary fragmentation and overlap – also be an instrument facilitating the Union’s ‘integrated approach’ to external conflict and crisis? As the proposal now stands, there are still a number of blind spots that could undermine its effective contribution to a multidimensional, multi-level, multilateral and multi-phased approach to address fragility and instability in third countries. The current external financing instruments of the EU, as established under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), have struggled to provide enough coherence and flexibility in responding to today’s quickly shifting context. In the face of mounting instability in the neighbourhood (and beyond) and a sharp increase in refugee flows and migration, the key finding of a mid-term self-assessment by the Commission was the need for “more strategic and overarching programming” and “coherent interactions at the operational level in the renewed international context”. The need for flexibility and the problem of silo approaches similarly figure in an externally evaluated Coherence report and the European Parliament’s implementation assessment. In an effort to address these recommendations, the Commission has come up with a new and bold proposal for future spending on issues relating to the neighbourhood, development and international cooperation. By merging the 11 existing instruments outlined below (cf. Table 1) into one financial instrument, the NDICI seeks to increase simplification, coherence, responsiveness and strategic direction in EU external action

‘Coronationalism’ vs a geopolitical Europe? CEPS Policy Contribution 23 JUN 2020.

EU member states have been discussing how to deal with the socio-economic repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, collectively. While lively debates about internal solidarity continue, there is also the pressing issue of how the EU and its member states wish to support third countries, outside the EU, in tackling their health and economic emergencies. On the one hand, the EU wishes to become a geopolitical power, which demands that the Union and its member states step up their supportive role on the global scene. On the other, there are signs of ‘coronationalism,’ with some national political parties questioning the timing of EU external aid when member states themselves are struggling. Based on expert contributions from a representative cross-section of 13 member states, this paper delves into the question of whether and how external solidarity features in political and public discourse in Covid-struck Europe. It finds that, for now, neither coronationalist nor geopolitical ambitions dominate the relatively little politicised debates about international cooperation and development aid

Europe ́s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management The EU’s Integrated Approach between Political Rhetoric and Institutional Practice. November 2019

The European Union (EU) aspires to play a part in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace- building through civil and/or military operations, through stabilisation efforts, and by building resilience at home and abroad. To bring this ambition to fruition, EU institutions have gradually expanded their ‘comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis’ (CA) to become a full-fledged ‘integrated approach to conflict and crisis’ (IA).1 In their most basic form, CAs seek coordination and coherence in responding to external conflicts and crises by adopting a system-wide ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA). In their more elaborate form, IAs have incorpo- rated non-traditional security concepts, variously known as conflict transformation, (non-liberal) peacebuilding and human-security approaches. In their most expansive form, IAs may even be understood to apply to external action writ large

Bouteflexit: Leave means leave in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. CEPS Commentary, 23 April 2019

The popular protests in Algeria are, once again, a powerful reminder that the EU’s quiet endorsement of authoritarian regimes, for the sake of regional stability, will not prevent the people in the Southern Neighbourhood from voicing legitimate demands for social justice and democratic representation. Finding new, non-paternalistic ways to support and engage with grassroots movements and local civil society, rather than with the oppressive elites in power, is the only approach that can meet local calls for dignity while securing the EU’s long-term interests in stability in its neighbourhood

What Egypt’s El-Sisi and the EU have in common when it comes to women’s rights. CEPS Commentary, 30 October 2018

A young Egyptian woman by the name of Amal Fathy was given a fine and a two-year prison sentence on 29 September 2018. Her crime? Uploading a video on Facebook in May in which she shared her experiences of sexual harassment in Egypt and criticised the Egyptian government for failing to deliver to its citizens. Her sentence signalled a first controversial human rights violation on the part of the Egyptian government since the EU announced in-depth cooperation on migration with Egypt during the Salzburg summit. This sentence also takes place against the backdrop of continued support by both El-Sisi and the EU for the protection and promotion of women’s rights. Fathy’s case flies in the face of EU and Egyptian government rhetoric about women’s rights and raises questions about the sincerity of both actors’ agendas on the rights of women

Between feminism and unionism : the struggle for socio-economic dignity of working-class women in pre- and post-uprising Tunisia

Generally seen as a pawn in the identity struggle between so-called secular and Islamist political actors, the women's question in Tunisia has received little attention from a class perspective since the 2010-11 uprising. Yet, over recent years, working-class women have been highly visible during protests, strikes and sit-ins of a socio-economic nature, implicitly illustrating how class and gender grievances intersect. Against the background of the global feminisation of poverty and a changing political economy of the North African region over recent decades, this article builds on Nancy Fraser's theory of (gender) justice to understand if and how women's informal and revolutionary demands have been included in more formal politics and civil society activism in Tunisia. The article finds that disassociated struggles against patriarchy (feminism) and neoliberal capitalism (unionism) fail to efficiently represent women workers' own aspirations in Tunisia's nascent democracy

'La femme' before and after the Tunisian uprising : (dis)continuities in the configuration of women in the truth regime of 'Tunisianité'

The rights of Tunisian women have been safeguarded in the aftermath of Tunisia's popular uprising, despite initial and widespread fears of the contrary following the democratic victory of the Islamist Ennahdha party. Article 46 of the new constitution not only reinforces 'les droits acquis' of Tunisian women, but also seeks to expand them. The post-uprising preservation of women's rights can be explained by the persistent hegemony of the image of the professional, modern and emancipated 'Femme Tunisienne' - since independence presented as a role model for women to live up to and its crucial role in the truth regime of Tunisian modernist identity ('Tunisianite'). In order to understand the (dis) continuities of this imaginary after the overthrow of Ben Ali, the paper traces the origins of the hegemonic yet ambiguous 'Femme' and discusses the role of Tunisia's women's movements in its reconstruction since the uprising