The Buddhist Text Known in Pāli as Milindapañha and in Chinese as Nàxiān bǐqiū jīng 那先比丘經. Some Philological Remarks and the Problem of the Archetype

This article is conceived as an introduction to questions concerning the relationship between various versions of a Buddhist text known in its Pāli variant as Milindapañha, and in its Chinese versions as Nàxiān bǐqiū jīng (那先比丘經; T 1670 versions A and B). After a brief account of the conjectures about its redactor(s) and its public of the original Indian environment, the Chinese versions of the text will be dealt with in more detail, with particular attention to the Western reception and the problem related to the reconstruction of a possible archetype. The guidelines provided by Gérard Fussman will be taken into consideration, with some additional comments regarding the suggestion, in the case of the Chinese versions, of taking the Chinese audience into account. To confirm this point, a passage with an eristic dialogue, attested in both Pāli and in Chinese, will be analysed in detail to show how the Chinese translator(s) modified the text for the benefit of the public

Note a margine su natura demoniaca, sessualità e donna in Bhagavadgītā As It Is di A. C. Bhaktivedānta Svāmī Prabhupāda

The article analyses three recurring concepts in the Bhagavadgītā As It Is written by Bhaktivedānta Svāmī Prabhupāda (the founder of the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement): the demoniac nature, the sexuality, and the woman. The research investigates the use and meaning of these three concepts and how they are linked to each other by a basic doctrine of aversion of materiality. The doctrine of Svāmī Prabhupāda will be defined a “Traditional Worldly Asceticism” as a result of a comparison between the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement and the works and ideas of western scholars such as Wilhelm Halbfass and Max Weber

Osservazioni sull’esposizione della creazione del corpo fatto di mente (manomaya-kāya) all’interno del Sāmaññaphala-sutta

This article will analyse in detail some features of a passage which describes the creation of a mind-made body (manomaya-kāya) within the Sāmaññaphala-sutta. The study starts from the translation of the term ‘manomaya’, which could have more than one grammatical interpretation. The point at issue is that both the commentarial tradition and a scholar who discussed this problem (Sue Hamilton) understand the compound with the first term (mano/manas) inflected in the instrumental case. I will argue that an interpretation, according to the genitive case, cannot be completely disregarded. Subsequently, the translation of a couple of terms (muñja and isīkā) will be discussed, having a look to modern translation, to the Buddhist world view, and to the use of these terms within some Vedic texts. Finally, an odd wording of a passage will be analysed, and the comparison with the use of the same passage in a later exegetic text will highlight the conservative feature of the tradition of Pāli texts