Growth and business cycles with imperfect credit markets

We study the process of growth and business cycles in an open economy which has access to international ¯nancial markets. The ¯nancial market imperfection originates from costly state veri¯cation and a positive probability of default on loans. The degree of credit market imperfection is endogenously derived. The results show that developed economies are able to borrow on easier terms than emerging countries. The credit market imperfection may cause some economies to fall into a development trap if the initial endowment of capital is too low. The ¯nancial market frictions also generate interesting business cycle dynamics. Financial market imperfections help in replicating the empirical fact that output growth shows positive autocorrelation at short horizons. The model also predicts that a poorer economy will experience a more severe and persistent e®ect on investment and output due to an exogenous shock. --Costly state verification,Credit markets,Growth,Business Cycles

Poverty traps and growth in a model of endogenous time preference

We study the effect of endogenous time preference in a simple neo-classical model of growth. The variation of time preference causes the economy to have multiple steady states, some of which are similar to poverty traps. The stability properties of these steady states are analyzed. The results are interpreted in light of the growth experiences of developing economies. The model can explain why two economies that have identical production technologies and identical preferences may converge to different levels of income depending on initial conditions. --Intertemporal choice,Saving,Growth,Local stability,Poverty traps

Inequality, politics and economic growth

The paper studies the relationship between inequality and economic growth. This is done in a two sector model of endogenous growth with agents characterized by heterogeneity of factor endowments. The private sector consists of a large number of competitive ¯rms who produce the only ¯nal good in the economy. This good is both consumable as well as accumulable. The government is seen to produce a productive factor interpreted as infrastructure. Infrastructure is both nonrival and accumulable. Infrastructural services °ow into the production of infrastructural stocks as well as the ¯nal good. Capital used for infrastructural production is ¯nanced by the government by taxing capital income. The choice of the growth rate is determined by the tax rate on capital income. We study the choice of the economy's growth rate under a median voter democracy. The results show that inequality of the distribution of capital does not hamper growth. --Endogenous growth,Infrastructure,Nonrival input,Welfare,Political equilibrium

Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets

We study the process of growth and business cycles in an open economy which has access to international financial markets. The financial market imperfection originates from costly state verification and a positive probability of default on loans. The degree of credit market imperfection is endogenously derived. The results show that developed economies are able to borrow on easier terms than emerging countries. The credit market imperfection may cause some economies to fall into a development trap if the initial endowment of capital is too low. The financial market frictions also generate interesting business cycle dynamics. Financial market imperfections help in replicating the empirical fact that output growth shows positive autocorrelation at short horizons. The model also predicts that a poorer economy will experience a more severe and persistent e.ect on investment and output due to an exogenous shock

Education and Growth in the Presence of Capital Flight

We study the effect of capital controls on the level of investment in human capital and the resulting growth path of an economy. The economy consists of two groups of agents based on the ownership of factors of production. One type of agents - called workers - own human capital and bequeath education to their offsprings. The other group of agents - called capitalists - own and bequeath physical capital. The workers have the political power to tax capital income. The capitalists, based on the tax rate imposed by the workers and the capital control regime in place, decide to invest part or all of their capital abroad. We characterize the optimal tax behavior of the workers. We find that higher capital controls are beneficial for investment in education whenever there is capital flight in a steady state equilibrium. However, higher capital controls are shown to have no effect on the tax rate on capital income imposed by workers: rather, they act as a disincentive for capital flight by lowering the return from foreign investment. We show that lowering capital controls can lead to higher growth only when there is no capital flight in the steady state. Importantly, to prevent capital flight in the long run, human capital accumulation must not show decreasing returns with respect to education and the economy must be sufficiently developed.

Education, Growth, and Redistribution in the Presence of Capital Flight

The conventional wisdom in the literature on capital controls and growth argues that capital controls increase the ability of a government to tax capitalists which proves detrimental for growth. To address this issue, we construct an OLG model to study the effect of capital controls on human capital investments and the incidence of redistributive taxation in a growing economy. We argue to the contrary: i.e., the conventional wisdowm linking higher capital controls to lower growth is reproduced only when an economy is sufficiently developed. For under-developed countries, higher capital controls can induce balanced growth, and the wisdom does not apply. When the model is augmented with a subsistence sector, we show that if workers are sufficiently poor, then workers do not invest in human capital. Hence, a modern sector does not exist. Higher capital controls however makes it feasible for a modern sector to exist by lowering the threshold income level required by workers to invest in human capital. Our results are consistent with recent evidence which show that, while financial liberalizations are associated with significant increases in growth, the effect is larger for countries with high education levels. Our results are also consistent with empirical evidence that argues that liberalizing the capital account positively affects growth only after a country has achieved a certain degree of economic development.

Why do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a "utility" good and a "health" good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent-income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: "The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent income". We test this implication for the savings behaviour in Australia. We show that even after controlling for life-cycle characteristics permanent income and savings are positively correlated. An improvement in the health leads to a positive effect on savings behaviour.Saving; Inter-temporal Choice; Health; Income Distribution

Education and growth in the presence of capital flight

We study the effect of capital controls on the level of investment in human capital and the resulting growth path of an economy. The economy consists of two groups of agents based on the ownership of factors of production. One type of agents - called workers - own human capital and bequeath education to their offsprings. The other group of agents - called capitalists - own and bequeath physical capital. The workers have the political power to tax capital income. The capitalists, based on the tax rate imposed by the workers and the capital control regime in place, decide to invest part or all of their capital abroad. We characterize the optimal tax behavior of the workers. We find that higher capital controls are beneficial for investment in education whenever there is capital flight in a steady state equilibrium. However, higher capital controls are shown to have no effect on the tax rate on capital income imposed by workers: rather, they act as a disincentive for capital flight by lowering the return from foreign investment. We show that lowering capital controls can lead to higher growth only when there is no capital flight in the steady state. Importantly, to prevent capital flight in the long run, human capital accumulation must not show decreasing returns with respect to education and the economy must be sufficiently developed.

Why do the Rich Save More? A Theory and Australian Evidence

We provide a theory to explain the existence of inequality in an economy where agents have identical preferences and have access to the same production technology. Agents consume a “utility” good and a “health” good which determines their subjective discount factor. Depending on initial distribution of capital the economy gets separated into different permanent-income groups. This leads to a testable hypothesis: “The rich save a larger proportion of their permanent income”. We test this implication for the savings behaviour in Australia. We show that even after controlling for life-cycle characteristics permanent income and savings are positively correlated. An improvement in the health leads to a positive effect on savings behaviour