Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Such auctions are commonly used, both formally and informally. In formal auctions, the seller restricts bids to an ordered set, such as an equity share or royalty rate, and commits to a format, such as first or second-price. In informal settings with competing buyers, the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront. Rather, bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex-post. We characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies for formal and informal auctions. For formal auctions, we examine the impact of both the security design and the auction format. We define a notion of the steepness of a set of securities, and show that steeper securities lead to higher revenues. We also show that the revenue equivalence principle holds for equity and cash auctions, but that it fails for debt (second-price auctions are superior) and for options (a first-price auction yields higher revenues). We then show that an informal auction yields the lowest possible revenues across all possible formal mechanisms. Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the effects of liquidity constraints, different information assumptions, and aspects of moral hazard.

Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions.

We propose a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion bias; that is, they fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive. We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social influence, whereby one’s influence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the social network that determines communication. Persuasion bias also implies the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions; that is, individuals’ opinions over a multidimensional set of issues converge to a single “left-right” spectrum. We explore the implications of our model in several natural settings, including political science and marketing, and we obtain a number of novel empirical implications.

A Model of Persuasion - With Implications for Financial Markets

We propose a model of the phenomenon of persuasion. We argue that individual beliefs evolve in a way that overweights the opinions and information of individuals whom they "listen to" relative to other individuals. Such agents can be understood to be acting as though they believe they listen to a representative sample of the individuals with valuable information, even though they may not. We analyze dynamics and convergence of beliefs, characterizing when agents' beliefs converge over time to the same beliefs, and when they instead diverge. Convergent beliefs can be characterized as the weighted average of agents' initial beliefs, and these weights can be interpreted as a measure of ``influence.'' We then explore implications in an asset trading setting. Here we demonstrate that agents profit from being influential as well as being accurate. When agents' choice of whom to listen to is endogenous, we show that an individual's influence can be persistent, even though the individual may be inaccurate.

Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements

We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion regarding the timing of its release. While it is well known that firms appear to delay the release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the economy (or the industry) affects this decision. We develop a dynamic model of strategic disclosure in which a firm may privately receive information at a time that is random (and independent of the state of the economy). Because investors are uncertain regarding whether and when the firm has received information, the firm will not necessarily disclose the information immediately. We show that bad news about the economy can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good news about the economy can slow the release of information by firms. As a result, the release of negative information tends to be clustered. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preempt the arrival of external information by disclosing their own information first. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock and market returns

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

We examine the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also incorrect to translate higher taxes paid by banks to a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any desirable public subsidies to banks’ activities should be given directly and not in ways that encourage leverage. Finally, suggestions that high leverage serves a necessary disciplining role are based on inadequate theory lacking empirical support. We conclude that bank equity is not socially expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially valuable functions, including lending, taking deposits and issuing money-like securities. To the contrary, better capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is socially optimal, and, viewed from an ex ante perspective, high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social costs. Approaches based on equity dominate alternatives, including contingent capital. To achieve better capitalization quickly and efficiently and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control equity payouts and issuance. If remaining challenges are addressed, capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy.capital regulation, financial institutions, capital structure, too big to fail, systemic risk, bank equity, contingent capital, Basel.

Test design and minimum standards

We analyze test design and certification standards when an uninformed seller has the option to generate and disclose costly information regarding asset quality. We characterize equilibria by a minimum principle: the test and disclosure policy are chosen to minimize the asset’s value conditional on nondisclosure. Thus, when sellers choose the information provided, simple pass/fail certification tests are likely to dominate the market. A social planner could raise informational and allocative efficiency, and lower deadweight testing costs, by raising the certification standard. Monopolist certifiers also satisfy the minimum principle but set a higher standard and reduce testing rates to maximize revenue

Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns.

Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements

We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion regarding the timing of its release. While it is well known that firms appear to delay the release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the economy (or the industry) affects this decision. We develop a dynamic model of strategic disclosure in which a firm may privately receive information at a time that is random (and independent of the state of the economy). Because investors are uncertain regarding whether and when the firm has received information, the firm will not necessarily disclose the information immediately. We show that bad news about the economy can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good news about the economy can slow the release of information by firms. As a result, the release of negative information tends to be clustered. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preempt the arrival of external information by disclosing their own information first. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock and market returns